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PREFACE
War preparations stir the deepest of human emotions, 
and inevitably in a free society public debate occurs over 
the exigency of preparedness, a complex process which in­
cludes the conduct of foreign affairs as well as programs 
of domestic defense. In the United States such a great 
debate began in the 1930's concerning the relationship be­
tween America and a Europe on the verge of war. Many Ameri­
cans maintained in the name of defense that the United 
States should build high the walls on the western side of 
the Atlantic Ocean and isolate itself from the evils of 
decadent Europe. Others insisted that America must support 
Britain, France, and the other European democracies if 
Adolph Hitler continued to threaten them.
Such division of opinion over foreign policy be­
came an American tradition in the early years of the Republic. 
Engendered by geographical separation from Europe and propa­
gated by Washington's Farewell Address, isolationism de­
veloped as a basic theme in American foreign policy. The 
doctrine flourished after World War I owing to the new 
vogue for the old Marxian accusation that the perpetrators 
of economic determinism— international bankers and munitions
iii
makers— were the cause of all wars, past and present.
Senator Gerald P. Nye and other national leaders 
gave this hypothesis its greatest hearing in the 1930's 
when they investigated the role of munitions makers in 
World War I . Nye's report was an endorsement of the overly 
simple revisionist arguments of the 1920's, that business­
men had pushed America into war. Convinced that Nye and 
his supporters were right, Americans buttressed their small 
world against the dangers of the larger one by the only 
way they knew, the legislative process. The neutrality 
laws were the result, isolationists reasoned that if the 
government prohibited American citizens from traveling on 
belligerent merchant ships no Lusitania incidents would 
occur again. They also reasoned that if loans were denied 
to belligerents and traffic in arms and ammunition banned, 
the "merchants of death" would be kept in their place.
Unfortunately isolationism did not deal realisti­
cally with the growing threat of the totalitarian powers. 
Interventionists who recognized this potential danger would 
have their day later, when the Nazi war machine began to 
move. In the meantime President Roosevelt attempted to 
prepare the nation for war by initiating a defense program 
at home and lending support abroad to the British and French
iv
in their efforts to counter German advances. This move to­
ward involvement in a European problem precipitated the great 
foreign policy debate at the close of the 1930's.
The business community, including industrial, fi­
nancial, and commercial interests, has left a record of 
its reactions to Roosevelt's preparedness program. Resolu­
tions passed by trade associations, speeches and letters 
of individual business leaders, editorial opinion in busi­
ness publications, as well as the records of the pre-war 
isolationist and interventionist organisations, all reveal 
the conflicting views of business before Pearl Harbor. 
Examination of these sources indicates that even though the 
opprobrium cast upon industry and finance by the Nye Commit­
tee and the Great Depression caused business leaders to be 
considered warmongers, both isolationist and interventionist 
segments of business were concerned with the wider ramifi­
cations of foreign policy. This study will attempt to de­
termine the role business played in foreign policy during 
the five years prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and to dis­
cover whether business succeeded in influencing Roosevelt 
in the formulation of his preparedness program.
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CHAPTER I
BUSINESS AND THE EARLY EFFORTS FOR 
REARMAMENT, 1937-1939
The peace treaties of 1919, ending World War I, 
failed in their design to establish permanent international 
amity. The Versailles combination of idealism and Realpoli- 
tik did not deter the "have-not" nations from demanding 
more prominent positions in the world community. After the 
Nazis ravaged the Weimar Republic in 1933, the Fuehrer soon 
instituted a reign of terror throughout Europe to regain 
German territories lost in 1919. Subsequent to authorizing 
universal military service and rearmament— both forbidden 
by the Versailles Treaty— Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland 
and attempted to unite Austria with the Third Reich. South 
of the Alps Benito Mussolini implemented his own expansionist 
policy, but wasted his resources trying to recapture the 
glories of ancient Rome in Ethiopia and other African lands.
The European crisis alarmed Americans, although 
Japanese expansion in the Orient seemed a greater threat
1
to American interests. Acquisition of Korea in 1910 and 
Manchuria in 1931 and 1932 did not fulfill the goals of 
Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which re­
served the natural resources of China and Southeast Asia 
for Japanese industrial use. The thought of a threat to 
China was revolting to the American public, instilled with 
the "missionary myth" and the eternal though unsatisfied 
hope for increased foreign trade with the Chinese, japan 
ignored these old, emotional ties between the United States 
and China, and attacked Shanghai and other Nationalist 
strongholds in late summer, 1937.
American reaction to these aggressions varied, 
although national opinion was united in its insistence upon 
nonintervention in foreign wars. This reservation resulted 
from American disillusionment over participation in World 
War I, which had not made the world safe for democracy, as 
President Wilson promised. instead, the establishment of 
a Communist government in Russia and the outbreak of minor 
wars elsewhere convinced the public in the 1920's that as 
far as the creation of a Wilsonian utopia was concerned. 
World War I had been a wasted effort. Adding to American 
disillusion over entry into the war was the belief that 
greedy bankers and munitions makers had forced the nation
into the conflict for the purpose of reaping huge profits 
from the sale of materiel and supplies to the Allies. 
Marxists, socialists, and progressives who had been preach­
ing this doctrine now found Americans receptive to the thesis 
that business was the major cause of war.
Anti-business elements buttressed their arguments 
with support from singular sources. The Anglophile Thomas 
W. Lament, senior partner of J. P. Morgan and Company, gave 
credence to the warmongering charge when in 1920 he admitted 
that his firm had never been neutral between 1914 and 1917 
because "we didn't know how to be."^ During the Great De­
pression further impetus was given to anti-business accusa­
tions. Publication of Helmuth C. Engelbrecht's Merchants 
of Death in 1934, and the Munitions Investigation Committee 
report in 1935, helped convince Americans that businessmen 
had influenced President Wilson in his decision to enter 
the war. These sensational but unproven charges added to 
American foreign policy formulation a new force inspired by 
militant pacifism and latent Populism, which won the public 
over to the crusade against the capitalists.
When Americans lined up behind Senator Nye, apostle
^The Manchester Guardian, L (January 27, 1920),
p. 68.
of the new creed, business opinion began to crystalize in 
regard to what course foreign policy should take to meet 
Axis advances. Business approached this problem from such 
variegated viewpoints that the concept of a great monolithic 
financial-industrial force controlling foreign affairs may 
be removed from consideration. From the 1937 China incident 
until Pearl Harbor businessmen divided into isolationist 
and interventionist factions to support or oppose the Roose­
velt Administration's formulation of policy established in 
the Quarantine Speech, the repeal of the arms embargo, the 
destroyer deal, lend-lease, and the Atlantic Charter. On 
occasion businessmen, such as Thomas Lamont, expressed in 
strong terms their views on foreign policy but the majority 
v;as too shaken by the Nye committee attack and by the 1929 
financial collapse to follow Lamont's example. This element 
dared not air its views on international relations, espe­
cially pro-interventionist opinions, which in the public 
mind would confirm the Marxian claim that business was again 
plotting a profit-making war.
Most businessmen and other Americans were in no 
mood for saving threatened nations from totalitarianism, 
but the invasion of China did engender anti-Japanese senti­
ment, which President Roosevelt used to rnaugurate his
foreign policy. Following Japan's advance against the Chi­
nese in July, 1937, Roosevelt made his first attempt to 
convert Americans from their isolationist tenets to his 
own interventionism, in Chicago, on October 5, he declared 
that America's duty was to oppose aggressors threatening 
Europe and Asia; as with any epidemic disease states vio­
lating the law of nations should be "quarantined" and so 
held in check. The President's proposal astounded isola­
tionists and interventionists alike. Certain of Roosevelt's 
advisers known for their extreme caution, such as Cordell 
Hull, agreed that the speech succeeded only in dividing 
further the nation on foreign policy. They ignored the 
possibility that Americans might be sympathetic to inter­
vention and supported the Secretary of State's estimate
that the President actually set back his foreign policy
2
goals by at least six months. Hindsight affords great 
opportunity to criticize this view as negative and short­
sighted. But the hysterical, isolationist tone of the 
letters and telegrams pouring into the White House, combined 
with the influence of the Hearst and other journals, con­
stituted such formidable opposition to the Quarantine Speech
2
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 545.
that the President had ample cause for his temporary re­
treat from interventionism. Businessmen were as surprised 
as most Americans at the Quarantine Speech and, as either 
isolationists or interventionists, reacted to it in vary­
ing ways.
Prior to the speech The Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle reported to its readers that Roosevelt's journey 
to Chicago was only for the purpose of promoting the New 
Deal domestic program. There had been no hint that a new
3
phase of the great foreign policy debate was then to begin. 
The novelty of the quarantine idea led The Wall Street 
Journal skeptically to ask what Americans intended to do 
about it. The Journal's own answer was "nothing," because 
its editors doubted that public opinion would support any 
sort of internationalism.'^ In more direct fashion Business 
Week insisted Roosevelt's words forced Americans to "put 
up or shut up" and, in the case of the first alternative,
5
involvement in war was a definite possibility. If war 
did break out. Gas Age's Floyd W. Parsons, speaking for
3
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLV 
(October 16, 1937), p. 2290.
^The Wall Street Journal, October 7, 3 937, p. 14.
^Business Week, October 16, 1937, p. 40.
isolationism, took comfort in America's advantage of being 
insulated from world disorder by the Atlantic and pacific 
oceans.^
Save for Editor Parsons, business reaction to 
the Quarantine Speech was moderate in comparison to Hearst 
and other isolationists. Upon reflection. The Wall Street 
Journal admitted that if the United States did not involve 
itself in world affairs war was more likely than otherwise, 
"so why not participate before war c o m e s ? T o  support 
the Journal * s logic Business Week added that Nazi policies 
closely followed Hitler's aggressive intentions published
O
years before in Mein Kampf. The editors of these publi­
cations recognized the dangers outlined by Roosevelt but 
still were reluctant to suggest any specific course of ac­
tion that might bring censure from the foes of the business 
community. The Commercial and Financial chronicle explored 
the effect that enforcement of the Nine-Power Treaty of 
1922 would have against aggressors and decided that such 
action might impair the world position of the United States
^Floyd W. Parsons, "Highlights," Gas Age, LXXX 
(October 14, 1937), p. 49.
7
The Wall Street Journal, October 8, 1937, p. 10.
0
Business Week, November 13, 1937, p. 15.
8rather than eliminate any crisis. But whatever came to 
pass, business opinion held that Roosevelt must maintain 
his pledge to keep America out of war and, if he failed, 
bear responsibility for the consequences. The business 
community in general, however, accepted the President's 
promise that he would avoid intervention in future inter­
national incidents.^
In contrast to the faint enthusiasm displayed by 
their press, individual business leaders joined other inter­
ventionists in congratulating the President, industrialist 
Owen D. young, who had played a prominent role in the 1929 
revision of the German reparations plan, hoped that the 
quarantine declaration would make America and the world 
demand that all nations, especially the aggressors Germany, 
Italy, and Japan, respect the law of nations. Young felt 
that since too few world leaders were speaking out on the 
steadily worsening international situation Roosevelt's 
words were a needed inducement for presidents and premiers 
everywhere to censure erring n a t i o n s . E q u a l l y
9
The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CXLV 
(October 16, 1937), p. 2291.
^^Telegram, Owen D. Young to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
October 5, 1937, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal 
File, Box 200 B.
commendatory was David M. Newbold, chairman of the executive 
committee of the Welsbach Street Illuminating Company of 
Philadelphia, who ranked the speech in greatness with the 
Monroe Doctrine. To him, Roosevelt’s message was a stan­
dard raised high "around which the free and Civilized People 
of the world can rally to sustain Christian Civilization." 
Newbold fully agreed with Roosevelt that America must recog-
11
nize her obligation to uphold international law in the world. 
These encouragements, although approaching the adulation 
used by Secretary Henry J. Morgenthau, failed to spur Roose­
velt further toward interventionism, because Hull's advice 
to delay in the face of isolationist opposition seemed the 
more realistic course to follow.
Certain businessmen not only congratulated Roose­
velt but also attempted to analyze the effect of the speech 
abroad. The Wall Street broker S. R. Bertron discerned that 
Roosevelt had the support of the democracies and possibly 
that of Germany in promoting peace. German acceptance was 
important because it meant automatic Italian support for 
such a scheme. But he feared the third aggressor, Japan, 
was too independent of the Third Reich to formulate
^^David M. Newbold to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
October 7, 1937, In ibid.
10
policies according to the desires of the German foreign 
ministry. Regardless of the fact that the speech v;as aimed 
mainly at japan, Bertron believed it a success because the 
leading nations, with the exception of Nippon, backed the 
President's proposal. This was due to the perfect timing 
involved, for Bertron saw that it followed Roosevelt's new 
South American Good Neighbor Policy closely enough to bene­
fit from the successful Latin venture and thus ensure its 
own success. Since foreign governments were quoting Ameri­
can opinion and trying to woo Washington's cooperation, 
Bertron thought the least Roosevelt could do was to impart
his thoughts on world problems through such devices as the
12Quarantine Speech.
Thomas J. Watson, president of the international 
Chamber of Commerce, was traveling in Europe at the time 
of the speech and gave Roosevelt a first hand report on 
the reaction of various European leaders. He found that 
the address caused Europeans to "stop and think" and to 
welcome America's stand in favor of laying plans for peace 
once present aggressions were ended. Even Mussolini's pri­
vate professions for peace convinced Watson that words of
12S. R. Bertron to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October
7, 1937, in ibid.
11
encouragement from Roosevelt to the Duce— conveyed by the
Chamber President— might help relieve international ten- 
13
sions.
To complement Watson's European report others as­
sessed the effect of the speech in Asia and reflected the 
antiwar, although sometimes confused, feelings of business­
men. H. B. Lear, president of Seattle's University National 
Bank and an advocate of the traditional aristocratic view­
point regarding competition in American life, judged the 
Japanese Exclusion Act to be the source of Japanece-Ameri- 
can antagonism. Antilabor as well as antiwar, Lear blamed 
this "immoral" law on organized labor which, in the process 
of protecting native American workers, had humiliated one 
of America's most traditional friends in the international 
community. As a friend of Prince Tokagawa and other high­
born Japanese, Lear the internationalist urged Washington 
to make friendly gestures toward Japan rather than employ 
hostile action, which, paradoxically, Lear the isolationist 
defined as the proposed build-up of the United States Navy.^^
Thomas J. Watson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Octo­
ber 12, 1937, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
Box 2489.
14
H. B. Lear to Daniel C. Roper, October 9, 1937, 
Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 172.
12
Conciliation also was uppermost in the mind of 
Herbert S. Houston, a founder of the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States. Houston approved of Roosevelt's 
"strong and clear-headed and courageous handling" of the 
Far East problem but urged the Administration to respect 
Japan as the rising nation of Asia.^^ Houston thought this 
reality gave the Japanese the right to retain Manchuria 
and Korea since, during his recent visit to the Mikado's 
empire, he had found vassal states so prosperous and orderly 
that fifteen million Chinese had immigrated to Manchuria, 
and Korean students were praising japan for the progress 
that had come with annexation. These observations led 
Houston, obviously no initiate of the China Lobby, to sug­
gest that Japan be taken at her word and allowed to work 
out a "modified" diplomatic formula with China. He realized 
japan's incursions in Asia were much too "oriental" in char­
acter for Westerners to comprehend and filled Americans 
with bitterness. But rather than allow such attitudes to 
degenerate into a meeting of force with force Houston wanted 
Washington to settle this and other international disputes
Herbert S. Houston to Cordell Hull, December 
30, 1937, in Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, B.C., Box 42. Cited hereafter as Hull Papers.
13
by peaceful m e a n s . H o u s t o n ' s  efforts to prod the Admin­
istration toward a more flexible policy concerning japan 
failed, but his proposals indicate a realization that an 
unbending attitude assured eventual rupture in diplomatic 
relations between the two governments.
Houston's plea for the pacific settlement of dis­
putes reflected American business thinking on international 
problems, as seen in the policy of the National Association 
of Manufacturers, whose members were the especial target 
of the Nye Committee report. At the 1937 Congress of Ameri­
can Industry NAM members, hoping to extirpate their "war­
monger" image, announced that they opposed war and favored 
peace. Realizing that Gerald P. Nye's findings still lin­
gered in the public mind, the manufacturers reiterated their 
argument that industry never prospered during war regard­
less of the Senator's fanciful charges. The loss in human 
lives was serious enough, but businessmen also remembered 
that armed conflicts heaped overwhelming loads of debt on 
the doorstep of each nation involved. Wartime booms were 
only illusory, claimed NAM, and the depressions which
Herbert S. Houston, "Seeking a Way to Peace in 
Asia," Address before University of Oregon, at Eugene, 
September 23, 1937, in ibid.
14
invariably followed wiped out war profits and set back busi- 
17ness a decade.
The fear of war among businessmen reached beyond
the Congress of American Industry in New York to the West
Coast. In San Francisco V. C. Giannini, scion of the Bank
of America founder, felt that international cooperation
was so imperative for the preservation of world peace that
isolation, to him the bane of civilization, had to be era-
18dicated from American foreign policy. In the Midwest,
in the isolationist capital of Chicago, there was sympathy
for Roosevelt's quarantine policy. Harrison B. Johnson,
a Chicago realtor, listened to the speech, returned home
immediately, and wrote a congratulatory letter to the Presi- 
19
dent. From the Southeast, W. Erskine Buford, a Charlottes­
ville, Virginia, investments councilor, wrote that the 
President's words were "courageous, proper, and much needed"
17
National Association of Manufacturers, Industry's 
Platform for 1938, A report prepared by the Congress of 
American Industry and the Forty-second Annual Meeting of the 
National Association of Manufacturers, December 8, 1937 
(New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 1937),
pp. 4-10.
18
Telegram from V. D. Gianni to Franklin D. Roose­
velt, October 6, 1937, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal 
File, Box 200 B.
19
Harrison R. Johnson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
October 5, 1937, in ibid.
15
to bolster democracy throughout the world. To Buford, such
an approach was the only way to avoid involvement in foreign 
20conflicts.
Other businessmen opposed to the New Deal now 
stood by the President's interventionist statements, but 
unlike Young and Giannini insisted that Roosevelt mitigate 
his domestic reforms in recognition of national security 
requirements. These men favored the Quarantine Speech if 
it represented a new direction in affairs at home as well 
as a statement of principle for coping with events abroad. 
Louis B. Harding, of Boston's Spencer Trask and Company, 
wanted a vigorous preparedness program for two reasons.
The role of world policeman that Harding thought the speech 
implied required the United States to throw off its "de­
fenseless polyp" image and support White House rhetoric 
with real force. The money thus spent for preparedness 
represented a "God given opportunity . . . for clearing up 
the unemployment situation and several other matters that 
are not in satisfactory shape." The "other matters" that 
Harding had in mind included the major share of the New 
Deal program, but in his criticism of the Rooseveltian
20
W. Erskine Buford to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
October 6, 1937, in ibid.
16
domestic program he dwelt most heavily on relief projects. 
Harding dismissed New Deal arguments for more relief funds 
with the reasoning that only local politicians and the 
recipients themselves cared about these projects, so the 
money could be diverted easily to defense industry, which 
in turn was ready to provide legitimate jobs for the needy. 
Harding assured Roosevelt that existing tax rates on in­
dustry could supply the funds for this program, with the 
happy result that businessmen would climb aboard the Roose--
velt bandwagon and no longer think of the President and
21the New Deal as a menace to their interests. Although 
opposed to most of the Administration's works of the 1930's, 
Harding and others supported without question the Presi­
dent's new foreign policy to preserve the peace.
War fears, however, did not grip completely the 
world of corporate executives. The demand for more than 
standard polemics came from scattered interventionists who 
later, in 1940, found a voice in the extremist Century 
Club Group. They urged Roosevelt to use force, if neces­
sary, to maintain peace and discourage nations from making 
war. To Nils Anderson, president of the Debevoise-Anderson
21Louis B. Harding to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
October 6, 1937, in ibid.
17
Company, New York iron ore and coal dealers, the use of
force specified American troops united with foreign armies
fighting aggressors abroad. Both national preservation
and international altruism were in Anderson's mind as he
supported this ultimate step towards intervention, for he
believed that if America as the major world power stood
aloof from international affairs all was hopeless. But he
agreed with Louis Harding that intervention was impossible
without first following a solid fiscal policy at home.
The method for attaining this financial stability was, in
Anderson's thinking, through a balanced national budget, a
now familiar demand of businessmen on the President. Once
Roosevelt did this, Anderson promised, further economic
recovery from the Great Depression could continue, devoid
22of New Deal remedies no longer needed.
A few weeks following the Quarantine Speech Norman 
H. Davis and other American representatives participated 
in the Brussels Conference. Called to deal with the Far 
East crisis, the conference did little more than adopt a 
resolution censuring Japan. The Chronicle considered the 
conference the only noticeable result of the Quarantine
22
Nils Anderson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 
7, 1937, in ibid.
18
Speech and a total failure because peace was supposed to 
be the conference's aim, not the division of the Powers 
into hostile groups. However, since the conference was 
"queered from its conception," the Chronicle assumed noth­
ing more could be exprected from the speech or the Brussels 
meeting. All conference activities had a distinct partisan 
tone, illustrated by the formal censure recommendation 
against Japan which originated in the League of Nations, 
an agency the Japanese had abandoned years before. The 
outcome, the Chronicle decided, was that Roosevelt in a 
"rhetorical outburst" had given the Japanese censure motion 
such undeserved importance that it damaged rather than 
aided the cause of peace.
Worse still, at the conference the Chronicle de­
tected the British and French trying to trap America into 
playing European politics. Not only had the British pro­
moted Anglo-American unity propaganda, but the French un­
successfully tried to secure United States naval protection 
for Indo-China. Davis, a leader in the sugar industry 
and long a Washington figure, withstood the French appeal, 
but this did not satisfy the Chronicle. Its editors feared 
these pressures were not the last of Anglo-French intrigues 
to involve America in Continental affairs; as the future
19
of Europe darkened the President would find it increasingly 
difficult to refuse the pleas of the Western Democracies.
If America were drawn into these entanglements the Chronicle 
predicted that unilateral action, a basic element in tra­
ditional isolationist foreign policy, would be greatly 
restricted. Additional foreign commitments, the Chronicle
surmised, meant the end of isolationism as the cornerstone
23of American foreign policy.
Ignoring the distaste of the Chronicle editors 
for the events which transpired at Brussels, Roosevelt did 
push a preparedness program, which despite its modest di­
mensions seemed wrecked before it could get started. Never­
theless, the President laid the foundation for the program 
in December and revealed his ideas in his annual message 
to Congress on January 3, 1938. The most significant sec­
tion of the speech was Roosevelt's declaration that foreign 
nations, in their disregard for the letter and spirit of 
international treaties, had forced America to build strong 
national defenses, which Congress must facilitate with
23
The commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLV 
(November 20, 1937), pp. 3251-3252.
20
adequate appropriations.^'^ Fortunately for the President's 
plan, the sinking of the Panay three weeks before, on De­
cember 12, 1937, had generated enough of a war scare to 
bring increasing support for rearmament by the time of the 
presidential address.
Still unconvinced, however, were isolationists 
in the business community. The Chronicle insisted that 
the people be informed, before it was already underway, 
why an enlarged armament program was necessary. If for 
self-defense, Americans who took "counsel of ignorance and 
fear" might believe that the Axis powers planned to invade 
the United States. Instead, Chronicle editors, always 
suspicious of Rooseveltian motives, were positive that the 
President was enunciating a completely new and dangerous
doctrine, the "right of joint action” with other democracies
25
against lawless totalitarian states. America's real de­
fense against the cataclysm of another war was, claimed 
the Chronicle in strict isolationist terminology, a navy 
adequate to protect the coastline backed by coastal
Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.). The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt with a Special in­
troduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt 
(New York: Random House, 1938), VII, p. 1.
25
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXXXVI 
(January 8, 1938), pp. 162-164.
21
batteries and a defensive, not offensive, army.^^
Business Week also deplored the "war fever" accom­
panying rearmament, especially Admiral Clark H. Woodward's 
outspoken statement that communists were associated with 
the anti-rearmament forces. The magazine regarded the 
Admiral's allegation an attempt to brand as communists all 
those opposed to rearmament. Business Week denied this 
and replied that, although isolationists were against re­
armament, the Communist Party stood on the opposite side 
of the issue. The Marxists in reality were behind Roose­
velt's saber rattling in the hope that America would sup­
port Russia in the war that the magazine editors were sure
27was approaching.
Brushing aside the fears of the business publi­
cations, the United States chamber of Commerce supported 
Roosevelt's request for $9,000,000 to buy antiaircraft 
guns, $6,000,000 for gauges and dies, and $2,000,000 for 
more ammunition as well as a 20 per cent increase in naval 
construction. Best described as a bare shadow of a rearma­
ment program, the $17 million provided little opportunity
^^Ibid., (January 29, 1938), pp. 650-652.
27Business Week, February 26, 1938, p. 51.
22
for war profiteering, regardless of the claims of the anti­
business forces. The Chamber leaders had been promoting 
a similar plan since 1934, but the President ignored sug­
gestions from this group which the Nye Committee so roundly 
condemned as warmongers. Noting Roosevelt's new interest 
in rearmament the Chamber's National Defense Committee 
eagerly unshelved its old proposals and published a new 
report, hedged with protestations for the pacific settle­
ment of international disputes, so as not to incur further 
wrath from those who still accepted the Nye Committee's 
judgments against business.
With no disarmament agreement in existence among 
the Great Powers the Chamber saw a militarily weak America 
at the mercy of the totalitarian governments. To protect 
United States territories and foreign commerce the Chamber 
recommended a modern defense force with a cadre of profes­
sionals which in an emergency could be quickly expanded 
with reserves. Presaging the 1940 destroyers for bases deal, 
the Chamber proposed the acquisition of new land and sea 
bases to undergird the rearmament program. The Chamber 
pledged industry's support to rearmament but urged the 
federal government to aid in turn the merchant marine, a 
vita] but neglected part of preparedness which business
23
hoped to revitalize under government auspices. If for no 
other reason, the merchant marine's existence was neces­
sary to import strategic war materials not available within
28
the United States.
Prior to publication of the Chamber report, the 
Army and Navy Munitions Board had drawn up its "Industrial 
Mobilization Plan" to fix the position of business in de­
fense. Disregarding Senator Nye's hold on the public mind, 
the board never questioned the role of business in national 
security. The financier Bernard M. Baruch was particularly 
interested in the board's work because mobilization had 
been his pet subject from the time he had served as chair­
man of the War industries Board during World War I. Over 
the decades he had been preaching the virtues of a strong 
and sweeping mobilization plan. Finally in 1938, he de­
tected signs that hostilities were imminent: the British
were stockpiling foodstuffs. This, he said, was the signal 
for America to stockpile a $22 million supply of manganese, 
chrome, tin, and tungsten. Baruch was convinced that the
28Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Ameri­
ca's Economic Strength in Time of War, A Report Prepared 
by the Committee on National Defense (Washington: Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, 1938), pp. 3-10.
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democracies' lack of such reserves had forced the British 
and French to appease Hitler, and America must not allow 
herself the same error.
Turning from Europe to North America Baruch warned 
that Mexico presented the immediate threat to the United 
States. Expropriation of American oil interests might 
sever economic relations at the Rio Grande and allow an 
opening for Axis trade as far as the "tip of Patagonia."
More important than commercial rivalry in Latin America 
was Baruch's fear that Germany and japan might try to se­
cure a foothold in Mexico for ulterior and dangerous motives 
which would compromise United States Security. He considered 
the Axis war fleets under construction as potential forces 
for making this a real threat to the nation. For this
reason he urged Roosevelt to elaborate upon and broaden
29
American preparedness plans as quickly as possible.
As a result of combined business and Munitions 
Board efforts a new mobilization plan was designed, based 
on an educational orders system. Advocated by the Chamber 
of Commerce as a part of its own 1934 scheme, the orders
29
Memorandum of Bernard M. Baruch to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, April 29, 1938, Roosevelt papers. President's 
Personal File, Box 88.
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allowed industry time to prepare for the mass production 
of military goods. After the modification of production 
procedures required by educational orders, factories were 
then to be ready to begin defense production if a crisis 
arose. The new system enraged isolationists, including 
Business Week, which turned on the industrialists and ac­
cused the War Department and the metal working companies 
of forcing Congress to approve the orders in the face of 
charges that the program was a "lobby-inspired boondoggle.
Bernard Baruch would hear nothing of such stric­
tures and with other business leaders volunteered to help 
organize the second great mobilization. He then requested 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., United States Steel's Board 
Chairman, to furnish the President data on the importation 
of materials necessary for steel production. Stettinius 
reported that the steel industry imported nearly two mil­
lion gross tons of materials annually, costing $136 million 
to carry on production. He stressed the need to protect 
sea routes affording access to these vital raw materials, 
because disruption of normal passage ultimately meant
^^Business Week, June 25, 1938, pp. 29, 30.
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failure for rearmament and the United States defense in­
dustry .
Stettinius' response to rearmament was one of 
several from industry. The Lead Industries Association, 
without fear of Senator Nye and other anti-business isola­
tionists, announced in language devoid of caution that 
the "lead industry is a war industry." Pointing out the 
necessity of having a healthy lead industry able to meet 
heavy military demands, the Association brought up the 
ageless issue, tariff protection. As a defense industry, 
lead producers thought they deserved protection regardless
of the reciprocity program that Roosevelt and Secretary
32Hull were then sponsoring.
While businessmen were pledging support to rearma­
ment, Hitler began his demands for the incorporation of the 
Sudentenland into Germany. He finally succeeded in this 
incursion at the Munich Conference, October 1, 1938, when
^^Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to Franklin D. Roose­
velt, July 5, 1938, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335.
32Statement of the Lead Industry Association to 
the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Washington, P.O., 
on the Trade Treaty Negotiarions with the United Kingdom, 
Newfoundland, and the British Colonial Empire Covering para­
graph 391: Lead-bearing Ores, Flue Dust, and Matters of All
Kinds. Tariff Act of 1930 (Washington: Lead Industries
Association, 1938), p. 10.
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the French and British leaders handed over to him the 
Czechoslovakian territories. As early as July the Chroni­
cle had predicted disaster for Czechoslovakia, but reasoned 
that the Bohemian demise was "a choice among admitted evils" 
necessary to maintain peace in Europe. Chronicle editors 
supported appeasement and explained that although Prime 
Minister Chamberlain's policy did not satisfy political
purists this was the only practical course of action open
33to the democracies. in early September Business Week 
gave victory to Hitler and without twinge of conscience 
guaranteed, after the Fuehrer's Nuremburg speech, that 
"world business will go ahead with its plans for a busy 
winter." Watching diplomats hurry to meetings in Bad Godes- 
berg and elsewhere as France ordered mobilization. Business 
Week professed the last days of September were the most 
sensational week since 1918, but the editors still saw no 
need to act against Hitlerian p o l i c y . T h e  chronicle 
blamed the crisis on the Versailles Treaty which had fabri­
cated Czechoslovakia from pieces of the Austro-Hungarian
33
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLVII 
(July 9, 1938), pp. 179-181; (July 30, 1938), pp. 629-631.
^^Business Week, September 10, 1938, p. 15; Octo­
ber 1, 1938, p. 16.
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Empire. Now the United States, Britain, and France had to 
suffer loss of face for this "mischief" done at the 1919 
peace conference.
President Roosevelt did not hesitate to act, re­
gardless of Wilson's alleged wrongdoing. On September 26 
he dispatched an appeal for peace to Hitler and drew such 
an insulting reply from the Fuehrer that Roosevelt quickly 
retorted, categorically rejecting Germany's claim— similar 
to the Chronicle's— that Versailles was the cause of the 
emergency.
The President's deft handling of this exchange 
impressed Thomas W. Lamont who telephoned the White House 
to say he was pleased with the way Roosevelt had come back 
at Hitler "in the most brilliant and forcible manner possible." 
Lamont considered such an appeal the best way to avert war 
if such could be done.^^ Roosevelt received further back­
ing from Thomas Watson, who supported Lament's assumptions. 
Following Munich, the International Chamber President cabled
35
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLVII 
(September 10, 1938), pp. 1551-1552; September 24, 1938, 
pp. 1834-1836.
^^Telephone message, Thomas W. Lamont to Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt papers. President's Personal File, 
Box 70.
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from Bucharest to assure Roosevelt that the crisis had 
passed in Europe, partly because of the President's inter­
vention. Watson wanted the President to take full advan­
tage of his position in international affairs and at future 
disarmament conferences lead the fight for the elimination 
of bombs, gas, and tanks, and press for the reduction in 
size of armies. Roosevelt replied that he would seize any 
opportunity to promote disarmament. As to his part in the 
Munich crisis the President explained to Watson that credit
for the settlement belonged to the Europeans, but he did
37believe his diplomatic notes appropriate and necessary.
The Chronicle shared none of the Lamont-Watson 
enthusiasm and branded the Roosevelt messages the undesir­
able but natural outcome of the Quarantine Speech. The 
magazine insisted that Munich conferees accepted the formal 
notes in accordance with diplomatic etiquette but the com­
muniques influenced them not in the least during the nego­
tiations. At any rate, the Chronicle hoped the notes, which 
it considered failures, had discouraged the President from 
further diplomatic ventures and ended interventionist
37Franklin D. Roosevelt to Thomas J. Watson, Octo­
ber 11, 1938, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
BOX 2489.
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38appeals for an American alignment with France and Britain.
At least the "bloodless war" in the financial world was 
over and won^^dded Business Week, and men everywhere ex­
pressed relief for that, even if Munich was nothing but 
an armed truce which might be dissolved at any time.^^
The Chronicle did agree with the President on one 
point, the need for rearmament to counterbalance the ap­
peasement of Hitler at Munich. Two weeks after the crisis 
Roosevelt, laying no faith in Hitler's promises, announced 
the enlargement of the preparedness program, to the modest 
sum of $300 million with hemispheric defense the most im­
portant aspect of the plan. Hitler's Munich victory sobered 
Americans to the realization of the need for greater re­
armament, although isolationism still influenced public 
opinion as reflected in the Chronicle's observations, it 
sided with those isolationists who favored some form of 
defense and unlike many took the more thoughtful view that 
the inadequacy of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as de­
fense barriers necessitated rearmament. In the new arms 
race America had to defend herself or else stand vulnerable
38
The Commercial emd Financial Chronicle, CXLVII 
(October 8, 1938), pp. 2143-2144.
39Business Week, October 8, 1938, p. 51.
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to attack. Within a few weeks the magazine took a more 
common ambivilant isolationist stand toward defense and 
demanded to know exactly for what purposes Roosevelt planned 
to employ the new national security system. The editors 
suspected that, as Commander-in-Chief, Roosevelt might use
his new military power to involve the country in the Euro-
. . 40pean crisis.
What the Chronicle only alluded to. Business Week 
brought into the open. Would the rearmament program give 
extrordinary powers to a president who, the editors believed, 
already possessed more authority than any previous chief 
executive? Distrust of Roosevelt and the New Deal had not 
been erased from the minds of businessmen and other Ameri­
cans just because Czechoslovakia had lost Sudentenland. 
Business Week pushed the issue further and ridiculed the 
program for constructing battleships and an excessive num­
ber of warplanes. To prove its charge of extravagance the 
magazine pointed to the Chief of Staff's new report which, 
the editors claimed, betrayed the War Department's fears 
that the politicians wanted a dramatic flourish of expen­
ditures for arms, not a well planned program, a prerequisite
40
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLVII 
(October 22, 1938), p. 2449; (November 12, 1938), p. 2917.
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41for effective preparedness.
Publications such as the Chronicle and Business 
Week may have favored isolationism but the coterie of busi­
nessmen led by Thomas Lamont never ceased urging the Presi­
dent to take a more interventionist position on foreign 
affairs and an aggressive approach toward rearmament and 
hemispheric security. That such pleadings were not chauvi­
nistic schemes as the isolationists charged can be seen 
in Thomas Watson's admonition to Roosevelt that concurrently
with rearmament the President had a duty to help devise
42
plans for the control of military weapons. Although not 
a mentor on arms control, the New York industrial counselor 
William W. Christmas favored rearmament and proposed the 
initiation of a national nonpartisan movement supported 
by private funds to propagandize for preparedness.^^ Another 
New Yorker, Bernard P. Day, vice president of a real estate 
firm, supported Roosevelt and, in anticipation of the 1940 
destroyer deal with Britain, suggested negotiations with
41
Business Week, December 17, 1938, p. 60.
^^Thomas j. Watson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Octo­
ber 26, 1938, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
Box 2489.
^William W. Christmas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
October 18, 1938, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335.
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Mexico to locate a naval base on the southern tip of Lower
California. Day thought such a base was needed to protect
the Panama canal and the weak nations of Central America.
To cap his argument the realtor saw the arrangement as the
perfect solution to the expropriation question, which Mexico
and the United States had been unable to solve. Land signed
over for such a base was the best way to compensate the
united States for industries expropriated by the Mexican
government after the Revolution, an act American business-
44men still found reprehensible.
Other businessmen found additional ways to coin­
cide their aims with rearmament. William J. Devlin, presi­
dent of the Philadelphia Hardware and Malleable Iron Works, 
was concerned over unemployment and urged that individuals 
receiving money from relief programs be transferred to 
defense jobs to eliminate relief projects. The public 
never begrudged government funds going for preparedness 
rather than ordinary domestic programs, and Devlin thought 
the current interest in rearmament presented an opportunity 
to substitute defense for relief, which businessmen con­
sidered the least acceptable part of the New Deal. Then,
44.Bernard P. Day to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Decem­
ber 19, 1938, in ibid.
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in the industrialist's eyes, the former reliefers would 
become productive defense workers participating in the 
struggle to restrain the Axis powers.
Despite the zeal of these businessmen for rearma­
ment there was much speculation as to whether strong de­
fenses would keep America out of war or involve her even 
more easily in future conflicts. The Gas Age editors re­
jected arguments of accelerated rearmament because they 
considered the possibility of involvement unlikely due 
to recent neutrality legislation passed by congress, in 
1914 Woodrow Wilson had insisted on defending the right 
of American ships to sail the seas, but Gas Age, now com­
pletely opposed to intervention, was confident the neutral­
ity laws had killed the ancient freedom of the seas doctrine 
and its threat to isolationism. To combat any surviving 
interventionism the editors entrusted the task to the most 
unlikely of allies, American radicals. Gas Age assured 
its readers that if the neutrality laws were not wholly 
successful pacifist "radicals with communist leanings" 
stood ready to neutralize the efforts of militant pro-war
45William J. Devlin to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
October 17, 1938, in ibid.
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minorities dragging the nation toward another European 
46
war.
If the Munich appeasement resulted in war both 
isolationist and interventionist businessmen, still haunted 
by Nye's warmonger charges, insisted that little profiteer­
ing would ensue. Gas Age predicted benefits for American 
trade and industry at the outset but later consequences 
for business were "another matter." Business Week was 
more conservative in its forecast and discounted the new 
rearmament program as a real boon to business. In contra­
diction to Gas Age, the editors of Business Week felt heavy 
industry might feel the effect of rearmament in the future, 
but they doubted that the moderate size of the congressional
appropriations for defense would cause a spectacular in-
47crease in production for at least three years. The Presi­
dent was well aware of the paucity of defense monies, and 
he requested an additional $525 million from Congress for 
defense in his Annual Message of 1939. Thomas Lamont ex­
pressed the interventionists' approval of the President's 
request and reported to the White House that in London
46
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Englishmen considered Roosevelt's recent peace moves a
48deterrent to the dictators' aggressions.
Unfortunately the Londoners had spoken prematurely, 
for Hitler absorbed Czechoslovakia on March 14. As soon 
as the President rebuked Hitler for this act, Maurice Leon 
of the Wall Street firm of Evarts, Choate, Curtain, and 
Leon, commended Roosevelt's protest as expressive of Ameri­
ca's anger over this latest aggression. Leon, who had 
acted as agent for the first Allied bond sale on the United 
States market in 1914, thought Roosevelt's course of action 
since the Quarantine Speech "absolutely right," but he 
wanted the Administration to take more direct measures to 
alleviate the crisis. "it was not enough to be right," 
he wrote; in his opinion England's leadership had failed 
and Roosevelt must direct the democracies against the Axis. 
Leon suggested that all nations institute against Germany 
a total embargo, including economic, financial, telegraphic, 
telephonic, and postal sanctions and make Germans realize 
that Hitler had made of Germany a "moral leper." At the 
same time Leon envisioned new economic pacts among the
48Thomas W. Lamont to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Febru­
ary 14, 1939, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
Box 70.
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Allies, creating prosperity which would pay for the arma­
ments needed to restrain Hitler. Also, Leon predicted 
that the return of prosperity in the democracies would 
arouse envy among the Axis populations with resultant up­
risings against their tyrannical governments.^^
In addition to suggesting various ideas and pro­
jects to Roosevelt or relaying to him personal observations 
on the European crisis, some businessmen aided him in more 
concrete ways such as gathering intelligence information. 
One such person was Miles M. Sherover, head of the Wiscon­
sin Steamship company. Soon after Munich Sherover promised 
Roosevelt that Army intelligence would receive models of 
the latest German aircraft used in the Spanish Civil War. 
Sherover reached an agreement with the foreign and defense 
ministers of the Loyalist Government to send captured Ger­
man warplanes and other equipment to Washington on Wiscon-
50sin Steamship Company vessels in April, 1939.
By spring of 1939 the President had presented a 
modest challenge to isolationism. Business spokesmen
49Maurice Leon to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 17,
1939, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 198 A.
^^Miles M. Sherover to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
April 11, 1939, Roosevelt papers. Official File, Box 249.
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reacted to Roosevelt's preparedness program in ways similar 
to that of the public in general: some were extreme inter­
ventionists, others, totally isolationist, under the in­
fluence of the fallacious slogan "it can't happen here," 
and the knowledge that the European aggressors were far 
from American shores, businessmen continued their opposition 
toward large government expenditures and had reservations 
about a costly defense program. The Chronicle and other 
publications were lukewarm, if not isolationist, which 
reflected businessmen's anti-Roosevelt feelings, engendered 
during the New Deal's formative years. Major industrial 
leaders willing to reveal their views, such as Thomas Wat­
son, favored some degree of intervention, as did financiers, 
including Thomas Lamont and V. D. Giannini. A few went 
beyond the President's desires and advocated armed force 
to counter totalitarianism. Other prominent executives, 
represented by U.S. Steel's Edward R. Stettinius, dutifully 
set about planning preparedness without participating in 
the great debate between isolationists and intervention­
ists. But interventionism was not limited to high corpora­
tion leaders. Realtors and small businessmen frequently 
supported the President with their letters and telegrams, 
although they never affiliated with such prestigious groups
39
as the Council of United Nations Committees or its fore­
bearer, the League of Nations Association, both dominated
by the leading business interventionists Lamont and Wat- 
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son.
A clear division within business groups on their 
attitudes toward the foreign policy debate is not discern­
able. Men from the great industrial corporations joined 
hands with bankers and small businessmen to support one 
side or the other of the foreign policy issue, while the 
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States trusted that the goal of 
Roosevelt's foreign policy was continued peace, based on 
adequate national defense. Business leaders pledged sup­
port to defense mobilization, although they feared as a 
consequence the dislocation of the nation's economy when 
business was still extricating itself from the Great Depres­
sion. Others rejected this possibility and believed peace 
could best be achieved by expanding the defense industries 
and basing foreign policy on a foundation of power. They 
saw no danger of war profiteering or other distasteful
Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph
of Internationalism in America During World War II (New 
York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 22, 86.
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side effects, but viewed this expansion of industry as the 
solution to the unemployment problem.
Linked to the apprehension over profiteering was 
Senator Nye's warmonger thesis, which commanded a follow­
ing among the American public. Worry over criticism from 
the Nye group restrained businessmen in their support of 
Rooseveltian intervention, although men of the stature of 
Baruch and Lamont— both bearing scars from their past en­
counters with Nye— never ceased to advocate stronger Anglo- 
American ties. The President called on Norman Davis when 
drafting the Quarantine Speech but other businessmen, iso­
lationist or interventionist, did not influence Roosevelt's 
gradual move toward an internationalist position on foreign
c 2
policy. Nevertheless, after Munich businessmen slowly 
accepted the nation's responsibilities to the world and 
prepared, albeit inadequately, for the stupefying events 
to come in 1939 at summer's end.
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CHAPTER II
THE DIVISION OF BUSINESSMEN OVER SHAM 
NEUTRALITY, 1939-1940
Adolph Hitler proved Prime Minister Chamberlain's 
prophecy, "peace in our time," false when his Panzers in­
vaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Months before, Barron's. 
The National Financial Weekly had warned that Germany's an­
nexation of Czechoslovakia was more important in European 
affairs that "the more spectacular and critical events that 
culminated at Munich," and the inclusion of non-Germans 
in the Third Reich boded further military aggression.
Barron's predicted that Hitler would not tolerate the Brit­
ish-French defense guaranty to Poland, designed as a new 
"sanitary cordon" to be drawn about Germany just because 
the old Allies considered the Reich a menace to the family 
of European nations. War might result from Nazi resentment 
of such diplomatics with Russia remaining neutral while 
Germany fought the western powers, a new but serious threat 
to non-communist nations.^
Barron's, The National Financial Weekly, XIX 
(March 20, 1939), p. 10; (April 3, 1939), p. 10; (May 8, 
1939), p. 10.
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With deep pessimism Banking added that for months
the question of war or peace had dominated business. "We
have heard the cry of 'wolf too often," said the editors.
War threats had become a regular business hazard which
they thought at least prepared America's capitalists for
2
Hitler's march to the East. When the Wehrmacht did cross 
the Polish border, the American business community committed 
itself to the Allied cause, although vacillation existed 
in some quarters. Business Week, less isolationist than 
before the invasion, accepted the argument that Danzig 
probably belonged legally to Germany, but added that the 
real issue of the European crisis was whether the Third 
Reich should be allowed to reorder the world according to 
its plans regardless of the interests of other nations.
The magazine rejected Hitler's claims for living space but 
compromised American "hard boiled" interests that demanded 
support for the "side that promises the least disturbance 
in the world." The magazine hoped that the Allies would 
make concessions to Germany and leave her no excuse for 
war making.^
2
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Individual business leaders eschewed Business Week's 
desire for compromise and, once the war was in progress, 
reaffirmed their support of Roosevelt's diplomacy. A few 
days before the President proclaimed a limited national 
emergency on September 8, Russell Leffingwell cut short 
his holiday at Lake George to pledge the services of J.
P. Morgan and company to the President and preparedness. 
Roosevelt had only to "command" Leffingwell and his part­
ners to execute any task, great or small, and the financier 
stressed that they meant just that.^ Regardless of the 
significance Senator Nye might have attached to this decla­
ration, Roosevelt replied in his best noncommittal manner 
that he appreciated such a "mighty nice note" and it, to­
gether with encouragement from Thomas Lamont, had given the 
President some cheer during these "bad days . . . but we 
have got to see to it that civilization wins through."
The Commercial and Financial chronicle despaired 
of these high sounding phrases, especially the current 
revival of Woodrow Wilson's "make the world safe for
4
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democracy" theme. The editors believed that these slogans 
fostered the fatalistic attitude among Americans that in­
volvement in the new war was inevitable. To counteract 
what it considered over simplified thinking the Chronicle 
reminded its readers that the Versailles Treaty had humili­
ated the demoralized Germans and conditioned them for Hit­
ler's rise to power in 1933. For those unconvinced of the 
need for neutrality the Chronicle continued that United 
States and Allied interests were not identical, which elimi­
nated any need on America's part to defend Britain or France, 
who could protect themselves without America's assistance.^ 
The Chronicle's position on foreign policy dupli­
cated that found in various business quarters, which, de­
spite the feelings of the Leffingwells and Laments, backed 
the isolationist neutrality laws passed since 1935. The 
Chronicle distrusted interventionists who it believed were 
subverting this legislation by destroying the "objective 
outlook" needed to keep the peace. If they succeeded, 
interventionists could force the nation into war against 
the Axis. The isolationists considered their apprehensions 
justified when President Roosevelt in his September 21
^The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CXLIX 
(September 9, 1939), pp. 5227, 5228.
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speech asked Congress to repeal the embargo and to allow 
Allied arms purchases in the United States. Barron's an­
ticipated a quick victory for the President over the pro­
embargo isolationists "just like when Two-ton Tony, or some­
one, runs up against Joe Louis . . . The magazine added, 
however, that Roosevelt's hostility toward the embargo did 
not mean that he was trying to involve America in the war 
as critics claimed.
While Congress argued the embargo issue, Barron's 
supported Roosevelt and the interventionists. Its editors 
echoed the President's hope that for the sake of United 
States security the Allies must win a victory, an impossi­
bility without American goods; this reality made the em­
bargo's existence "not only hypocritical but also dangerous." 
The magazine, in an excess of optimism, assumed all busi­
nessmen would abandon the embargo and unite with the Presi­
dent on this major question, thus ushering in a new age 
of cooperation between the Administration and business in­
terests. Barron's did not hide the fact that repeal of 
the embargo opened up new opportunities for business. The 
magazine stated that no one questioned the tragedy of the 
new war, but since the conflict "was not of our making" 
American opinion should not condemn business benefitting
46
7
from trade with the Allies.
Barron's hopes for a united business front against 
the embargo were destroyed when Business Week editorialized 
that repeal of the neutrality law after the war had begun 
would be an un-neutral act which favored the Allies over 
the Axis. If interventionists did succeed in quashing the 
embargo. Business Week feared the result might be German 
vengeance on America instead of a hastened Allied victory 
as the interventionists promised. The gamble must be taken 
"with our eyes open," said Business Week, because this de­
parture from neutrality seriously jeopardized American
_ 8 security.
As the neutrality debate unfolded during the autumn 
of 1939, "cash and carry" became an important part of the 
issue. In Congress interventionists and isolationists, 
including Senator Borah, voted for the retention of this 
part of the Neutrality Law of 1937 which allowed belliger­
ents to purchase nonmilitary goods with cash and ship them 
home aboard their own vessels. As Barron's hopefully said 
in support of his measure, such strictures on credit eliminated
7
Barron's, XIX (September 11, 1939), p. 4; (Sep­
tember 18, 1939), p. 4.
8
Business Week, September 30, 1939, p. 45.
47
the possibility of economic entanglement and United States
involvement in the war through trade. Barron's still agreed
with Business Week, however, that, as with raising the
embargo, adding cash and carry to the 1939 law could be
misinterpreted by the Axis, and Americans "might easily
find ourselves trying to ride successfully through a storm
with our present rigging." Regardless of this, Barron's
announced that it supported the middle ground, a cash and
carry law applying to all transactions with belligerents
and empowering the President to establish war zones from
9
which united states ships would be banned.
Other business circles did not share Barron's 
enthusiasm for this idea, included was Banking, which 
detected a "catch" in cash and carry. The bonanza which 
might ensue from this system for the individual trader or 
industrialist did not promise the general business community 
riches; in the long run the "overexertion" to fill war orders 
would result in "over-relaxation" after the war and cause 
another Great Depression. Banking condemned the amassing 
of gold, inevitable under cash and carry, because the pre­
cious metal was the only exchange available to France and
9
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48
Britain once they started their purchases. This "modern 
mercantilism" would give the United States un-needed gold 
in addition to the hoard lying idle at Fort Knox, and the 
editors argued that further bullion increases would only 
cause inflation.
Individual businessmen reflected the disparate 
reactions of their own press to the proposed neutrality 
legislation. Opposition to cash and carry came from various 
sources. Philip B. Fisher, director of Security Research 
Bureau, a Philadelphia securities investment counseling firm, 
stood for the embargo, which he considered a truly neutral 
law, and against cash and carry, not because it favored the 
Allies but for the often repeated reason that the Adminis­
tration dared not change its neutrality laws during a war 
because of the dangers involved. Fisher's purist approach 
to neutrality was only superficial because he opposed the 
entry of Americans and their ships into the European war 
zones. He had come to the conclusion that the government's 
pro-Ally feelings during recent crises might lead the Axis 
to brand the nation neutral in name only, regardless of 
how Congress voted on the embargo and cash and carry.
^^Herbert M. Bratter, "The Catch in Cash and Carry," 
Banking, XXXIII (January, 1940), p. 28.
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Discounting both freedom of the seas and freedom of the 
press, Fisher shared the Chronicle's fear of inflammatory 
journalism, and, in a totalitarian mood, wanted restraints 
placed on reporters, cartoonists, and public speakers to 
keep their potentially partisan actions from betraying 
American neutrality. Accomplishing this, Fisher thought 
that the nation could ponder the question of joining the 
Allies or remaining neutral without propagandists influenc­
ing the decision.
Still others petitioned Congress in support of 
the isolationist tradition. A Wilmington, Delaware, real­
tor convinced himself, but not Congress, that if the Presi­
dent simply announced that belligerents could procure no
war materials from the United States hostilities would
12cease within twenty-four hours. A small town Oklahoma 
banker opposed the inclusion of any form of credit in the 
proposed law because "no good businessman" would extend
Philip B. Fisher to Elmer E. Thomas, September 
25, 1939, Papers of Elmer E. Thomas, Division of Manuscripts, 
university of Oklahoma Libraries, Norman, Oklahoma, Box 
126. Hereafter cited as Thomas papers.
12Paul C. Kessler to Elmer E. Thomas, September
30, 1939, Thomas Papers, Box 126.
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credit to an individual or nation that had repudiated its 
13debts. A Hollywood furniture dealer expressed the stan­
dard anti-Roosevelt sentiment that once the Neutrality 
Law of 1937 was emasculated the President would become a 
practical dictator and "plunge us into war. . . Less
emotional but more confusing, a Champaign, Illinois, de­
partment store owner favored "militant neutrality," but 
wanted America to keep out of war.^^ An admirer of Senator 
Borah, C. P. Steaverns, president of Howe and French, Bos­
ton chemists, thought the neutrality statute should remain 
unchanged until the European war forced Americans to take 
drastic action. If this day came Steaverns indulged in 
wishful thinking and assumed prompt congressional action 
would somehow provide a panacea for the ensuing world holo­
caust.
Southwestern oil men often agreed with other
13
Walter B. Stephens to Elmer E. Thomas, September 
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14W. F. Bidwell to Elmer E. Thomas, September 22, 
1939, Thomas Papers, Box 138.
15F. K. Robeson, Jr., to Elmer E. Thomas, September 
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P. Steaverns to Elmer E. Thomas, September
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isolationist businessmen that modification of the 1937 
Neutrality Law was tantamount to taking sides, even though 
such legislation had been a mistake from its inception.
The crude oil producer H. F. Worley illustrated the divi­
sion within the business community on foreign policy. He 
believed that the Nye Committee definitely had proven that 
munitions makers and financiers were responsible for drag­
ging America into World War I. He considered the 1937 
neutrality legislation sound, especially the arms embargo 
provision. But Worley distrusted the cash and carry pro­
posal, which he was sure Roosevelt, in a replay of World 
War I, would circumvent to protect American investments in 
European war machines. Worley sensed, as did others, strong 
backing in Washington for cash and carry so he argued that 
the principle, repugnant as it was, could be included in 
the new law without repealing the all-important embargo 
on arms and ammunition. Worley's suspicions corresponded 
with those of other businessmen who believed Roosevelt's 
actions, despite his good intentions, were sullied by such 
bad judgment that aid to Britain was the first, and probably
17Wade H. James to Elmer E. Thomas, September 20,
1939, Thomas Papers, Box 126.
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18
unintentional, step towards a full alliance with the Allies.
The division over foreign policy within a particu­
lar business group was seen in the petroleum industry, where 
in contrast to Worley, oil men from his own Southwest fa­
vored aid to the Allies and urged Congress to leave Roose­
velt's hands untied in foreign relations because "we can 
trust h i m . I f  the President displayed the same clever­
ness as the Europeans, America could manipulate cash and
carry in such a way as to save the Allies but not embroil 
20herself in war. One driller admitted that with all her 
faults England was the "Mother of our civilization" and
21deserved rescue from Hitler, preferably by cash and carry.
But Lindbergh's receipt of the Iron Cross from Goering
indicated the presence in Washington of America's own
Cliveden Set, striving to defeat the new system of trading
22
with the Allies. Certain oil men favored an aid program
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far broader than cash and carry. Robert Bradshaw, a dril­
ling company owner who foresaw the lend-lease principle, 
thought industry should sell material to the democracies 
s long as their cash lasted. Once their reserves were 
exhausted Bradshaw wanted credit extended to the Allies on
the grounds that the struggle against fascism was as much
23
America's as Europe's.
Cash and carry was in reality an isolationist at- 
ii ;^t to keep the United States out of war, but in 1939 
. ', _arventionists at least took comfort in the lifting of 
th_ embargo which made arms available to the Allies. The 
solution to this problem, however, only led to the creation 
of another, the establishment of war zones under the new 
lav Shipping interests, unlike other business groups,
Uxii' »d against the plan after Congress proposed the crea- 
tic -}f areas forbidden to American merchantmen. Banking 
was '.azed that Congress had accepted this section of the 
neutr lity bill which initially had prohibited the passage 
of non-contraband cargoes to points far from combat areas, 
puch as Australia and South Africa.
23
Robert Bradshaw to Elmer E. Thomas, September 
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^^Bankinq, XXXII (November, 1939), p. 5.
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The Chronicle seconded the editors of Banking 
and judged that of all congressional actions the "peak of 
excited absurdity" was reached with this restriction on 
shipping. The Chronicle watched in dismay as Congress 
tried to "scuttle nearly half" of the American merchant 
marine. In 1807 Thomas Jefferson had good reason to pro­
tect the small American nation with an embargo, said the 
editors, but the leading world power of 1939 had no need 
for such a narrow policy. While the "silly season" lasted 
in Washington, the Chronicle wrote that Italy and other
neutrals were ready to take advantage of American "coward-
25ice" and steal United States overseas trade. As far as 
actual losses were concerned. Business Week reported that 
four of America's five largest customers were belligerents 
and beyond the reach of shippers under the new bill. Brit­
ain, Canada, France, and Germany bought over $1,230 million 
in goods during 1938, or 40 per cent of all United States 
exports for that year. If America allowed a war on the 
other side of the globe to curtail its shipping. Business 
Week believed that the end was near for the nation's inter­
national trade.
25
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLIX 
(November 4, 1939), pp. 2873-2876.
^^Business Week, October 21, 1939, p. 52.
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From the legal viewpoint the Chronicle reasoned 
that international law neither forced neutrals to trade 
with belligerents nor required neutral governments to termi­
nate such commerce upon war's outbreak. If a state pro­
hibited its nationals from conducting trade under the aegis 
of neutrality, international law was not violated unless 
the order was partial to one belligerent over another.
With this in mind Chronicle editors criticized the congres­
sional plan for ignoring the problems caused by changing 
the neutrality law during hostilities. Regardless of the 
consequences, the legislators were determined to eliminate 
the arms embargo provision, which the magazine was willing 
to let stand. The Chronicle found unwise other changes 
limiting shipping because the editors believed no valid 
ground existed for so "great a sacrifice of traditional 
neutral rights.
Trade associations joined the business press in 
fighting the combat area delimitation. The Foreign Commerce 
Committee of the United States chamber of Commerce reported 
that, much as in 1914, the attempts of Germany and Britain 
to blockade each other had already disrupted shipping
27
The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CXLIX 
(October 7, 1939), pp. 2135, 2136.
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routes. Britain had done so with a proclamation forbid­
ding arms, food, and other contraband to be transported 
to Axis ports. The resulting drastic reduction in German- 
American trade was complicated by Britain's successful 
efforts to sweep from the seas Germany's merchant marine, 
comprising 6 per cent of all world shipping. This action, 
the Chamber claimed, placed a greater world-wide demand 
on the United States to supply goods previously available 
from Germany. The Chamber of Commerce protested that these 
pressures, plus Britain's conversion to war production, 
created a greater export demand at the very moment when 
Congress was preparing to restrict American shippers. If 
it became illegal to do business in combat areas, the Cham­
ber urged shippers to direct more attention to South Ameri­
can markets, now stripped of their customary German imports. 
Regardless of such risks as the Latin penchant for debt 
repudiation, the southern continent provided profitable 
compensation for business if European markets were denied 
to the United States.^®
West Coast shippers regretted the combat zones
28
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57
more than the Chamber of Commerce in Washington. Marshall 
Dill, president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, 
led the movement to allow the continued operation of United 
States vessels anywhere on the high seas. At an emergency 
meeting on October 3 in San Francisco representatives from 
pacific Coast ports prepared a statement opposing the neu-
O Q
trality bill and sent it to Congress. The shippers' 
major complaint was that the bill would force American 
vessels regularly plying the sea lanes between the United 
States and Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, the Straits Settle­
ments, Burma, Ceylon, and India to suspend services immedi­
ately. Americans might find Russian, Chinese, and Japanese 
ports closed to them if the President declared those nations 
belligerents.
The expansion of the merchant marine, a hope shared 
by shippers with the United States Maritime commission, 
was also a victim of the bill. The drastic decline in ton­
nage resulting from the bill's passage rendered any ship 
construction plan superfluous. The shippers argued that 
the public would blame Congress if this bill created a lack 
of transport during a national emergency. But more immediately,
29
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American commerce, "completely at the mercy" of foreign 
firms had to stand by helplessly as the Europeans shifted 
their own ships from the Pacific to the more lucrative 
Atlantic routes. The foreign freighters left in the Paci­
fic would charge prohibitive rates on American goods bound 
for Asia, making such trading ventures extremely unprofit­
able.
Dill and his associates envisioned further catas­
trophe: the destruction of the entire West coast economic
structure— agriculture, labor, industry, and railroads—  
dependent on trans-Pacific trade. Suspension of American 
flag services would involve the unemployment of thousands 
of seamen and longshoremen and payroll reductions in the 
millions of dollars. Even Midwestern industry, they claimed, 
was bound to suffer losses when cut off from its markets 
served through the West Coast ports. Whether this series 
of calamities transpired hinged on Congress' willingness 
to allow the relatively safe operation of merchantmen in 
the pacific. As long as America remained at peace, the 
San Francisco group insisted that American shipping enjoy 
freedom of the seas, and that war zones be excluded from 
the neutrality law.
Across the nation in New York City shippers were
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equally disturbed about the proposed war zones. The Mari­
time Association of the Port of New York pressed Congress 
to delete Africa's Atlantic Coast from the restricted list 
because from that region American shippers obtained vital 
strategic materials for national defense. The Association 
assured Congress there was no likelihood of hostilities 
south of the Iberian Peninsula; therefore it was unnecessary 
to tie up vessels sailing in those latitudes.
The New York Board of Trade joined the Maritime 
Association to protest the war zones as a surrender of 
American neutrality. Instead of perpetuating isolationism, 
the board urged Congress to act in the spirit of the 1938 
Merchant Marine Act and allow essential shipping "on all 
routes . . .  at all times." Paralleling the arguments of 
the San Francisco group, the New Yorkers objected to ship­
ping restrictions that would scrap the merchant marine and 
aggravate the still serious unemployment problem. Trade 
routes nurtured for years would be surrendered to belliger­
ent and neutral traders interested in carrying their own 
national products, not American exports. The Board of 
Trade reminded Congress that the legislation under considera­
tion so hampered commercial intercourse with neutrals that
^^Telegram of C. H. Calloghan to Elmer E. Thomas,
October 23, 1939, Thomas Papers, Box 138.
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existing trade treaties with these countries were in danger 
of being nullified. In place of such unwise action the 
board petitioned Congress to forbid the shipment of con­
traband as listed in the 1937 Neutrality Law and to draw 
up a new bill conforming to international law, free of 
artificial barriers to world trade.
The pleadings of the shippers did rescue trade
routes in distant quarters from the isolationist ax but,
as the Chronicle had predicted, the combat area clause in
the new law ended North Atlantic services comprising 30
per cent of all American merchant marine activity. The
Chronicle, nevertheless, was gratified that Congress saved
all that it did, considering the extent to which the nation
was under the spell of what Banking termed the "anxiety,
almost a mania," for legislation to keep America out of
war. Banking condemned this approach to the problem as
"short-sighted" because the United States might not want
31to continue such a policy during a long war. Regardless 
of the duration of the hostilities, the Chronicle feared 
that once Congress began chipping away at American neutral­
ity the belligerents would not hesitate to continue the
31
Banking, XXXII (November, 1939), p. 5.
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job until violations of American rights reached such large
proportions that only force could protect the United States 
32
position. Business warned the nation that sham neutrality
was unworkable, but Americans were thinking only of how
to escape the new war menace. Traditional freedom of the
seas neutrality was cast aside because, as The Wall Street
Journal explained, "if we want security we must be content
33to put pride in second place."
In his struggle with the isolationists over revi­
sion of the neutrality act in the fall of 1939, the Presi­
dent often made use of businessmen to further his objective 
of repealing the embargo on military shipments. Among his 
allies was The Non-partisan committee for Peace Through 
Revision of the Neutrality Law, headed by William Allen 
White. This Progressive Republican, philosopher-editor 
of Kansas' Emporia Gazette, accepted the chairmanship of 
the organization from James T. Shotwell and others outside 
of business c i r c l e s . A l t h o u g h  businessmen did not
32The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXLIX 
(November 11, 1939) , pp. 3027, 3028.
^^The Wall Street Journal, July 16, 1939, p. 6.
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participate directly in selecting the committee's leader 
they provided the funds necessary to fight for the embar­
go's repeal. Hugh Moore, president of Vortex Cups, supplied 
money for the campaign and after being rewarded with the 
executive chairmanship spent two days of each week guiding 
the administration of the committee. A membership campaign 
conducted by telegram recruited professors, businessmen, 
labor leaders, and various professionals to the cause. 
Frederick McKee, a Pittsburgh cement manufacturer, contrib­
uted $1,300 and, with Moore, provided funds for White's sub­
sequent interventionist ventures. IBM President Thomas 
Watson soon joined. Henry I. Harriman, head of the New 
England Power Association, followed Watson. As president 
of the United States Chamber of Commerce a few years before, 
Harriman had supported Roosevelt's New Deal; now he placed 
himself behind the Administration's preparedness program. 
Thomas Lamont and his wife backed the committee as did 
Martin J. Collins, president of Graham paper Company and, 
from the isolationist Midwest, Marshall Field. W. G. Carey, 
the president of the Chamber of Commerce, sympathized with
gc
the committee's aims but declined the membership invitation.
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White's committee faithfully supported the President 
throughout the neutrality debate, although the business 
members of the group had to witness the sacrifice of the 
North Atlantic shipping trade in order to achieve the 
greater interventionist goal, the embargo's repeal.
The White Committee toasted its victory over the 
embargo at the very time the White House, in Byzantine 
fashion, extinguished the life and suppressed the report 
of a more important group. It was the War Resources Board, 
composed of businessmen who, at their first meeting on 
August 17, 1839, had assumed that their task was to map 
out an industrial mobilization plan. Taking their presi­
dential commissions most seriously, Walter S. Gifford, 
American Telephone and Telegraph President, John L. Pratt, 
a General Motors director. United States Steel Chairman 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and the isolationist chairman 
of Sears, Robert E. Wood, labored for three months preparing 
their report. The board members should have sensed some­
thing amiss from the outset: Bernard Baruch was not among
them. Baruch had expected appointment as chairman to the 
new board in recognition of his twenty-year private cam­
paign for preparedness. The President had considered Baruch 
for a similar post in 1938, but the financier wanted Hugh
64
Johnson and George Peek, associates from the War Industries
Board of 1918, to serve with him. This was unthinkable to
the President because he had banished them both from New
36Deal councils years before. Baruch's close relationship
with Roosevelt was of no avail in overcoming the President's
will and restoring the former New Dealers to favor, and
the financier's efforts to have his own way cost him the
chairmanship of the War Resources Board.
Without Baruch's experienced leadership to guide
it, the board sought advice from various industrialists
in the preparation of its report to the President. Again
the spector of the Nye Committee appeared as Alfred P.
Sloan, Jr., chairman of General Motors, wrote at length
37on war profiteering. Tired of business playing the scape­
goat in Senator Nye's modern morality play, Sloan suggested 
that the War Resources Board concentrate on solving the 
problem of excess profits and thus restore the good repu­
tation of commerce and industry. The board's final report
Harold L. Ickes, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939, 
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contained nothing so spectacular as Baruch's superagency, 
invested with complete power over the wartime economy, in 
place of Baruch's dream, separate offices, to exist during 
the war only, were assigned the responsibilities for pro­
duction, labor, finance, food, price stabilization, and
38public information.
For reasons unknown President Roosevelt dismissed 
the board and disregarded these mild recommendations. Un­
doubtedly the President was highly sensitive to public re­
action about his association with business, especially 
when he was in the middle of his campaign against the em­
bargo. charges that "Morgan men" controlled the War Resources 
Board helped bring about its downfall. Cyrus Eaton, a 
manufacturer himself but better known as a latter-day com­
panion of Soviet commissars, claimed that Wall Streeters 
were inferior to industrialists as technical advisors on 
war resources. If New York financiers continued to infil­
trate the board, Eaton predicted the establishment of an 
economic dictatorship "more repugnant" than Hitler's except.
38
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66
of course, to the Morgan c l i q u e . E a t o n ' s  tirade moved 
Roosevelt to assure the industrialist that there was no 
cause for alarm because the appointments logically had no 
effect in expanding East Coast economic power. America 
had faced emergencies before without sacrificing her free­
dom, Roosevelt wrote, or succumbing to defeatism as had 
40Eaton. Nevertheless, when the President disbanded the 
board, Eaton, unswayed by Roosevelt's argument, affirmed 
that all Americans except Wall Streeters hailed its demise.
After the defeat of the embargo and the death of 
the War Resources Board the position of business in the 
defense program remained unsettled. This set the stage 
for Thomas Lamont's speech before The Academy of Political 
Science on November 15, 1939. Lament's introductory remarks 
were those commonly used by businessmen at the time, a 
denial of charges made by the Nye Committee report. Business 
feared war, he stressed, because it disrupted orderly means 
of production and destroyed good faith among nations. La­
mont accurately reported that since 1935 the Nye thesis had
39
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lost many of its adherents. The public realized, he con­
cluded, that American businessmen, who thought as indivi­
duals and not as a special interest group, loved their
42country as warmly as other citizens, "no more, no less."
Lament's plea for the public to recognize business' 
passion for peace mirrored Roosevelt's search for a person 
of the highest character to undertake a unique assignment, 
the ambassadorship to the Holy See. Again he turned to 
the business community and appointed Myron C. Taylor, for­
mer board chairman of United States Steel. The President 
told Taylor that the new European war was largely the result 
of a universal moral and spiritual void. His Christmas 
message to the Pontiff in December, 1939, predicted a reli­
gious and cultural revival after the war if international 
leaders first prepared the way. As a beginning step Roose­
velt proposed that the Pope accept an American representa­
tive to the Vatican. After Pius XII agreed and the President 
announced Taylor's appointment many businessmen agreed with 
the action. Thomas Watson congratulated the new "Ambassa­
dor of Peace" and promised him the cooperation of the
42
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International Chamber of Commerce. To emphasize the need 
for a peace movement Watson described the international 
Chamber's June, 1939, congress which had as a theme the 
importance of a spiritual revival based on the Golden Rule, 
a rather ill-timed subject in light of Hitler’s coincident 
planning of the fourth partition of Poland. Nevertheless, 
Watson expected his new committee for Economic Peace to 
complement Taylor's work in Rome as they created economic 
and spiritual designs for the post-war world.
The Chronicle lauded Taylor's appointment as an 
"event of first rate importance," although little attention 
had been given to the new diplomatic post. The magazine, 
however, asked why Sumner Wells had arrived in Rome with 
Taylor the same day. Well's visit to Mussolini was "shrouded 
in mystery" but the intent of the "quixotic" Roosevelt was 
obvious; the President and Wells were trying to interfere 
in European politics. If America got "slightly mauled" 
from such meddling the responsibility, decreed the Chroni­
cle, was Roosevelt's.^^
43
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With war's advent in 1939 President Roosevelt 
began his policy of friendly neutrality based on as much 
assistance to the Allies as America could afford in the 
fight against Hitler. The business community found itself 
divided into supporters and opponents of this new White 
House policy, as did the nation at large. Although the sug­
gestion of compromise with the Axis was offered by some 
editors of the business press, Thomas Lamont and others 
scorned such thoughts and pressed for more aid to Britain 
and France.
The divergent opinions held by businessmen con­
cerning the Neutrality Law of 1939 indicate that the con­
cept of a monolithic business world managing American foreign 
policy was nothing more than a myth. Barron's championed 
the embargo's repeal, and whether increased trade possibili­
ties or sympathy for the Allies' struggle against fascism 
was the motivating factor, many businessmen were of the 
same persuasion. Among this group can be found representa­
tives from the financial, industrial, and commercial seg­
ments of business. In opposition were isolationist business­
men following the path laid down by Business Week, which 
favored retention of the embargo for reasons of international 
law. Regardless of the Allies' needs in the battle against
70
the Axis, Business Week and the supporters of its position 
considered a change in the rules of neutrality after the 
war had broken out tantamount to an act of war in itself.
The cash and carry issue also created division 
among businessmen. Barron's supported this basically iso­
lationist idea although Banking feared that inflation might 
occur from the resulting gold flow into the United States.
A more definite pattern emerged in the opposition of busi­
ness to the isolationist war zone concept included in the 
1939 neutrality legislation. Shippers unanimously opposed 
the prohibition against American merchantmen sailing seas 
in close proximity to combat areas. Maritime associations 
joined in the fight against this dread threat to the mer­
chant marine only to find themselves deserted by the rest 
of the business community. Businessmen promoting more aid 
to Britain and France let Secretary Hull speak for them: 
Congress and the nation demanded the establishment of war 
zones to keep the United States out of war. If the zones 
satisfied America's yearning for peace there was less pos­
sibility that public opinion would oppose aid to the Allies, 
the most important interventionist aim during the period 
of friendly neutrality. This rationalism cleared the con­
sciences of interventionist businessmen over the loss of
71
one-third of America's shipping so that they supported with­
out feeling guilty Barron's "middle ground," a law includ­
ing both cash and carry and the war zone concept.
President Roosevelt in his masterful way continued 
to balance the isolationists against the interventionists 
as he expanded the aid program for Britain and France. 
Whenever it served his purpose the President enlisted the 
talents of businessmen for his preparedness program. De­
spite the cloud created by the Nye Committee hanging over 
their heads, men from big business always answered the call, 
whether it was to serve on the ill-fated War Resources 
Board or to promote Roosevelt's interventionist legislation 
as did the White Committee during the embargo debate. 
Following the Polish invasion, anti-Roosevelt feeling, 
left over from New Deal days, was still evident among busi­
nessmen particularly in the editorial opinions of their 
press. These publications sought to stigmitize the Presi­
dent as either an anbitious tyrant expanding his sway over 
foreign policy or at best a well-meaning but incapable 
leader exposing America to the threat of war. individual 
businessmen who had been suspicious of Roosevelt since 
1933 rarely expressed distrust of the President in the 
conduct of foreign policy. At the same time business
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leaders in communication with the White House mainly lined 
up behind the President's pro-Ally policy. In fact, their 
overenthusiastic support for interventionism placed many 
businessmen far ahead of the slow moving Administration, 
as seen in the interventionists' endorsement of the lend- 
lease principle well over a year before it was law. Roose­
velt soon realized, however, much to the discomfiture of 
isolationist businessmen, that the amount of aid necessary 
to keep the Allies in the war was much more than first 
estimated, as the "phony war" came to an end and Germany 
commenced her full-scale invasion of France.
CHAPTER III 
BUSINESS REACTION TO THE FALL OF FRANCE
Businessmen frequently took to heart William E- 
Borah's preachments concerning the "phony war," the Sena­
tor's catchword for the state of the European conflict in 
late 1939. Borah's facility for turning a phrase in this 
instance created apathy among businessmen and other Ameri­
cans toward the European crisis. This attitude was espe­
cially pronounced in the business press. The Wall Street 
Journal saw no reason for American involvement because 
"it is not our w a r . S o  attached to the philosophy of 
noninvolvement was the Journal that its editors rejected 
Herbert Hoover's modest proposal for giving "counsel" to 
the nations which were to sit at the peace table. Even 
this small role placed unwanted responsibility upon the 
United states for the future peace treaties which, the 
Journal thought, were destined to be mere duplications of 
the discredited Versailles Treaty. Tb- Journal wanted the 
united States to avoid the risk of being held responsible
^The Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1939, p. 12.
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in any degree for such a document as that.
At that moment, however, one risk was being taken: 
the Import-Export Bank had approved the granting of funds 
to belligerents. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
reported a $20 million loan to Finland, which was the re­
sult of the efforts of the pro-Finnish movement in the 
United states, propaganda from this group had captivated 
many Americans and the editors feared that the supporters 
of the Finnish cause might force the Roosevelt Administra­
tion to issue a non-recognition proclamation against the 
Soviet Union. The Chronicle sympathized with the plight 
of the Finns in the struggle against Russia, but the maga­
zine saw a pattern emerging which might be repeated in the 
greater European war. Although the threat to American 
neutrality was minimal during the phony war the danger be­
ing "manufactured within our own borders" was not. A loan 
to Finland meant loans to the Allies and certain involve­
ment if the Continental war expanded. The Chronicle blamed 
this interventionist meddling on President Roosevelt, who 
had scuttled the 1933 World Economic Conference only now 
to advocate world solidarity in "extravagent and shallow" 
phrases. The Chronicle had greater scorn for Admiral Harold 
Stark's January 21, 1940, speech defending the Administration's
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proposed $2.5 billion naval expansion program. The maga­
zine compared the efficaciousness of this proposal to past 
New Deal leaf-raking projects and labeled the words of the 
Chief of Naval Operations "too fantastic for sober discus­
sion, " especially his claim that all totalitarian nations 
had united against the United States in the current war. 
The Chronicle editors suspected that the inspiration for 
the new naval construction and for involvement resulted 
from Roosevelt's association with the idealist Woodrow 
Wilson at Versailles in 1919. Even though the President's 
internationalist proclivités were suspended after the 1937 
Quarantine Speech, as the phony war neared its end, the
editors charged that he was "traveling along courses of
2
involvement in the conflicts of Europe. . . . "
The Chronicle's reaction to Roosevelt's foreign 
policy did not completely mask an older fear prevalent 
among many businessmen. The Oil and Gas journal reiterated 
the standard argument that modern war so dislocated indus­
trial development, the "life blood" of business, that it 
could not be considered either a temporary or permanent
2
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL (Janu­
ary 6, 1940), pp. 13, 14; (January 20, 1940), pp. 324, 325; 
(January 17, 1940), p. 885; (February 17, 1940), pp. 1043- 
1045.
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benefit.^ Barron * s study of the trend toward centralized 
trade and exchange controls in the major nations supported 
this argument. Since the British and French empires domi­
nated America's external financial activities, Barron's 
reasoned, the new exchange controls in those countries 
posed a threat to American business. The increase in Ameri­
can exports caused by the war was merely an illusion, be­
cause in reality trade was being undermined as the belli­
gerents placed tighter restrictions on their commercial 
dealings with foreign nations.^
As many businessmen continued to debate foreign 
policy, others sensed the nearness of the phony war's end 
because of developments in Eastern Europe. Barron's viewed 
Russia's activities in the Middle East as a comfort to 
Hitler because the ultimate loser in such machinations was 
the British Empire. Barron's realized that Russia, not 
Germany, was Britain's traditional rival in Asia and that 
Moscow held the strategic threat to Britain's lifeline 
"from Cairo to Calcutta." if Stalin confined his expan­
sionist policies to Asia and the Middle East a clash between
3
The Oil and Gas Journal, XXXVIII (January 18, 
1940), p. 17.
4
Barron's, The National Financial Weekly, XX 
(April 22, 1940), p. 3.
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Russian and German interests elsewhere would be avoided.
But this left the Baltic open to Hitler and placed greater
5
pressure on the British Empire at other points on the globe.
Hitler decided that Northern Europe was his for 
the taking now that the British and Russians were occupied 
elsewhere. On April 9, 1940, the phony war suddenly be­
came real as German forces invaded Norway and Denmark.
The Allied debacle in Scandinavia made the Chronicle long 
for "some sort of success" on the part of France and Brit­
ain to offset the German victory. Although the Chronicle 
realized the Allies had taken the initiative in the Middle 
East something more was needed to counter "new and grave
adventures" which the editors were certain Hitler had planned 
6
for Europe.
The occupation of Scandinavia caused American 
businessmen to speculate on the effectiveness of the 1939 
Neutrality Law, now that the Baltic was in Nazi hands.
The British blockade of Germany had little chance of starv­
ing the Third Reich into submission because the nation was 
supposedly over 80 per cent self-sufficient in foodstuffs.
^Barron's. XX (February 12, 1940), p. 3.
^The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CL (April 
27, 1940), p. 2779.
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Strategic war goods, however, were in short supply, espe­
cially iron ore which, Barron * s believed, was the reason 
for the Norwegian invasion in the first place; Swedish
7
ore was thus insured for the Nazi war machine. Unless 
another blitzkreig was undertaken the effectiveness of the 
blockade might be the "best available measure of the odds 
of victory." American businessmen guessed that such a 
possibility would challenge the aims of America's neutrality 
laws. The Chronicle noted that the President continued 
to "hew closely to the line" of neutrality, although his 
"obvious intent" was to aid the Allies, just as had hap­
pened during the early years of World War I. But the dif­
ference in 1940 was the existence of neutrality legislation 
which required American ships to avoid combat areas. The 
Chronicle found an "encouraging indication" in the State 
Department's announcement that discussions with the Allies 
on contraband control and other wartime problems had been 
successfully concluded and that London and Paris hoped to 
"minimize the inconvenience" for the United States and 
other neutrals as the war progressed. The Chronicle con­
sidered it fitting that during the discussions the Ameri­
can representatives reserved all rights of the United States
7
Barron's, XX (April 15, 1940), p. 3.
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under international law, a position the magazine feared 
Roosevelt might compromise in his pro-Ally temper.
The editors of Business Week considered Hitler's 
advance into Scandinavia as proof that the Allied effort 
to starve Hitler out of power was working since he was 
forced to move into Scandinavia to protect his Swedish 
source of steel, "the German life preserver." Of more 
concern to Business Week was the stock market's response 
to the new German offensive. Moral misgivings combined 
with business caution kept the market from soaring as it 
had seven months before, during the invasion of Poland.
The anticipation of war orders then had caused the market 
to rise, but throughout the phony war both sides had so 
conserved their resources that the scanty purchases of 
war goods caused a sharp decline in the market. This lack 
of spectacular performance suited Business Week. Another 
market rise, said the editors, "would introduce important 
maladjustments into our economy." If the belligerents of 
either side followed the Scandinavian campaign with a break­
through on the Continent, Business Week predicted that war 
orders would come "thick and fast." The resulting bottle­
necks in production called for a program of plant expansion, 
all of which supposedly would bring great profits. But
80
Business Week warned industrialists to look ahead and avoid
being led into a trap of overexpansion by the hope of quick
profits. The order of the day, said the editors, was "don't
0
bite off in war what you can't swallow in peace."
The breakthrough on the Continent anticipated by 
Business Week took place May 10, when Germany attacked 
Flanders. American apathy over the European war disinte­
grated as the nation witnessed the Nazi blitzkreig. The 
Chronicle, usually isolationist in tone, proclaimed in 
interventionist phrases that this invasion aroused in Ameri­
cans "the most bitter resentment and a clear determination
g
to prepare for any eventualities." More directly Business 
Week told its readers that "we might as well face the facts. 
The United States has ceased to be n e u t r a l . Business 
Week came to this conclusion after noting the popular sup­
port for a waiver of part of the Johnson Act, which placed 
restrictions on loans to foreign governments. Business 
Week knew the question of granting credit to the Allies 
was "bound to come" because the best way to aid the Allies
8
Business Week, April 13, 1940, p. 54.
9
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL (May
18, 1940), p. 3104.
10
Business Week, May 18, 1940, p. 56.
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short of war was to give them the cash necessary to pursue 
the conflict. Although France and Britain possessed suffi­
cient dollar reserves at the moment, the decision had to 
be made whether the Neutrality and Johnson acts should 
be repealed and preparations made to loan funds when it 
became necessary to do so. Since the United States favored 
the Allies, she should see to it that France and Britain 
received needed material to put forth the best war effort.
If the huge loans required by such an undertaking had to 
be made in the form of "volunteer aid," the editors stressed 
that no strings should be attached. With this proposition 
Business Week presaged the coming of lend-lease, a program 
that would appear a year later.
President Roosevelt took advantage of this inter­
ventionist view in his special message to Congress on May 
16, when he declared that "the American people must recast 
their thinking about national protection." The President 
climaxed his address with what many businessmen considered 
the fantastic request for 50,000 warplanes, a billion dollar 
project at least. As the public attempted to comprehend 
the magnitude of the program, prominent businessmen stood 
behind the President in his latest effort to draw America 
into the interventionist camp. Baltimore and Ohio President
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Daniel Willard congratulated Roosevelt for his Maytime 
endeavors which appeared to be the beginning of a viable 
interventionist program. But Willard, always suspicious 
of the motives of hard core New Dealers, added that he was 
disturbed to hear men "high in political life" say that 
America must never enter the war. He recalled that in 
1917, when he was chairman of the War industries Board, 
the same kind of people were voicing such opinions, but 
America still intervened when finally required to do so.
If war conditions made it necessary Willard believed the 
United States would enter the present conflict, "regardless 
of all the Johnson Acts, resolutions by Congress and as­
surances by candidates for public office." Immediate sup­
port of the Allies, rather than the usual flood of Chamber 
of Commerce resolutions, was the only way Willard saw to 
make American entry unnecessary. Dollars were needed im­
mediately to purchase war materials for the Allies. Whether 
the loans were repaid mattered not to Willard, as it did 
not for the Business Week editors, because he thought the 
money should be made available initially in the form of 
grants. Willard's reasoning in favor of grants paralleled 
that of other interventionists: they all believed the
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Allies "were in effect fighting our own battle.
In contrast to Daniel Willard's measured approach 
to the new crisis, panic propelled many to suggest extra­
ordinary schemes for American defense. The Wall Street 
broker Louis P. Eisner wired Roosevelt that "neutrality 
is a fiction" and all steps "short of war" must be taken 
to protect American interests. First he wanted the Civilian 
Conservation Corps converted into a military training or­
ganization, and government subsidies granted to aircraft 
companies to provide for the strengthening of air defenses. 
The naval building program needed to be accelerated, even 
though unit costs of production might increase. Fearing 
for internal security, Eisner urged that the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation combat the "Trojan-horse" tactics used 
by disloyal German-, Russian-, and Italian-Americans.
Loyal Americans should join the reserve corps of whichever 
military branch could best use their talents and training. 
Eisner thought that the President, in his Quarantine Speech, 
had been the only world leader to forecast accurately the 
future, but it was now too late to stop the aggressors in 
Europe. Rather, the Administration had to prepare the 
Americas against an attack that Hitler was sure to launch
Daniel Willard to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 
13, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal Pile, 
BOX 1621.
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1 2as soon as he defeated Britain and France.
The hopelessness of the European situation filled
American minds with despair but also with the urge to turn
America into an armed camp, William J. Devlin, president
of the Philadelphia Iron and Malleable Works, who, in an
audacious moment, had written to Neville Chamberlain in
October, 1939, demanding that Britain resume payment on
her war debt to the United States, now advocated a fortress 
13
America. After the invasion of France, Devlin assured 
Roosevelt that the people favored any amount of expenditures 
to defend the country including the cost of the proposed 
50,000 warplanes, but he insisted that Americans opposed 
direct participation in what was not their war. Devlin 
considered the current conflict to be of that character. 
Devlin also subscribed to the Trojan horse theory and 
thought the White House should pay more attention to the 
work of the Dies Committee, because subversives boring 
from within might be more dangerous than the enemy attack­
ing from without. The similarity of Devlin's views with
12
Telegram of Louis P. Eisner to Franklin D. Roose­
velt, May 10, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 
335.
13
William J. Devlin to Neville Chamberlain, October
12, 1939, Thomas Papers, Box 138.
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those of groups emphasizing the dangers of internal sub­
version was evident; however, he thought such a danger 
only a possibility and not the paramount issue, which was 
the Nazi menace itself.
On the official level, the Business Advisory Coun­
cil approved a resolution which involved the group in one 
of the most heated arguments of the great debate over for­
eign policy. As an appendage of the Department of Commerce, 
the Council gave periodic advice to the Secretary and his 
staff. Edward R. Stettinius, James D. Mooney, and Donald 
Nelson were among the members of the Council. To enlist 
this group's support for intervention the President called 
a meeting of the Council May 23. Anticipating the possi­
bility of American involvement in the war, Roosevelt told 
the Council that a Nazi victory would destroy the French 
Army and the British Fleet, which had served as the buffer 
between Europe and A m e r i c a . T h e  Council readily accepted 
the President's invitation to join the fight for intervention,
14
William J. Devlin to Franklin Roosevelt, May 
20, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335 P.
^^Informal remarks of Franklin D. Roosevelt before 
the Business Advisory Council, May 23, 1940, Roosevelt 
Papers, Secretary's File, Box 58.
86
If certain isolationist businessmen had been present possi­
bly the Council would have displayed less enthusiasm for 
Roosevelt's internationalism. Jay C. Hormel, soon to be 
an executive board member of the isolationist America First 
Committee, was absent from the meeting. Robert E. Wood, 
destined to be America First's chairman, was a past member 
of the Advisory Council but was not active at that time.
In the search for adequate national defense the 
Council proposed the acquisition of Atlantic and Pacific 
air and naval bases. The Council wanted Roosevelt to sign 
permanent leases for installations in Newfoundland, Bermuda, 
Trinidad, Jamaica, and British Honduras in the Atlantic.
In the pacific, the Council suggested arrangements be made 
to acquire French New Caledonia and Christmas Island. To 
justify such action and pacify the isolationists, the Coun­
cil rationalized that these agreements could cancel out 
the Allies' war debts. The year before. Senators McNary 
and Lodge had proposed this step.^® The military writers 
George Fielding Elliot and Hanson W. Baldwin had taken up 
the idea in the spring of 1940. Taking advantage of these 
sentiments, Roosevelt tied the transfer of bases into his 
plan for delivering reconditioned United States destroyers
^^The New York Times, February 22, 1939, p. 1.
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to Britain. The Council, unaware of the developing destroyer 
deal, suggested a leasing arrangement for the bases unless 
Hitler was about to "impose a disastrous peace upon the 
Allies." If this occurred Washington should annex the re­
quired land as United States territory. In addition to 
enhancing the defense program the Council thought that the 
defense dollars poured into these European possessions would 
provide additional foreign exchange for the Allies, which
the mother countries could use to purchase military goods
17
in the United States.
The Council also proposed a solution to the emerg­
ing problem of subversion in defense industries; a National 
Industrial Defense Corps composed of volunteer plant workers 
should protect factories against potential sabotage. The 
proposal eventually reached the floor of the Senate in 
slightly altered form but progressed no farther and failed 
to become law.^^
17
Resolution of Business Advisory Council, May 
24, 1940, Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.), Secretary of Commerce December 
1930-1940 File, Business Advisory Council. Cited hereafter 
as Hopkins Papers.
18Business Advisory Council Report of Special Com­
mittee on Mr. George A. Hill's Proposal to Establish a 
National industrial Defense Corps. Hopkins Papers, Secre­
tary of Commerce File, Business Advisory Council.
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The Business Advisory Council's vote of confidence, 
united with interventionist sentiment in general, caused 
the President to press for greater American involvement 
in the world crisis. Several months after the fall of 
France P. D. Houston, president of the American Bankers 
Association, reflected that during the German invasion of 
the Low Countries, "isolationism and pacifism broke down 
completely," and, although Roosevelt was aware of this in 
the spring of 1940, he still saw fit to play the isolation­
ists and interventionists against each other to achieve
19his foreign policy goals.
In his May 26 fireside chat Roosevelt told the 
nation that greater defense preparations were necessary 
but no New Deal accomplishments would be scrapped in the 
process. This promise satisfied New Dealers who were less 
interested in aiding the Allies than in defending the re­
forms brought about in the 1930's. Only the traditional 
anti-Roosevelt groups remained completely opposed to the 
President's efforts, domestic and international. Summing 
up this viewpoint the Chronicle told its readers that Roose­
velt's "dismal failures . . . are being obscured by the
19
P. D. Houston, "Banks and Defense Production," 
Banking, Journal of American Bankers' Association, XXXIV 
(March, 1941), p. 83.
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stirring events in Europe," for which the "politically 
minded" New Dealers were thankful. Not against national 
defense in general terms, the Chronicle with undisguised 
pleasure reported that rearmament so occupied Roosevelt that 
he had not had time "fortunately . . .  to meddle in foreign 
affairs" for several weeks past. The Chronicle editors
saw as evidence of this that the latest fireside chat dealt
20entirely with domestic defense. But this hostility to­
wards intervention was on the wane in such business cir­
cles as the New York Chamber of Commerce. This group in 
early June agreed that the united States must support Brit­
ain at all costs; if severing diplomatic relations with 
Germany proved ineffectual then American warships and the
air force should be sent to this one remaining Allied na-
21
tion not yet invaded by the Wehrmacht.
Other New York businessmen sent personal congratu­
lations to the White House and proffered advice to the 
President on various military and defense matters. Ameri­
can Gear's Chairman Carl Byoir cleared with Press Secretary 
Stephen Early a telegram from Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney
20
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL
(June 1, 1940), p. 3406 
21
The New York Times, June 7, 1940, p. 1.
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so that the message could be made public soon after Roose-
22
velt received it. Whitney considered the President's 
appeal for greater production of military goods as an op­
portunity to cooperate with Latin America in air defense.
If the Monroe Doctrine was still a part of American for­
eign policy, Whitney wanted to fuse it with the Good Neigh­
bor Policy to defend the Americas. Such a defense system 
would create "a fortress of peace around our present trade 
companionship." unfortunately, with less than 1,000 modern 
warplanes in the air fleets of the Central and South Ameri­
can nations, such "peace" was precarious at best. Washing­
ton could rectify this problem by supplying United States 
aircraft to the Latins and also by encouraging plane pro­
duction in South America.
Thinking in broader terms of defense, Harold S. 
Vanderbilt worried over the fate of the Royal Navy in the 
event of a German victory. He agreed with Roosevelt that 
the buffer provided by the Fleet between Europe and America 
had to be maintained. Either the United States should buy 
the Fleet or London must scuttle it to keep the ships out 
of Nazi hands. Possibly the seat of the British Empire
22
Telegram of carl Byoir to Stephen J. Early, 
May 27, 1940, Roosevelt papers. Official File, Box 335.
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could be moved to Canada, which would end talk Vanderbilt
had heard of annexing that Dominion to the United States,
and the Fleet divided among the Commonwealth nations.
Vanderbilt realized that Britain considered these proposals
unthinkable at the moment, but he had heard rumors that
Hitler planned to execute one million hostages if he did
not receive the Fleet intact upon his victory. Should this
be true, Vanderbilt wanted the British, if they did surrender,
to dispose of the Fleet by presenting it to America. He
presumed highly secret negotiations would be necessary for
such a project, and possibly undemocratic methods would be
required, but in his opinion the salvation of democracy
23
justified these means to accomplish the end.
Whitney and other interventionists, blind to the 
power still wielded by isolationists, found incomprehen­
sible the reluctance of Congress and the President to en­
act broader programs to aid the Allies. Charles E. Stuart, 
president of a New York engineering firm and a member of 
the Fuel Administration during World War I, had been baf­
fled by the isolationists in Congress who opposed modifi­
cation of the Neutrality Law in 1939. Traveling throughout
23
Harold S. Vanderbilt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
May 21, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 6666.
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the North and South he reported to the White House that 
he found no one opposed to the Administration's interven­
tionist policy. He remembered Goering's Reichstag decla­
ration that America would be considered in her turn, which 
meant that the Nazi threat must be met with an accelerated 
defense p r o g r a m . S u c h  grand schemes were dependent on 
careful planning and extensive organization but above all 
they required what The Wall Street Journal termed "moral 
unity," the end of "pressure-group mentality." The Journal 
identified the "mutual hates . . . suspicions and distrust" 
in the nation, which had grown during New Deal days, as
25
the greatest impediment to the President's defense program.
These misgivings, however, did not stop Roosevelt 
as he went a few steps further in the promotion of inter­
vention. On June 10 at Charlottesville, in an address 
the Chronicle considered improper for the head of a neutral 
state to make, he compared Mussolini, who had just attacked 
France, to a thief who had stabbed an innocent victim in 
the back in order to get at the spoils. This dramatic 
speech was a milestone in the passing of American foreign
24
Charles R. Stuart to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
May 21, 1940, Roosevelt papers. Official File, Box 335.
25
The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1940, p. 12.
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policy from a neutralist position to that of near-belliger- 
ency. Regardless of Mussolini's attack on France, isola­
tionists were still opposed to European entanglements 
although most favored the buildup of the American military 
at home. The Journal agreed with the sections on national 
defense in Roosevelt's remarks but the references to inter­
vention "might have been better u n s a i d . i n  spite of 
its isolationist views the Journal sympathized with the 
nation's revulsion against Mussolini and respected those 
who openly supported direct intervention against the Euro­
pean dictators. Another group, equally buoyed up by the 
speech, raised the Journal's suspicions: it was saying
"we need not fight but. . . . "  The Journal labeled these 
citizens as either fools or simply untrustworthy, who had 
allowed their emotions to obscure the fact that "you can­
not go halfway into a war. Either you are in or you are 
27out." The tragedy was thus complete, added the Chronicle,
because the President's words had "so definitely placed"
28America on the Allied side.
26
Ibid., June 12, 1940, p. 12.
27
Ibid.
2 8The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CL
(June 15, 1940), p. 3709.
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Despite the Chronicle's opposition to the Presi­
dent's speech, chambers of commerce from Pecos to Buffalo 
and Atlanta to San Francisco backed Roosevelt's pro-Ally 
policies. The San Franciscans did not hold against the 
President the 1939 Neutrality Law's restrictions on ship­
ping as they proclaimed their desire to restrain the Axis 
29
powers. The Buffalo Chamber joined the other groups in
their zeal, but could not forget the Nye committee charges
and added a reminder that no war fortunes should be created
during the present e m e r g e n c y . S p e c i a l  organizations
31
such as the Pennsylvania Grade Crude Oil Association
and the New England Shoe and Leather Association supported
32defense by resolution. Elsewhere, in the South the Georgia
33Cotton Seed Crushers Association, which provided linters
29
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of Commerce, June 6, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, 
Box 335 S.
30
Resolution of the Executive Committee of the 
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31
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tion, June 27, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official Box 335 P.
32
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tion, no date, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335 N.
33
Telegram of W. M. Hutchinson to Franklin D. 
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for explosives, subscribed to defense, as did the Oklahoma
34Millers Association.
Limitations glossed over in resolutions were often 
in the minds of individual businessmen. James D. Francis, 
president of the Island Creek Coal Company in West Virginia, 
favored adequate national defenses, but, in what he termed 
the isolationist tradition of the Washington Farewell Ad­
dress, opposed "further alliances" with foreign nations.
He insisted that Roosevelt's responsibilities were to 
America only, not the world at large. Francis, further 
revealing his attachment to traditional foreign policy,
feared that the Monroe Doctrine would be challenged if the
35
united States involved herself on the Continent.
The week following the Charlottesville speech the 
Chronicle characterized the Allied position as being at 
its lowest ebb since the beginning of the war. But worse 
came on June 22, when France signed an armistice with Hit­
ler and removed herself from the conflict. This inaugurated 
a new phase of the war but the Chronicle reported that
^^Resolution of Oklahoma Miller's Association, 
May 28, 1940, Thomas Papers, Box 136.
35
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Roosevelt had not yet made any changes in policy which would 
involve the country to any greater extent than it already 
was.^^ Barron's accurately explained the cause for France's 
defeat in both economic and diplomatic terms. The arti­
ficial alliances cultivated by France in Eastern Europe 
had failed to sustain the encirclement policy against the 
Third Reich because the small countries were tied econom­
ically to Berlin, not to Paris. To Barron's this lesson 
in diplomatics meant that the United States might repeat
37France's blunder, "if we attempt to control" South America.
The age-old problem of Latin American defense 
had always been of concern to the United States, and now 
the fall of France combined with the possibility of Axis 
infiltration in South America made the formerly academic 
question one of extreme urgency. Businessmen thought it 
time to update the Monroe Doctrine for use in modern war 
but disputed the merits of the policy being pursued by the 
President. The Administration planned to establish a credit 
pool of $500 million for the nations south of the Rio Grande. 
Barron's approved of this approach to the problem because
36
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL 
(June 29, 1940), p. 4019.
37
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"a policy of Hemisphere Defense involves more than mili-
38tary preparation." The magazine then urged the imple­
mentation of a more elaborate scheme, a cartel system 
outlined previously by the President and Cordell Hull.
This economic program provided marketing outlets for sur­
plus Latin American products based on quotas allocated to 
each republic. Barron * s considered the plan's objectives 
"highly praiseworthy" but believed that many complications 
attended such a project.
Although the Chronicle insisted that this latest 
Administration scheme was an attempt to "prime the pumps 
from the Rio Grande to Patagonia," businessmen realized
that the plan showed promise in keeping Latin America out
39of the Axis orbit. Conservative forces represented by 
the Chronicle carried the day, however, and forced the 
President to drop the cartel proposal before the start of 
the Havana Conference in July, 1940.
The absence of certain nations from the confer­
ence did not surprise business circles because, as Barron's 
observed, pro-German dictators ruled in several of the
38
Barron's, XX (July 29, 1940), p. 10.
39
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(July 27, 1940), p. 461.
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Latin capitals. If Germany created a New World satellite 
out of just one of these countries hemispheric defense 
would be "virtually impossible." To guard against this 
possibility Barron's had a controversial solution: the
United States must be willing to interfere with the "in­
ternal affairs" of Latin nations flirting with Nazism.
The conference overcame such overshadowing diffi­
culties and produced the Havana Act which gave each Ameri­
can nation a share of responsibility for maintaining the 
Monroe Doctrine, but denied the United States authority 
to guide the internal affairs of the various republics. 
Recognition of their autonomy made the assembled Latins 
more amenable to uniting under the Havana Act against Nazi 
aggression in the western hemisphere. The editors of Busi­
ness Week only hoped this move was timely enough and suf­
ficiently sweeping in scope to keep Hitler away from the 
Latins, who were economically and politically unprepared 
to face the Nazi threat.
If the Havana Conference solved the Latin American 
question Roosevelt still faced the problem of united States 
relations in the Western Pacific. Japan had not been resting
40
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on her laurels since the beginning of the "China incident" 
in 1937. Her army fought doggedly on the mainland to ex­
tend its control beyond the coastal provinces while the 
Emperor's officials consolidated the Imperial position 
in Manchuria and elsewhere. The failure of diplomatic 
notes to restrain Japanese aggression in China forced the 
Administration into renouncing the trade treaty signed 
in 1911 by the two nations. The Journal had predicted 
that the termination of the treaty would not aggravate re­
lations between the two countries. What the Journal did 
fear was complete Japanese rejection of the Open Door policy 
toward china. This, said the editors, could lead to national 
security problems more serious than the fate of commercial 
exports and imports.
In contrast to the Journal, Business Week was 
concerned over Japan's reaction to the termination of the 
treaty. Although the United States was in a better diplo­
matic position than Tokyo, Business Week warned that if 
Washington played its advantage too hard it would create 
a martyr complex among the Japanese and drive them to
42
The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1939,
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extremes which might destroy trade relations and the Open 
Door p o l i c y . Banking added that now the handling of the 
Japanese "will be a supreme test of the virility of Ameri­
can statesmanship.
Barron * s doubted that an agreement on China would 
ever be reached if the united States held strictly to the 
nonrecognition of Japanese conquests.^5 The Chronicle
took the same position because "it would be unrealistic
46not to face the facts as they are." Once the United States 
freed herself from the Japanese treaty businessmen specu­
lated whether the President would aid the Chinese National­
ists by placing an embargo on Japanese trade. Barron's 
judged that japan's greatest fear was a United States em­
bargo, since there was "considerable doubt" that Nippon 
could continue the China campaign without imports.
Henry Stimson's proposed moral embargo was rejected 
by many businessmen who thought it was an invitation to 
defy international law. To these men the neutral United
43
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States had no right to take such action. The Chronicle 
considered Stimson's viewpoint, "just the spirit . . . 
which will contribute efficiently to our drifting into 
every important war. . . . "  The Chronicle expressed sym­
pathy for China's plight, but reminded its readers that 
the old Celestial Empire, which had experienced decades 
of political chaos and civil war, was herself mainly re­
sponsible for her condition in 1940. The Japanese invasion 
of Indo-China in September settled the question for the 
President. On September 26 he embargoed iron and steel 
scrap exports to Japan regardless of future consequences.
Business Week regarded Roosevelt's action as "our 
first skirmish in the final showdown in the Orient. . . . 
This proved that the conflict was primarily a businessman's 
war, but. Business Week emphasized, it was the Japanese 
business community which "squirmed and protested," not 
American businessmen, to whom the embargo had cost $32 mil­
lion in scrap iron exports per year, to say nothing of fu­
ture losses if the government proclaimed a complete embargo. 
If the United States severed its ties with Japan and sup­
ported Britain, the editors urged American industrial lead­
ers to prepare themselves with the "vision and drive"
47
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required to supply British war quotas and American defense 
needs.
In the early months of 1940 the business community 
was shocked over the German successes in Western Europe.
The French defeat caused many businessmen to throw aside 
their apathy and support the Administration's defense pro­
gram, and in some instances to advocate direct American 
intervention in the war, always adding that the war was 
bad for business and that no war profits should be made 
by industry.
"Grassroots" businessmen in their local commercial 
organizations unhesitatingly supported defense and the 
Allied position in Europe without fully comprehending the 
implications of such policies. The technicalities of neu­
trality and nonbelligerency meant nothing to men outraged 
by the transgressions of the European aggressors. If send­
ing aid to Britain portended direct involvement in the 
European war local chambers of commerce never comprehended 
the implication, individual businessmen, particularly 
traditional Anglophiles and past members of the War Indus­
tries Board, did understand the dangers for America if she 
again aided the British in a great war. But this group 
was convinced that support of Britain against Hitler was
103
absolutely necessary in order to preserve western democracy, 
and such dangers as presented themselves were inconsequen­
tial in comparison to the great task of defeating the Axis.
Isolationist businessmen recognized no interven­
tionist obligations on the part of the United States. To 
them, the fall of France was not the signal for America 
to pour out aid for the British war effort, but the French 
defeat did make such publications as the Chronicle and its 
supporters more amenable to rearmament on the home front. 
Isolationists in the business community subscribed to the 
fortress America concept, which they hoped would isolate 
America from the troubles of the world abroad, isolation­
ism limited their vision, however, and they failed to grasp 
the magnitude of the task of rearmament. The Chronicle 
and its allies found themselves caught on the horns of the 
isolationist dilemma: they longed for adequate defenses
but disapproved of spending the great sums of money neces­
sary to provide them. The rabidness of the attacks against 
the Administration's foreign policy explains why the Presi­
dent pursued his interventionist goal through "quarterback­
ing, " as Barron * s characterized his cautious progression 
from isolationism to internationalism. The Japanese em­
bargo and other controversial Administration policies
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caused the great foreign policy debate to take on a more 
systemized appearance during 1940. In the promotion of 
their goals both isolationists and interventionists estab­
lished national propaganda organizations, in which business­
men played an active part.
CHAPTER IV
BUSINESSMEN JOIN THE GREAT DEBATE
In the month preceding the fall of France leading 
interventionists decided that their cause required greater 
direction to win over the nation. As a result they organ­
ized themselves into the committee to Defend America by 
Aiding the Allies. Rumors soon spread of secret meetings 
of international bankers plotting American intervention 
on the side of the Allies, as the little band of Anglophiles 
completed the organization of their group. It was not by 
chance that they formed the committee in New York, the 
center of internationalism in the United States. Meetings 
were attended by businessmen as well as representatives 
from numerous facets of American life, including Robert 
Sherwood, creator of the celebrated "Stop Hitler Now'" 
advertisement, which branded isolationists as either idiots 
or traitors.^
By and large the committee members did not share 
Sherwood's extremism. Most took the moderate position of 
the chairman, William Allen White, who thought the best 
way to keep the United States out of war was to aid Britain
The New York Times, June 11, 1940, p. 46.
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to the utmost. As soon as White agreed to assume the lead­
ership of Committee to Defend America, Thomas Lamont, who 
had been instrumental in persuading White to do so, tele­
phoned Franklin Roosevelt and announced that the interven­
tionists were united and ready to back the Administration's 
pro-Ally efforts. Lamont told the President of the com­
mittee's fortune in having White as its chairman, since 
he came from the "Grass Roots" area, the stronghold of 
isolationism in the country. Lamont found it much more 
satisfactory having a Midwesterner leading the interven­
tionist campaign, because an Eastern committee chairman 
would arouse the old suspicions against Wall Street and 
munitions makers. Lamont respected White's executive abili­
ties as well as his interventionist sentiments. This as­
sured Lamont that White planned to make the group's member­
ship as representative as possible to turn aside the
warmonger epithet which the isolationists were sure to hurl
2
at the committee.
Lament's faith in William Allen White was well 
placed, as the committee's accomplishments in the great
2
Thomas W. Lamont to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 
15, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
BOX 70.
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debate proved. Lamont and White promised the President 
that all their projected plans would be forwarded to the 
White House for approval before implementation. After 
agreeing to abandon programs that failed to gain the Presi­
dent's approval, they urged Roosevelt to confer with Alfred 
M. Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential condidate, and 
secure his support for intervention. If Landon were con­
verted to their position Lamont and White knew what a seri­
ous blow it would be to the isolationist-conservative bloc 
within the Republican party. Roosevelt did not need their 
urging because he had previously contacted Landon, and had 
in mind a cabinet post for him, although the appointment 
never materialized. Landon was sympathetic to the Allied 
cause, but out of consideration for his party position as 
titular leader he never associated with the intervention­
ists.
Once Roosevelt approved the committee's formation 
its members worked diligently to further interventionism 
during the great debate. The May manifesto of Lamont, White, 
and other charter members was the committee's first public 
declaration. The document stated that civilization had 
entered a great "struggle for life or death" which made 
it impossible for America to live alone in the world.
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Nazi victory threatened all hopes for "peace, security, and 
freedom," and Americans had to aid the European democracies 
"fighting with their backs to the sea" to protect the Western 
Hemisphere. Thomas Lamont directed the drafters to add 
that America's own "totally inadequate defenses" had to 
be strengthened to guard against Axis aggression. He pre­
sumed this addition coincided with Roosevelt's remarks on 
defenses in the May 26 presidential radio address. No one 
was more devoted to the British cause than the senior part­
ner of J. P. Morgan and Company, but he supported home de­
fense as necessary to give balance to the overall prepared­
ness program.
Following agreement on the committee's principles 
the founders invited 687 prominent Americans to join the 
National committee and "carry [the committee's] points of 
view to the American people."^ Eventually 605 prospects 
accepted the invitation; Tallulah Bankhead and Gene Tunney 
commingled with Reinhold Niebuhr and Piorello LaGuardia 
to formulate policy. Two businessmen active in the first 
White Committee joined the new group: Hugh Moore became
executive chairman and Frederick C. McKee served as treasurer.
3
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Financiers who followed Lamont into the committee included 
the younger J. F. Morgan and William Loeb. From industry 
the committee counted on its rolls General Electric's Gerard 
Swope and the silk manufacturer Ward Cheney.^
In the second month of its existence the committee 
published Defense for America, a monumental compilation 
of interventionist arguments. Quincy Wright and James B. 
Conant as well as Lewis W. Douglas, president of New York's 
Mutual Life Insurance Company and later ambassador to Brit­
ain, contributed to the volume. In his essay Douglas re­
counted the centuries old "crusade to emancipate the human 
spirit" from state control in Europe. The Nazi regime 
aimed to destroy what progress the crusade had made, a fact 
Douglas hoped Americans now comprehended so that they would 
join in the fight to save democracy. He stressed that the 
threat to the United States was not one of territorial losses, 
instead, the danger lay in the Nazi threat to "freedom 
under justice" and the Bill of Rights. Turning to the 
weaknesses of the isolationist arguments Douglas found 
it strange that those who opposed intervention were will­
ing to arm the United States but would not admit that the
^Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies 
Membership List, December 9, 1940, White Papers, Box 317.
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Axis threat was the reason for preparedness. Douglas in­
sisted that if the isolationists employed logic in their 
thinking they must either recognize the German threat or 
else oppose the defense program.^ in these writings Doug­
las exemplified the businessmen who immersed themselves 
in the political affairs of the nation. These men were 
a breed apart from the William Knudsens and Walter Giffords 
of the industrial mobilization program, who thought mostly 
in terms of their technical fields and rarely publicized 
their views regarding international relations. Only two 
members of the Business Advisory Council of 1940, the Bos­
tonians William Y. Elliott and Louis E. Kirstein, joined 
the Committee to Defend America. Also, only two. Jay C. 
Hormel and R. Douglas Stuart, supported the America First 
Committee, the isolationist organization which was organ­
ized a few months later.
As the summer of 1940 rolled on, the White Com­
mittee propagated for general support of the Allies in vari­
ous ways. Sympathetic statements by such prominent men 
as Benjamin Connor, former United States Chamber of Commerce 
president, that "our national existence depends on an English
5
William A. White (ed , ), Defense for America (New 
York; The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 139-140.
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victory" were published in Executive Director Clark Eichel- 
berger's Progress Bulletin.^ Eichelberger also spread the 
news that the July polls recorded a majority in favor of 
aid to the Allies. White and other Republicans successfully 
carried the battle for intervention into the Republican 
Convention and helped nominate Wendell Willkie for the 
presidency; thus White thwarted the isolationist bloc within 
his own party.
The greatest success of the White Committee in 
1940 was its part in effecting the agreement to give 50 
World War I vintage destroyers to Britain in exchange for 
bases in the Atlantic. The number of vessels was consid­
ered inadequate by such Anglophiles as Thomas Lamont even 
though the accomplishment bordered on the spectacular, 
considering the amount of isolationist opposition. To 
increase the aid to Britain Lamont urged White to press 
for the establishment of a new procurement authority, out­
side the New Deal-dominated Treasury, to be responsible 
for sending planes, tanks, and munitions to England. La­
mont considered the newly formed National Defense Advisory 
commission inadequate for this duty, although he would
6
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, 
Progress Bulletin, Number 4, July 19, 1940, p. 4.
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not quarrel with the job it was doing as a purely advisory 
organization. Authority, not advice, was necessary to 
get the priorities for shipping the vital materials to 
Britain, in addition to material Lamont wanted the commit­
tee to support the development of training camps in Texas 
and California for English and Canadian airmen, and Ameri­
cans, if Congress would allow them to join the British 
forces. Since these various projects would spread the 
committee's resources too thinly, Lamont received little 
support for them, but in other ways he was more influen-
n
tial in shaping committee policies.
In the early days of October, 1940, Lamont sug­
gested to White that they support what essentially was an 
embryonic form of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act. Lamont presumed 
the idea was "probably premature" but nevertheless should 
be kept in mind for future consideration. He wanted un­
limited loans made to England directly by the government 
in order to shorten the war and give victory to the Allies. 
Only this plan would stay the need to send American troops 
against Germany and Japan, in this way Lamont was certain 
that England could "stop the war on the other side of the
7
Thomas W. Lamont to William A. White, October
4, 1940, White Papers, Box 316.
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Atlantic" and dispel the possibility of the conflict spread­
ing to the Western Hemisphere.
Chairman White's major problem was not in obtain­
ing support for his projects, but restraining the extreme 
Anglophiles who wanted to send American troops to Europe 
immediately. Eventually it became obvious to White that 
the extremist element in the committee had totally differ­
ent ideas from his own as to what constituted aid to the 
Allies. After months of friction he resigned as chairman 
in the first days of 1941. Thomas Lamont reported to the 
White House that the committee's New York Chapter, a hot­
bed of extreme interventionism, finally drove White to 
abandon the chairmanship. The New Yorkers had decided 
upon Fiorello LaGuardia as their honorary chairman, and as 
Herbert B. Swope made this nomination he could not refrain 
from making what in Lamont's estimation were several "per­
fect insults" against White for failing to support all-out 
intervention.
Businessmen outside New York, however, had attacked 
White's position before the Swope speech. A few days pre­
ceding the resignation J. Lionberger Davis, chairman of 
the board of the St. Louis Security National Bank and close 
friend of Franklin Roosevelt, wrote to Emporia saying it
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was impossible to believe White’s recently issued statement 
that he had joined the committee only for one reason: to
keep America out of war. The elderly banker threatened to 
resign the vice presidency of the St. Louis Chapter of the 
Committee to Defend America unless White retracted this 
profession. Davis hoped that the United States did not 
have to become an active belligerent, but he would support 
such a course of action if necessary to keep the Axis "from 
crushing innocent peoples and . . .  menacing our own free­
dom and way of life." Davis maintained that the loss of
freedom was more terrible than war, even though taking up
3arms was a loathsome task.
Messages from isolationists made White see that 
he was out of step with the Eichelberger-Davis group and 
resignation was mandatory. Afterwards former President 
Herbert Hoover congratulated him in the best isolationist 
style and observed that the "war whoopers are becoming 
more bloodthirsty every minute." Hoover admitted to being 
an "appeaser" because he claimed that if Roosevelt pursued 
an interventionist policy ten or fifteen million American
Q
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lives would be lost in battle. In what he presumed were 
his last ten years of life Hoover told White he was pre­
pared to devote them to "helping people live a little longer" 
by denouncing intervention. Reflecting his lingering bit­
terness over his 1932 defeat Hoover added that he was equally 
prepared to spend his remaining years in a concentration
camp, for Roosevelt would "no doubt take care of it in the 
9
end anyhow."
Isolationists never ceased their attack on the 
White Committee. From the day White joined the committee 
they claimed that he was nothing more than a Midwestern 
tool of the Wall Street manipulators. Father Charles Coug- 
lin first spread this rumor in his malodorous publication 
Social Justice. He alleged that the April 29 meeting which 
had selected White as chairman of the Committee to Defend 
America was attended by eighteen powerful Eastern bankers. 
Senator Rush Holt and others capitalized on the munitions 
makers legend and charged that big business controlled 
the White Committee through their large financial contri­
butions. It was true that J. P. Morgan donated $500, but
9
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David Dubinsky, the bête noire of many capitalists, had given 
an equal a m o u n t . T h e  sources of the initial contributions 
showed that the committee's strength lay in the interven­
tionist-minded East; New York City had given approximately 
two-fifths, or $35,000 of the first $86,000.^^
Possibly for integrity's sake all extreme inter­
ventionists should have left the White Committee, but they 
continued membership in it while forming another organiza­
tion called the Century Group. During the summer and fall 
of 1940 the Century Group cooperated fully with the White 
Committee, with dual membership in both held by Ward Cheney, 
Lewis Douglas, and William L. Clayton, a Houston cotton 
merchant. A more extreme organization also materialized 
in 1940 to join the interventionist side of the great de­
bate. Calling themselves the Fight for Freedom Committee, 
Ward Cheney, Marshall Field, and others, who retained their 
membership in the former groups, advocated immediate mili­
tary intervention to stop Hitler and save the democracies. 
Isolationists attacked these groups as they had the White
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies 
Comptroller's Daily Cash Report, October 26, 1940, White 
papers. Box 316.
^^William A. White to Mark Anderson, July 8, 1940, 
White Papers, Box 316.
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Committee. Charges of big business control were common, 
but in reality the extreme interventionists received stron­
ger and more consistent support from big labor than from 
12
management.
in September, a few months after White and Lamont 
formed the Committee to Defend America, isolationists railed 
around their own self-proclaimed standard bearer and or­
ganized a committee to promote the principles of non-involve­
ment. R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., son of Quaker Oat's first 
vice president, left his legal studies at Yale and founded 
the America First Committee. If the interventionists had 
achieved success through action by committee so too, he 
promised his followers, could the isolationists. In Wil­
liam Allen White's opinion Stuart was "not politically 
mature and . . . somewhat naive," but Sears Chairman Robert 
E. Wood favored the enterprise and soon the committee grew 
into a national organization. Wood became the temporary 
chaimman and remained in that position until the group 
was dissolved, because no one dared assume the controversial 
title of permanent chairman. Wood feared Sears' business
12
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would suffer if he accepted the permanent leadership, and 
at times he had his doubts about keeping the temporary 
office.
Stuart set up his operation in the Quaker Oats 
offices, although his father was somewhat apprehensive over 
this move. To insure success the publicity men from Quaker 
Oats and Sears gave professional guidance to the committee 
staff, and William Benton, one of the nation's most success­
ful public relations executives, lent further help to the 
cause. William Allen White claimed that Benton had bragged 
that all the "smart money in this country" was on the iso­
lationist side, which guaranteed victory over the inter­
ventionists.
White's own opinions of America First's celebrities 
indicated the type of individuals generally associated 
with the committee. He said of former Ambassador to japan 
William R. Castle that the retired diplomat probably had 
his hopes set on being appointed Secretary of State if the 
Republicans won the 1940 election. White wondered, however, 
in what way family sugar interests in Hawaii might affect 
Castle's formulation of foreign policy. He knew that Castle 
thought Germany would be victorious in Europe and had no 
objections to Japan's imperialist program in the Pacific.
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White dismissed John T. Flynn, who opposed the entire de­
fense program, as one on the verge of a nervous breakdown 
who should be treated accordingly. Regarding Katheryn 
Lewis, daughter of the labor leader. White expressed con­
tempt for her being a fellow traveler, and pity for her
committee associate Oswald G. Villard, because he was "fairly
13senile" and without any "firm ideological base."
Isolationist businessmen had to work with this 
amazing array of eccentrics if they hoped to direct the main 
isolationist force in the great debate. But the ability 
to reconcile the differences between fellow travelers and 
steel executives in the interest of the common goal was 
lacking in America First leadership. Possibly more indus­
trialists were directly associated with America First than 
the White Committee, whose business world membership tended 
more toward financiers and lawyers. Best known among the 
America First businessmen was Henry Ford, described by 
White as an "incorrigible, anti-democratic, individualist 
Fascist." Still resentful over the public ridiculing of 
his 1915 Peace Ship Mission, the automaker became an ardent 
supporter of America First. Although too aged for his
13
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views to be influential. Ford did block one interventionist 
project during the Battle of Britain, when the Administra­
tion arranged with the Ford Motor Company to make engines 
for the RAF's Spitfire. Edsel Ford agreed to the plan, 
but his father canceled the agreement on the basis that 
America was not at war with Germany and should not under­
take such an unneutral project as making Merlin Rolls-Royce
engines for the British. After Pearl Harbor, however,
14Ford cooperated with industrial mobilization. Henry 
Ford's influence on America First was negligible, because 
he was expelled from the National Committee only two months 
after the group was organized. The Board of Directors 
doubted that Ford's views were "consistent with the official 
views of the Committee" and decided he had to be "dropped 
as a member.
William Regnery, president of Western Shade Cloth 
Company, was one of the directors who voted to end Ford's 
association with America First. Three weeks after the
14
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board ostracized Ford, Regnery offered to underwrite the 
committee's expenses up to $40,000. This sum was in addi­
tion to his previous $10,000 donation. The board, however, 
decided to delay acceptance of the $40,000 until other 
sources had been e x h a u s t e d . T h o m a s  N. McCarter, chair­
man of the board of Public Service Electric and Gas Com­
pany, also served as an America First director. Hanford 
MacNider, president of Northwestern States Portland Cement 
Company, sat with McCarter on the board and contributed 
to the committee's policy making from his broad experiences 
of the past two decades. From 1925 to 1928 he had served 
as assistant secretary of war and in the early 1930's he 
was minister to Canada. Other industrialists who served 
on the National Committee were Edward L. Ryerson, vice 
chairman of Inland Steel and Sterling Morton, the salt 
king.
Another active but bothersome America First di­
rector was Jay C. Hormel, president of the Hormel meat 
packing company, William Allen White respected Hormel 
as a competent industrialist who exercised a "generous pa­
ternalistic policy toward his employees, but who too often
Minutes of America First Committee Board of 
Directors Meeting, December 27, 1940, America First Papers, 
Box 23.
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applauded Hamilton Fish and other isolationists on the
17
Republican Policy Committee." Hormel had the singular 
quality of injecting disharmony into otherwise staid con­
ferences with his thoughts and proposals. One such instance 
occurred the year before America First was founded, when 
at an Executive Committee meeting of the Business Advisory 
Council, Hormel added to a discussion on foreign trade 
that intercourse with belligerents could lead to overex­
pansion and dislocate the American economy. He proposed 
instead that the United States develop permanent markets 
in Latin America and close out all European business.
The BAC members favored developing Latin American trade 
but rejected the rest of Hormel's scheme. After Hormel 
relinquished the floor at the Business Advisory Council
meeting the stenographer laconically recorded that "con-
18
siderable discussion followed."
In America First Hormel hoped he had found an 
organization that would serve as a vehicle for his ideas
17
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on American foreign policy, but he disagreed with the 
methods Wood and Stuart were using to propagate the com­
mittee's principles, in Hormel's opinion open attacks should 
not have been directed against any specific part of the 
Roosevelt program; instead, he wanted quiet, unpublicized 
lobbying conducted in Washington against proposed inter­
ventionist legislation. Hormel realized that America First 
was fighting a rear guard action in the great debate and 
could not afford a policy of "guerilla warfare against the 
subissue of the moment." The interventionists always won 
the individual debates over cash and carry and aid to the 
Allies. Instead of dissipating America First's strength 
on these issues, Hormel wanted all efforts concentrated 
on the main objective; the promotion of noninvolvement 
in the war. In line with this approach Hormel suggested 
that America First support for reelection congressmen of
either party who consistently voted against the legisla-
19tion dragging the country closer toward war.
During the lifetime of America First the Board 
of Directors never approved a program suitable to Hormel; 
the committee steadfastly opposed Administration foreign
19
Telegram, Jay C. Hormel to Robert E. Wood,
January 14, 1941, America First Papers, Box 19.
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policy without offering a viable substitute. Its programs 
mainly attracted unwanted support from such lunatic fringe 
leaders as Father Coughlin and Gerald L. K. Smith. With 
these men using America First for their own purposes Hormel 
realized the public could not help but think the committee 
"a little bit screwball." Over the months Hormel waited 
for America First to embrace a policy backing both adequate 
national defense and noninvolvement in Europe's war. In­
stead, the committee neither adequately supported defense 
nor succeeded in keeping the United States away from Brit­
ain's war with the Axis. There were moments when Hormel 
nearly convinced his colleagues that he had joined the 
wrong committee, because he always considered the Neutrality 
Law of 1939 an unfair restriction on American shipping.
In the best Wilsonian tradition he informed Director Stuart 
that the United States should maintain her right to ship 
normal quantities of linseed meal and other goods to Hol­
land and elsewhere "item by item to all the countries—
20combatant and occupied."
At the end of November, 1941, with the Axis pre­
paring to breach America's traditional water defense system.
^^jay C. Hormel to R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., October
30, 1941, America First Papers, Box 19.
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Hormel believed that only a complete regeneration could 
save America First. Its leaders had to accept realisti­
cally the world crisis and propagate three basic principles: 
an impregnable national defense system; constant prepared­
ness; and the preservation of representative republican 
government by staying out of wars in Europe and Asia.
Hormel believed his proposals constituted a positive pro­
gram far superior to the brickbat throwing that the com­
mittee had indulged in during its first year's existence.
He was willing to live with lend-lease, and destroyers
21sales, if given the chance to spread his basic principles.
Robert Wood in vain attempted to placate Hormel 
with assurances that a new set of principles would be pub­
licly revealed in the first week of December, 1941. Wood, 
however, bluntly told Hormel that the majority of the com­
mittee disagreed with his proposed principles, especially 
if Hormel regarded the United States already at war. Wood 
admitted that America had entered an undeclared limited 
naval war, but he insisted the American people had not com­
mitted themselves to make the sacrifices a total war re­
quired. No expeditionary force had been raised to effect
21
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the "all out" war needed to destroy Germany. Such efforts.
Wood estimated, would cost "a couple hundred billion dol-
22ars" and destroy the national economic structure.
The adjustments made to America First did not 
suit Hormel and he resigned from the committee three days 
before Pearl Harbor. For a year his associates had ignored 
his complaint that the committee was against everything 
and for nothing. Although he still opposed an American 
invasion of Hitler's Europe he did not see how, at such a 
late date, isolationists could expect Congress to avoid 
"participation" in the war. Despite differences of opin­
ion Hormel praised General Wood's reputation and general
abilities as the only force that held the organization
23
together during its existence.
Hormel's appraisal of Wood was extremely accurate. 
A chairman less than completely dedicated to the isolation­
ist cause with a reputation qualified in its sincerity and 
integrity would never have survived the state of turmoil 
in which the General constantly found himself, in the din
22
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of battle Wood never faltered as he fought the making of 
an Anglo-American alliance in Washington. Wood accused 
the Department of State, especially Ambassador Bullitt, 
and the President as well as Mrs. Roosevelt of pro-Allied 
feelings, which, he wrote, were contrary to those of the 
"overwhelming majority" of Americans, whether businessmen 
or workers. Republicans or D e m o c r a t s . W o o d  recalled in 
the simplistic idiom of the isolationists that the Versailles 
Treaty did not make the world safe for democracy, but rather 
it created Hitler and Nazism. He then drew the conclusion 
that defeating Hitler with American aid in the current war 
would only produce another Versailles and more Hitlers.
Since all nations were staggering under their 
past war debts. Wood predicted ruin for the Powers that 
dared participate in another conflict. To avoid such a 
fate Wood proposed the standard isolationist solution: the
United States must stand aloof from the European conflict 
and convert North America into a great fortress defended 
by a strong Army and Navy. If the British Empire collapsed. 
Wood assumed Canada planned to annex herself to the United
^^Robert E. Wood to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 
6, 1939, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, Box 
1365.
128
States, and thus solidify North American defenses. This 
security, however, would be meaningless if the United States 
entered the war, because. Wood presumed, the American social 
system might collapse, leaving few liberties and none of 
the social and economic gains made since 1933. Wood hated 
to behold the dissipation of American wealth being used, 
as he thought, to preserve the British and French empires 
when the funds could be well spent at home if the President 
were neutral in thought as well as deed.
Roosevelt did not brook this criticism even from 
the respected Robert Wood and replied that the General at 
his age should discriminate between newspaper interpreta­
tions and facts, and stop making such "wild and wholly in­
correct statements." The President insisted that no one 
in official Washington considered war inevitable so Wood
ought to get his "feet back on the ground" and cease being 
25so disturbed.
Resentful over this presidential chiding. Wood 
answered that he sincerely hoped the Chief Executive did 
not consider him "simple enough to take columnists' arti­
cles . . .  at face value," because his information came
25
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert E. Wood, October 
12, 1939, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, Box
1365.
129
not from journalistic sources but from Administration offi- 
cials, including one State Department officer. Wood 
did withdraw his request for "neutrality in thought" but 
he continued to demand neutral action, which he found ig­
nored in the case of the Bremen, the German liner delayed 
by authorities in the New York harbor after the invasion 
of Poland. Wood recalled that although he had disagreed 
with portions of the New Deal, mistakes in domestic policy 
could be rectified. In foreign affairs, however, rectifi­
cation was impossible; errors in diplomacy might lead to 
Armageddon. Nevertheless, the General accepted Roosevelt's 
word that the Administration did not anticipate American 
entry into the European war and admitted that two of the 
original points he had brought to the President— the infor­
mation about Ambassador Bullitt and Roosevelt himself— were 
merely hearsay.
Roosevelt could not resist answering Wood and 
immediately pointed out that "hearsay evidence . . .  is not 
admissable in the court." But if Wood still insisted on 
being a doubting Thomas he should come down to Washington
26
Robert E. Wood to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 
25, 1939, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File,
Box 1365.
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and let the President personally "quiet [his] troubled 
27
mind." Regardless of such bandying the Roosevelt charm 
failed to draw Wood into the interventionist camp, and 
seemed to have the opposite effect, with the General lead­
ing the opposition throughout the great foreign policy 
debate.
Although Wood stood as the rock of Gibraltar amid 
the diverse and perhaps unstable personalities of the iso­
lationist movement moderation tempered his thinking on 
certain issues. Wood thought the isolationists and inter­
ventionists saw eye to eye on the strengthening of the Army 
and Navy and supported the current program because the 
richest nation, America, had to "make itself impregnable." 
Also Wood found that both schools of thought opposed foreign 
nations establishing new colonies in the Western Hemisphere 
and supported plans to defend North and South America, at 
least as far as the Equator, although many isolationists 
were reluctant to extend the defense zone as far as Cape 
Horn. One other point of agreement was on aid to Britain 
within the limits of the Neutrality Law. Many interven­
tionists opposed cash and carry in favor of lend-lease but
27
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert E. Wood, October 
28, 1939, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, Box 
1365.
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Wood considered the former system the best method to give
Britain the aid vital to her continuing the war against 
28Germany.
Wood's high point as isolationism's leader came 
at the NAM Congress of American Industry in December, 1940. 
In a major address he recalled the great fears his business 
associates had of Communism in the 1920's. In that decade 
his friends feared that Bolshevism would conquer all Europe 
and then spread to the United States. But the threat proved 
groundless and. Wood added, Russia had reverted to "a second- 
rate Asiatic depotism." The same fate would befall Nazism, 
he predicted. Isolationists applauded this speech as the 
embodiment of their principles. The Commercial and Finan­
cial Chronicle urged all Americans "to ponder [this] strong 
and straightforward address . . . ." The Chronicle agreed 
with Wood that in America "a minority, highly entrenched 
. . .  is determined upon much more aggressive action"
against the Axis and should be checked immediately before
29they involved the nation in war.
28
Robert E. Wood, "What Should Be Our Policy In 
the Present European War?", Address before the 1940 Congress 
of American Industry, December 13, 1940 (New York: National 
Association of Manufacturers, 1940), pp. 1-17.
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The star speaker in the America First stable, 
however, was Charles Lindbergh, who became so entangled 
in explaining away his anti-Semitic statements and iron 
Cross— a gift from Herman Goering— that it was question­
able whether he was an asset or liability in the last months 
of America First's existence. Before the founding of America 
First, Lindbergh had advised Americans to investigate the 
background of every person who expressed opinions about 
the European war and America's relation to it. Dorothy 
Thompson, an avid internationalist, immediately challenged 
Lindbergh's own record. Barron's thought Miss Thompson 
had "very properly turned 'Lindy's ' own advice against him 
and went pretty thoroughly into his h i s t o r y . i s o l a t i o n ­
ists ignored these attacks but were disappointed in the 
small number of converts Lindbergh had brought into the 
fold. The Chronicle lamented that Lindbergh's "honest 
attempt to discuss the fundamentals of the situation" and 
to point out "the wisest course for us to follow" after the 
French surrender was ignored by the White House. The in­
terventionist Administration, claimed the editors, was
30
Barron's, XIX (October 30, 1939), p. 10.
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just "playing politics" with the "sincere effort" of Lind­
bergh and isolationists in general.
Other America First speakers added confusion in 
the ranks when they indiscriminately renewed the warmonger 
charges against industry, which made isolationist business­
men blench at being associated with the side of villainy 
in the great debate. The Wall Street Journal challenged 
Senator Burton J. Wheeler, one of America First's most 
popular speakers, on this after the Senator "insinuated" 
that Wall Street favored entry into the war. The Journal 
replied that such charges were the "crudest nonsense," and 
the securities business contained no greater proportion of
extreme interventionists than any other segment of the 
32
nation.
As the committees girded themselves for action in 
the great debate they found on their doorsteps the issue 
of whether America could survive in an economic world domi­
nated by a victorious Germany. Many Americans suspected 
that once Hitler enslaved the workers of Europe he could 
out produce and outsell the united states in world markets
31The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL (June
22, 1940), pp. 3880-3881. 
32
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and destroy the nation in an economic war. Robert Wood 
expressed the isolationists' sentiments when he told the 
Congress of American Industry that the American economy 
could compete successfully with a victorious Germany, al­
though the government might have to fight fire with fire 
and establish export cartels and mass purchasing organiza­
tions. Once this was done the laws of economics would 
prevail in America's favor. Wood argued, because Europe 
needed America more than America needed Europe.
Less well known than Wood or Charles Lindbergh 
but nevertheless a powerful gun in the America First camp 
was George N. Peek. One of many who passed through the 
halls of the New Deal in the 1930's later to become dis­
illusioned with the Roosevelt Administration, Peek had 
served as Export-Import Bank president and presumed to be 
an authority on international economics. If the Nazis 
used slave labor to compete with the United States Peek 
assured America Firsters that free labor could out produce 
these Hitlerian helots. This had been proven, he believed, 
by the fact that America's greatest progress came after the 
abolition of slavery. The interventionists challenged 
this reasoning. Peek explained, out of self-interest. In­
ternational bankers and others who profited from world trade
135
were attempting to involve in foreign markets American 
industrialists whose proper places were in the prosperous 
and stable domestic market. In particular Peek condemned 
James P. Warburg, a former New York banker turned economist 
and author, as a typical international financier willing 
to abandon principle in the pursuit of profit, in 1936 
Warburg had written two books opposing Roosevelt's reelec­
tion but during the presidential campaign changed to the 
Democratic side after Alf Landon embraced protectionism.
This proved to Peek's satisfaction that the present inter­
ventionists belonged to the same group the Nye Committee 
chastized as the warmongers of World War I. Although they 
were backing Roosevelt and his foreign policy Peek considered 
them "queer company for the New Dealers who were going to 
drive the money changers from the temple." An unexpected 
supporter of Peek on one point was Bernard Baruch who, on 
June 10, 1941, stated that the United States could under­
sell Germany in neutral world markets if Americans maintained 
a "low price structure throughout the war." At the same 
time Baruch dismissed the alleged threat of cheap German
33America First Committee, Can Hitler Cripple 
America's Economy; An Interview with George N. Peek, 
Moline, Illinois (Chicago; America First Committee, 1941), 
pp. 23-29.
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labor as nothing more than an exaggeration from the inter­
ventionist propaganda mill. Barron's answered Baruch for 
the interventionists and reminded him that although the 
United States operated under free enterprise Germany had 
passed into a state-controlled economic system which was 
potentially dangerous to all capitalist c o u n t r i e s . ^4
The Chronicle supported the isolationists in play­
ing down the effect of a German victory on the American 
economy. The Chronicle surmised that the Nazi success in 
destroying France had "stimulated the imaginations of the 
world to the point" that many misinformed interventionists 
pronounced Germany, if victorious in Europe, the future 
political and economic arbitrator of the world. But the 
Chronicle suspected that Germany was already weary after 
seven years of war and if victory in Europe were hers she 
would lack the strength to challenge the United States 
politically or economically. Instead of participating 
in "international wire-pulling and bitter jealousies" the 
Chronicle hoped that as long as the war lasted Americans
would choose to remain at home and "develop first and
35
primarily our defensive position."
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The White Committee's Lewis Douglas was among the 
first to discount the isolationist premise that the united 
States could live at peace in a Nazi-dominated world. The 
isolationists were blind, Douglas wrote, if they thought 
German life in 1940 was similar in any way to that in America, 
To the contrary, Douglas believed that Hitler planned to 
use his regimented masses to lead a world revolution aimed 
at crushing the "degenerate democracies." Douglas rejected 
isolationist assurances that trade with Germany could con­
tinue uninterupted. He retorted that regardless of their 
proposed reasonable sounding trade agreements the Nazis 
were determined to conduct the trading on their own un­
principled terms backed by threats of violence. In pro­
duction Douglas pointed out that this German dominated 
trade pitted free labor against the Third Reich's workers 
and would require reorganization of the American system 
into an imitation of Germany's, with "unrestrained personal 
authority and organized violence" binding it together. Re­
garding Peek's callous comparison of free labor to slave,
36
Douglas and his associates found it unworthy of comment.
In support of Douglas, the Business Week economics 
staff came to the conclusion that Germany might attempt to
36
White, "Defense for America," pp. 140-147, White
Papers, Box 317.
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launch an "economic blitzkrieg" against the United States. 
After a victory over France and Britain, Germany would 
have the raw materials for her state-controlled economy 
which, through a loss leader policy, could then inflict 
the "crowning indignity" on America : atuomobiles marked
"made in Germany" for sale in auto agencies throughout the 
United States.
By the end of 1940 the interventionist theory of 
impending economic war had gained acceptance in the White 
House. One reason, Barron's reported, was that even the 
"sled-length isolationists who love Roosevelt least" now 
accepted the possibility of economic conflict with Germany. 
With many isolationists and all interventionists in agree­
ment on this point the President felt safe to act. Business­
men were relieved when the White House indicated that it 
would meet the German industrial threat if it materialized, 
but they hoped that the President would appoint someone 
besides "Uncle Henry" Morganthau and his "grabby . . . 
aggressive, young clique" of New Dealers to run the program.^®
Animated by the formation of the committees of 
the great debate interventionist businessmen toyed more
37
Business Week, June 18, 1940, pp. 37-44.
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with the idea of direct intervention in the European war, 
and isolationists in the business community cast shriller 
denunciations against Rooseveltian foreign policy. Promi­
nent in the work of the committees were individual business­
men. Praise for Thomas Lamont's important contributions 
to the Committee to Defend America came from his fellow 
interventionists and from Roosevelt himself. Robbed by 
Senator Nye's anti-business propaganda of the chairmanship, 
which was rightfully his, Lamont relinquished the mantle 
of leadership to William Allen White in the interest of the 
interventionist cause.
With no burden from the Nye Committee to bear, 
the America First isolationists unhesitatingly chose a 
businessman as their leader. Critics frequently assumed 
that America First was the anti-Roosevelt businessmen's 
final ploy for ousting Roosevelt from the White House. 
Although the committee was founded a few weeks before the 
election other events were more important in its formation. 
The White Committee had been thriving for months and iso­
lationists thought that their cause would prosper if simi­
larly organized. The success of the destroyer deal in 
September left no doubt that the America First Committee 
was needed immediately to oppose future interventionist
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projects which isolationists feared would involve the United 
States in war. The theory that America First was another 
front for the Roosevelt haters is untenable because only 
one businessman from the rabidly anti-Roosevelt American 
Liberty League, Thomas N. McCarter, was active on the iso­
lationist group's national committee. In contrast, several 
Liberty Leaguers joined the pro-Roosevelt White group, in­
cluding such prominent interventionists as Frederic R. 
Coudert, William L. Clayton, and J. P. Morgan.
The clash between the two committees over the 
possibility of economic war with Germany indicates the 
intractable position taken by the groups on all issues in 
the great debate. Suggestions for compromise in either 
group were met with scorn by the extremists. No middle 
ground ever developed upon which reasonable isolationists 
and moderate interventionists could stand to build a posi­
tive foreign policy and defense program for the nation.
The President knew this, and continued his "quarterbacking" 
to effect his preparedness program, the next steps of which 
were the destroyer deal with Britain and conscription at 
home.
CHAPTER V
BUSINESS AND THE POLICY OF NONBELLIGERENCY
The first move toward a bipartisan foreign policy 
came on June 20, 1940, when the President appointed Henry 
L. Stimson and Frank Knox as secretaries of War and Navy. 
These actions represented the initial steps in the Adminis­
tration ' s move to transform America from a neutral into a 
nonbelligerent in world politics. The presence of two 
prominent Republicans in the cabinet lightened the burden 
of the battle on Roosevelt as he sought passage of a con­
scription law and arranged the donation of warships to 
Britain, steps which permanently closed behind the Presi­
dent the doors of neutrality. America's new nonbelligerent 
status suited the purposes of the interventionist business­
men who placed great faith in Stimson and Knox's ability 
to shape a pro-Ally foreign policy. Barron's noted that 
"often in tough spots . . .  Roosevelt has contrived to make 
a move killing two birds with one rock, " thus acting in 
the nation's and his own political interest. The magazine 
did not consider the cabinet a coalition as the White House 
had labeled it, but agreed that the move was "good politics"
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for the President and "good business" for the government, 
as well.^ The appointments also indicated to the editors 
the President's accurate sizing up of American public opin­
ion, now willing to support a change in policy from neu­
trality to nonbelligerency.
Exceptions to this opinion included the isolation­
ist Commercial and Financial Chronicle which disliked the 
idea of the interventionists Knox and Stimson taking over 
the War and Navy departments. In the magazine's opinion 
the "political amateurs" in the White House made the appoint­
ments to remove the public's attention from the reorganiza­
tion of the National Defense Advisory Commission, the agency
2
in charge of industrial mobilization. More bluntly. The 
wall Street Journal characterized the Stimson appointment 
as a "calamity," because of the veteran cabinet member's 
past interventionist record. Regardless of Stimson's "un­
questioned integrity and fine ability" the Journal felt that
as Secretary of War he "could open this country to the
3
danger of war. . . . "  In any event, Stimson and Knox
^Barron's, The National Financial Weekly, XX (May 
20, 1940), p. 4; (June 24, 1940), p. 10.
2
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL (May 
25, 1940), p. 3264; (June 22, 1940), p. 3878.
3
The Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1940, p. 4.
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were put to work promoting the transfer of destroyers to 
the hard pressed British fleet. President Roosevelt's 
interventionist supporters were so successful in winning 
public support for the deal that the columnist Mark Sulli­
van estimated nine out of ten Americans favored the destroyer 
trade. This, Sullivan declared, should spur the President 
on to conclude the arrangements, regardless of the legal 
and diplomatic problems created by the transfer. On Sep­
tember 3 the President took advantage of the rising senti­
ment in favor of the destroyer transaction and announced
4
his executive agreement to Congress.
The business press, along with other segments 
of the American public, speculated on the effect that the 
destroyer deal would have on United States relations with 
other world powers. Business Week regarded the destroyer 
transfer as the climax of events that had taken place since 
the French surrender, when Roosevelt designated the British 
Isles as America's first line of defense. Now there was 
no question that the United States had ceased to be neutral 
and had become a "non-belligerent, extending all aid— short 
of war— to the Allies."^ interventionist businessmen who
4
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, 
Progress Bulletin, August 12, 1940.
^Business Week, September 7, 1940, p. 52.
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had grown impatient with the President's waiting for the 
political winds to blow from the right direction before 
acting on the transfer of the vessels now congratulated 
Roosevelt. A Chicago realtor, however, scolded the Presi­
dent for being "inclined to pussyfoot too much," because 
the destroyer transfer "should have been made several months 
ago." Regardless of the delay the Chicagoan, along with 
many interventionists, pledged his support to the President 
in the coming election "probably on account of what I deem 
to be your strong foreign policy."^
Barron's decided that the President had delayed 
the destroyer deal because he was "on the verge of soft- 
pedalling his foreign policy." The magazine assumed that 
an invasion of Britain was imminent and the unprepared 
state of the American military machine had caused the White 
House to "speak softly until it can get a big stick."
Unless the deal could be disguised as a commercial trans­
action, Barron's regarded it as tantamount to a declaration
7
of war on Germany.
^Alexander Bisno to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Sep­
tember 5, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335.
7
Barron's, XX (August 12, 1940), p. 4; (September
30, 1940), p. 4.
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Regardless of the legal category in which the 
Administration placed the destroyer deal, isolationists 
were enraged over this pro-Ally move. The Chronicle, 
reflecting its traditional distrust of the President, went 
straight to the heart of the matter. It quoted word for 
word to its readers the United States statute prohibiting 
delivery of warships to belligerents when America was a 
neutral. The Chronicle fought to the last against the 
Administration's "insidious steps . . .  to squander the 
lives and substance of the people in unnecessary warfare. 
. . . "  Ambassador William C. Bullitt's "rabble rousing" 
Philadelphia speech, which pictured Adolf Hitler in Inde­
pendence Hall was, in the Chronicle's opinion, a violation 
of the Criminal Code. A diplomat, argued the editors, 
was a government employee and could not influence legisla­
tion although Bullitt had tried to do so with his inter­
ventionist speechmaking. When the President announced the 
destroyer transfer on September 3, the Chronicle found 
this "newest departure of the capricious Mr. Roosevelt 
. . . startling in itself." The White House had described 
the transfer as an "epochal" act, a stock term which, when 
uttered by the President, always made the Chronicle editors 
"grow uneasy." Either the President had reference to the
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destroyers, which the Chronicle doubted, or else he had 
marked the beginning of a protracted policy of "executive 
usurpation" in foreign affairs. If the destroyer deal 
indicated a new White House approach to international re­
lations the Chronicle puzzled over how many other deals 
remained hidden from the public "in the dark alcoves of 
secret diplomacy," The President's use of executive agree­
ments in the destroyer transfer rated as the best recent 
example of what the Chronicle described as Roosevelt's 
tyrannical tendencies in government, which the magazine
had recognized long before with the advent of the New Deal 
8
in the 1930's.
Isolationists were equally unhappy about the Brit­
ish transfer of bases to the United States that went along 
with the destroyer deal. Roosevelt's acceptance of bases 
on foreign soil for the use of the Navy involved America 
deeper in international affairs. The Chronicle pointed 
out to the "superficially inclined" Roosevelt supporters 
what should have been obvious to the "inquiring mind," 
namely, the new American bases were on British soil. The
Q
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Chronicle believed that the American defense system would 
be ill-served if the Axis should take possession of the 
territories in which the bases were located. Since the 
leaders of the British Empire "were not born yesterday," 
it was clear to leaders in Washington and London, the Chroni- 
cle declared, that for practical purposes United States 
forces would defend "against all comers" the territories 
involved. At the very least, the magazine predicted, the 
"equivalent of an alliance," the bane of isolationism, would 
have to be negotiated with Britain to provide for such 
eventualities.^
Before the isolationists could launch a campaign 
against the destroyer for bases deal they discovered that 
they had lost the fight. They were caught off guard by 
the threat of peacetime conscription, a custom never be­
fore practiced on American soil. Until the summer of 1940 
the preparedness debate centered around material goods, 
and Roosevelt had said little about the need for human 
resources in defense. But as France neared defeat. Busi­
ness Week observed that "we talk glibly about arms and 
equipment for a million men . . . but— what million men?"
9
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLI 
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The magazine reminded its readers that in modern war "armory 
drilling" and "a few weeks of field exercises" were insuf­
ficient training for men entering combat, in 1940, six to 
twelve months were required to train properly military 
personnel. This meant to Business Week that universal 
training in time of peace and selective military service 
in time of war were now necessary in America.
Individual businessmen echoed these views in their 
petitions to the President. The New York investment coun­
selor Edwin Trent recalled that in 1917 valuable time had 
been lost preparing civilians for military life. Two years, 
not just one as Business Week suggested, were necessary 
in Trent's estimation to prepare men for combat. The fi­
nancier thought France's imminent collapse made prepared­
ness doubly important for the United States. If America 
allowed herself to assume the old French cloak of compla­
cency Trent predicted that survival in the world crisis 
was impossible.
More extreme than Trent was John Kennedy, presi­
dent of Baltimore's united States construction Corporation.
^^Business Week, June 15, 1940, p. 54.
^^Edwin Trent to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 23, 
1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335 T.
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Pronouncements from Berlin convinced Kennedy that Hitler
had prepared an invasion of the United States as soon as
the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe were fit for the task. This
made Kennedy's "blood boil" when he knew that America, with
billions of dollars available for defense financing, was
"playing tiddle-winks" while the Germans steeled their
war machine for the attack. Kennedy urged the President
to declare a state of national emergency and thus smooth
the way for a defense program capable of meeting the Nazi
menace. Then, the Baltimorian continued, Henry Ford and
other industrialists should start producing war goods and
the Administration begin conscription at once to raise an
12
army of "at least five million."
After the French surrender greater numbers of 
businessmen expressed their views on conscription. The 
Business Advisory Council's Executive Committee voted to 
support the Burke-Wadsworth conscription bill, but in con­
sideration of the still prevalent public opinion that busi­
ness was not above warmongering, the Executive Committee 
thought it in the best interests of the legislation not 
to announce publicly the council's support, instead.
12
John Kennedy to Millard Tydings, May 31, 1940, 
Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 335 U.
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council leaders urged individual members to promote the 
bill "in quarters where such endorsement would not be mis­
interpreted. " The council endorsed universal compulsory 
registration and selective training, but for the regular 
Army and Navy personnel it favored retention of the tradi­
tional voluntary enlistment system which provided for longer
13periods of service.
The Special Defense Committee of the United States 
Chamber of Commerce followed the Business Advisory Council's 
course in supporting the voluntary enlistment program.
The men needed for the basic functions of the regular Army 
and Navy had to be more permanent in nature than draftees. 
The Chamber regarded these fully trained and experienced 
components as ready for immediate action or for use as a 
cadre when forces were expanded in an emergency. General 
George C. Marshall's testimony before the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee on August 17 convinced the Chamber of 
the need to retain the standard enlistment system. The 
Chief of Staff explained that the elaborate teamwork in­
volved in the conduct of a modern war necessitated reten­
tion of long term enlistees. With the addition of
13
Minutes of Business Advisory Council Executive 
Committee Meeting, July 12, 1940, Hopkins papers. Secretary 
of Commerce, 1938-1940 File, Business Advisory Council.
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conscription a large reserve of trained personnel would
14be ready if needed to meet a challenge from abroad.
Businessmen and other Americans regarded conscrip­
tion as the only feasible method for raising a large army 
in a democratic nation. Some might resent a military draft, 
but the Chamber pointed out that all citizens must be pre­
pared to render service in defense of the nation's common 
safety. Furthermore, as befitted a democracy, conscrip­
tion fell on "rich and poor alike. " This meant to many 
businessmen that the draft would have a mellowing effect 
on class relations. The system's "absolute equality" made 
Barron's believe that with both the high- and lowborn suscep­
tible to the draft, conscripted army life was "an object 
lesson in understanding between classes." Moreover, Bar­
ron 's predicted that conscription would make the nation 
"invincible against attack" but interfere little with the
careers of the young draftees, not yet established in per-
15manent occupations.
Businessmen who backed the draft as important to
14
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national defense balked at an absolutely universal system 
and advocated exemptions for industrial workers. Business 
Week warned that the government should guard against en­
listing "men whose services . . . would be more valuable 
in industrial capacities." The Business Advisory Council 
held a similar opinion and urged the Administration to 
exempt workers in strategic industries, individual busi­
nessmen personally interceded at the White House for ex­
emptions. c. R. Smith, president of American Airlines, 
wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt expressing his hope that essen­
tial civilians could remain at their posts. Anticipating 
that exempt workers would be branded "draft dodgers" Smith 
proposed that the government institute some form of recog­
nition for defense workers, such as a badge or button, to 
signify the wearer's participation in the war effort.
After Congress passed the conscription bill on 
September 16 isolationists reluctantly accepted the new 
law. The Chronicle reflected the thoughts of isolation­
ist businessmen that there was "no sadder commentary on 
the state of world affairs" than the inauguration of the 
peacetime draft. The Chronicle still insisted that.
^^C. R. Smith to Eleanor Roosevelt, October 16, 
1940, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 3355.
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although conscription was the law of the land, the "skill­
ful conduct of foreign affairs" would make it unnecessary 
to use the young Americans impressed into service. Seizing 
the opportunity to criticize New Deal domestic policy, 
the magazine thought the Democrats at least should sacri­
fice some of "their own pet nostrums" if they expected the 
nation to accept conscription. It seemed to the Chronicle 
that Roosevelt had too quickly abandoned American liber­
ties at home, as he continued to display "incredible capri-
17ciousness" in the conduct of foreign relations.
The battle over conscription and the deal for 
destroyers coincided with the 1940 presidential election 
campaign. His victories on these issues led the President 
to regard the coming election as a test to determine whether 
he should strengthen further the ties between an America 
presumably neutral and a Britain definitely at war. As 
the Republicans prepared for their nominating convention 
Barron * s predicted that Thomas E. Dewey would win the nomi­
nation, although the New Yorker had not yet swung over to 
the interventionists in foreign policy. Barron's realized
17
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that "thumping Tom's" enemies were supporting the isola­
tionist Robert A. Taft, or Wendell L. Wilkie, an avowed 
interventionist, "to stir up the animals," when in reality 
the choice of the anti-Deweyites was Senator vandenberg. 
Barron's reported that this group aimed to build an organi­
zation of convention delegates willing to unite "not be­
cause they love each other more but because they love Dewey 
18
less."
To combat this opposition Barron's decided Dewey 
needed a "President-maker" in the person of Alf Landon, 
still angry over the treatment he received from the "old 
Guard ghosts" in the 1936 campaign. Landon dreamed of trans­
forming the Republicans into a progressive party and if 
he were convinced that Dewey was a Landon progressive Bar­
ron 's surmised that "this convention would be all over but 
the demonstrations."
Barron's and scores of others on the scene did 
not anticipate the power of the interventionists and pro­
gressives to hamstring the regular Republican organization 
and force the nomination of Wendell Wilkie. Despite his 
moderate, even liberal, political complexion Willkie re­
ceived support from isolationist business elements which
18
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either tolerated or ignored his quasi-New Deal stance on
domestic issues and his interventionist, bipartisan approach
to foreign policy. The Chronicle declared that Willkie
was "miraculously created to meet the extreme needs of the 
19
hour."
Businessmen saw Willkie as the only hope for re­
moving the New Dealers from government. The Chronicle 
considered it inconceivable that another national leader 
could compare favorably with Willkie who was so well equipped, 
"intellectually and by experience" to cope with the crises 
confronting America in 1940. He was far superior to the 
Roosevelt group in Washington, "pretending to be states­
men" by spending billions for war equipment before the 
funds were in the Treasury. The editors were convinced 
that the President and his advisors had no sense of "real­
ity . . .  responsibility or regret" for their enormous 
blunders. If Willkie entered the White House the Chronicle 
told its readers that irrational money raising schemes to 
finance the defense budget, such as the vaunted excess pro­
fits taxes would be "unthinkable and impossible." Business­
men could rest assured that without "sacrificing an iota
19
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of national safety" Willkie would no longer permit expendi­
tures to outrun provisions for sound financing. But to 
enact this program the Chronicle reminded its readers that 
businessmen must act as well as talk, and fight to oust the 
incumbent President, "one of the most astute politicians 
of our history.
In its enthusiasm for the colorful Willkie, the 
Chronicle may have been willing to gloss over the candidate's 
interventionist ideas, but many Republican businessmen were 
not. Jay Hormel best represented this group. Although as 
a Republican convention delegate he had voted on all ballots 
for his America First cohort Hanford MacNider, Hormel im­
mediately beseiged Willkie with ready advice on foreign 
policy. After pledging his support to the candidate, Hor­
mel advised Willkie that a full attack on Rooseveltian diplo­
macy would increase the chances of a Republican victory. 
Hormel liked the candidate's evaluation of Roosevelt's 
"attacks on foreign powers" as "useless and dangerous," 
but he added that the Indianan's statements contained too 
many "errors of commission" to please isolationists. When 
Willkie referred to Germany as "a power hostile to our way
20
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of life," Hormel pointed out that such statements only in­
flamed latent rivalries between the Germans and Americans.
To accept the New Deal "war party's" propaganda that the 
loss or capture of the Royal Navy spelled a calamity for 
the United States, as Willkie had, was not, according to 
Hormel, becoming to the Republican candidate. Willkie's 
belief that America must cooperate with the Allies since 
no one nation could guarantee world peace seemed illogical 
to Hormel. By his own questionable reasoning, Hormel in­
sisted that a nation would never have to fight if it simply 
avoided international conflicts.
Hormel implored Willkie to abandon the interven­
tionists and to adopt an isolationist foreign policy.
Hormel assured the candidate that the businessmen's approach 
to problems, domestic or foreign, still stood for success 
in the public mind and if used would sharply contrast the 
Republican and Democratic positions on national policy. 
Survival in business rested on the cultivation of universal 
good will, Hormel maintained, and if Willkie applied this 
technique to foreign relations he could save the nation from 
foreign dangers. To counter the "war hysteria" caused by 
Roosevelt, Hormel advised Willkie to set down precisely 
what constituted an adequate military force and pledge the
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enlargement of Army and Navy immediately to that level.
Also Willkie should announce whether the Philippines and 
South America were inside the United States defense peri­
meter. Having no faith in Roosevelt appointees, Hormel 
trusted that Willkie would evaluate the competency of those 
responsible for the formulation and execution of war plans, 
if the White House had thought to draw them up, to guard 
the nation from attack. The efforts of Hormel and other 
isolationists to bring Willkie around to their anti-Roose- 
velt position were successful at the end of the campaign, 
when the Republican, in panic at the thought of losing 
the race, ended the short-lived bipartisan foreign policy
with a series of attacks on the President's interventionist 
21
program.
Roosevelt easily won renomination at the Democratic 
convention of 1940. This was disgusting enough to isola­
tionists but to use virtually the old slogan "he kept us 
out of war" was insufferable. The Chronicle asked if the 
American public was "so simple-minded that twice within a 
quarter of a century it can be snared in the same trap.
21
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betrayed by the same bait?" The editors believed that
Roosevelt's foreign policy, from the Quarantine Speech of
1937 to the transfer of armaments to the Allies through
private manufacturers in 1940, belied the words of peace
spoken at the Democratic convention. The assertion of
keeping America out of war in 1940 appeared as unreliable
22
to the Chronicle as the implied promise of 1916."
After the national party conventions foreign af­
fairs dominated the presidential campaign. This led to 
renewed attacks against Rooseveltian domestic policy.
Even the normally moderate editors of Barron's regarded 
this emphasis on external matters as a cloak to shield the 
passage of undesirable domestic policies. The inauguration 
of new measures after the fall of France, the magazine 
charged, indicated that Roosevelt was trying to remold 
America's economic system to "dwarf anything previously 
undertaken by the New Deal." if Congress approved the 
plans, which included "ghastly" higher taxes, huge cartels 
handling all exports, a defense establishment beyond concep­
tion, and conscription, Barron's predicted that "before the
2 3Nazis get through in Europe we'll be living in a new country."
22
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The Chronicle agreed that international affairs 
had stolen the limelight in the campaign when domestic 
policies should have been the focal point. If Willkie con­
centrated on attacking the New Deal the Chronicle insisted 
that he would gain an overwhelming victory, because the 
President's "mere meaningless mouthings" proved he had no 
"sympathy with nor understanding of . . . free government. 
Barron's saw, however, that Roosevelt might be robbed of 
his foreign policy trump card if Hitler launched his antici­
pated invasion of Britain. Whether the offensive brought 
victory or disaster to Germany the magazine judged that an 
astute appeasement campaign might lessen American fears of
a Nazi attack and thus reduce Roosevelt's chances of re-
25election in November.
Near the end of the campaign Willkie used isola­
tionist arguments against Roosevelt. Essentially the Re­
publican charged that the President had entered into secret 
international understandings to put America into the war.
The Chronicle, which had criticized the White House in the 
past for the secrecy that surrounded it, backed Willkie
24
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and added that rumors of sub rosa agreements had reached 
America from across the Atlantic Ocean. Without consult­
ing the Senate the President appeared, to the Chronicle, 
to be deeply involved in un-American diplomatic proceed­
ings which could be stopped only when the electorate voted 
in a new president in November.
Barron's also backed Willkie's charges that Roose­
velt had bungled America into a compromising position in 
world affairs. This proved to the editors that the Presi­
dent's skill in foreign affairs was a myth, while Willkie's 
sincerity was so obvious that it "cannot be branded as fake." 
But the Democratic campaign continued the "waving of the 
bloody shorts," as the Chronicle described it, as in the 
case of Henry Wallace and New York's Governor Herbert Leh­
man. He had stated that the defeat of Roosevelt in the 
November election would give the greatest pleasure to the 
Axis dictators, who would no longer have to concern them­
selves with a formidable opponent in the White House. The 
Chronicle took exception to this argument, and answered 
that the dictators would much prefer Roosevelt and his
"mis-government" to the "superior, businesslike adminis-
26tration" that Willkie would introduce into Washington.
26
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Related to the Democratic claim that Franklin
Roosevelt's reelection was essential to preparedness was
the question of the third term. Barron * s reported that
the anticipation of an early peace in Europe spurred the
President on to seek a third term. His participation in
a quick defeat of the Axis would be "a shining climax to
27
an already notable career." The Chronicle quickly dis­
missed this idea and proclaimed there was no reason for 
defying the tradition of no third term. In addition to 
the Constitution one unwritten tenet vital to the function­
ing of government, the Chronicle emphasized, was the pro­
hibition against third terms. The magazine granted that 
George Washington approved of a third term in times of 
great emergency, but 1940 did not meet this requirement. 
The Chronicle had confidence that the American electorate
would come to the same conclusion by November and oust
28
Roosevelt from office.
The President could count on support from busi­
ness, however, despite the united front the business press 
arrayed against him. James P. Warburg, who retained his
27
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relations with the financial community as he turned to 
politics and other pursuits, devoted himself to the Presi­
dent's campaign, as he had done four years before. In 
particular he attacked Willkie's knowledge of international 
affairs. Regardless of Willkie's bipartisan approach to 
foreign policy, Warburg distrusted the Republican nominee's 
abilities to cope with the international crisis. To prove 
his point Warburg described the inconsistencies in Willkie's 
foreign policy speeches. When in cattle country Willkie 
expressed his vehement opposition to Argentine beef imports, 
but elsewhere in the nation he defended Cordell Hull's 
reciprocal trade treaties. More exasperating to Warburg 
were Willkie's attempts late in the campaign to portray 
himself as a man of peace and Roosevelt as a warmonger. In 
addition to these contradictions in Republican campaign 
oratory Warburg had two basic reasons for opposing Willkie's 
candidacy: a Republican victory would sweep isolationists
into Congress and impede if not kill the interventionist 
program; and Willkie knew nothing of the complicated puzzle 
called foreign policy. Accordingly in mid-October Warburg 
issued a press release in which he stated "I am for the Presi­
dent because I am for his essential policies, because I have 
more confidence in the known qualities of his leadership than
164
29
in the potential qualities of his opponent. . . . "
Despite Willkie's strenuous campaigning the Presi­
dent won handily on election day. After Roosevelt's tri­
umph the Chronicle announced that the opposition must not 
question the electorate's verdict. But the magazine did 
consider the election a "tragedy" because "issues were so
few and . . . electors were enabled to determine so very 
30
little."
The President's foreign policy summer offensive 
neither won nor lost supporters for intervention. In the 
business world isolationists denounced the appointment of 
Knox and Stimson, and J. Howard Pew and his reactionary 
clique, then in control of the Republican party, read the 
two men out of the GOP. The destroyer deal and the con­
scription law led this group to believe that the President 
would turn the nation into a police state under the pre­
tense of saving the world from the Axis. In their desire 
to defeat the President isolationists gladly supported 
Willkie for the presidency not only to save business from
29
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Roosevelt's clutches but to preserve American life from 
further government controls.
The Willkie nomination gave interventionist Republi­
can businessmen the excuse they needed to remain in their 
own heretofore isolationist-dominated party and not bolt 
to the Roosevelt bandwagon, in this way they could with 
clear conscience support destroyers, bases, conscription, 
and their own party's nominee as well. In financing inter­
ventionism, Willkie would not resort to excise taxes and 
other money raising devices repugnant to the business com­
munity. While their isolationist colleagues demanded some 
sort of preparedness within the limitations of a balanced 
budget, interventionist businessmen relied on their candi­
date's business abilities to develop a financial founda­
tion which would support aid to Britain and national defense. 
Willkie's last minute abandonment of the interventionist 
bipartisan foreign policy dismayed Thomas Lament and other 
businessmen supporters but possibly they as well as Willkie 
realized the race was lost by that time. In any event 
Roosevelt, upon being declared the victor in November, would 
be more forceful than ever in promoting the common goal of 
interventionism.
The business community in general favored Willkie
166
over Roosevelt but felt powerless to aid their candidate 
in an effective manner. Businessmen hoped to attack the 
New Deal in the campaign and so discredit it that the elec­
torate would support Willkie, but the international crisis 
snatched this issue from them and made foreign policy the 
paramount question of 1940. Third terms, destroyers, and 
all the rest, said Henry I. Harriman, the former Chamber
of Commerce president, "sink into insignificance compared
31
to the problem of national defense." Unable to change 
this reality the Republicans could not persuade the public 
in a time of peril to abandon the tested Roosevelt for the 
untried Willkie. Accustomed to defeat in politics by 1940, 
businessmen shrugged off the Republican loss and prepared 
to follow the thrice victorious Roosevelt as he sought 
further intervention. For industrialists in particular 
this meant that more consideration would have to be given 
to industrial mobilization, which so far had been only 
partially successful but which now had to become sufficiently 
effective to make the United States the "arsenal of democ­
racy. "
31Henry I. Harriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
October 17, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal
File, BOX 3572.
CHAPTER VI 
GUNS, BUTTER, AND MOBILIZATION
Preparing for total war severly taxed the imagina­
tions and capabilities of the nation. After the fall of 
France, industrialists subscribed to mobilization, but a 
"business as usual" attitude prevailed in various quarters. 
Labor-manageraent struggles, plant expansion problems, and 
businessmen chaffing under government controls contributed 
to a slowdown in mobilization. Most leaders, however, backed 
the Administration's rearmament plans. The United States 
Chamber of Commerce designated defense to be of "first im­
portance" for business and America as a whole. The Chamber's 
Defense Committee reported that the Administration had ap­
proved plans for expansion of the Navy, the first step in 
preparedness. Without mentioning the possibility of war 
profiteering, the committee lauded Congress for having 
authorized a 70 per cent increase in naval strength during 
1940.^ The committee also praised the President's call 
for coordination of aircraft production with the capacities
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Present 
Military Situation, A Report prepared by the Special Com­
mittee on National Defense (Washington; chamber of Commerce 
of the United States, 1940), pp. 1-6.
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of the flight training schools. To achieve this goal, 
the committee calculated that a million men would have to 
be trained as ground and air crews to service the new air­
craft.
The Chamber of Commerce organized meetings in
various localities to explain mobilization to businessmen.
At a Chamber forum in New York the business consultant
Leo M. Cherne dramatized the importance of business in
modern war by showing that the $50,000 required to destroy
an enemy soldier on the battlefield was spent mainly on the
assembly line under the direction of business executives.
According to Cherne, generals and admirals had less to say
than in the past about allocating military funds. This
placed a greater burden on business as it coped with pri-
2
orities and other mobilization problems. W. Gibson Carey, 
Jr., president of Yale and Town Manufacturing Company, 
promised that industry could be counted on "one hundred 
per cent" to work out these questions. However, the spirit 
of the Nye Committee still haunted businessmen, as seen 
at a New York gathering in October, 1940. The department
2
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store executive Benjamin H. Nam declared that businessmen, 
especially the retailers, must not raise prices or increase 
profits to excess. Such actions, he pointed out, left 
business open to charges of war profiteering.^
A month later the 1940 Congress of American indus­
try, sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers, 
gave its support to preparedness. Industrialists announced 
that they were "profoundly conscious" of the threat to 
America from war and revolution in 1940, which made vital 
their role in national defense.^ The Bankers Magazine spoke 
for business and much of the general public when it editorial­
ized that "world shaking events" made imperative rapid re­
armament to protect America and its neighbors.^
Support from the Chamber of Commerce and NAM was 
heartening to the proponents of preparedness, but the reali­
ties of rearmament presented serious problems to American
3
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industry. Certain business publications reflected the 
commercial world’s distaste for mobilization. Iron Age 
argued that rearmament would raise operating rates and 
sales curves, like "strepticocci push up a fever chart." 
Considering the disastrous after effects in such cases, 
the editors happily reported that few industrialists took 
the 1917 view that war production was good for business.^ 
The Wall Street Journal questioned whether the President 
considered a real national emergency to exist. If so, 
the editors did not understand why, in his May 21, 1940 
speech, the President had said that New Deal social gains 
must not be weakened during mobilization. The Journal 
reasoned that sacrifices had to be made in all areas of 
American life to make rapid rearmament a success. If the 
emergency did not transcend all else, the magazine con­
sidered the billions of dollars going to defense a fantas-
7
tic waste of the taxpayer's money.
Assuming that defense was a valid objective, busi­
nessmen found themselves divided on the best methods to 
further industrial mobilization. Some thought necessary 
the reduction of civilian production, while others insisted
6
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that America's industrial capacity could accommodate both 
civilian and defense production. NAM President Henning 
W. Prentis, Jr., preferred to reduce civilian production.
g
To him, guns were far more important than butter. Agreeing 
with Prentis, NAM Secretary Noel Sargent believed that 
the European war gave the United States cause to prepare 
for possible involvement. If war became a reality all 
civilian life had to be subordinated to the one goal of 
victory over the Axis. In contrast to Prentis' wish for 
immediate action, Sargent suggested delay in all-out war 
efforts until the United States had entered the fighting.
9
Both men, however, stood for guns in preference to butter.
Formidable opposition to the Prentis-Sargent posi­
tion came from a number of big businessmen who wanted both 
guns and butter. Regardless of priorities Eugene G. Grace, 
president of Bethlehem Steel, assured Americans that the
8
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nation's plants could take on defense needs with no decrease 
in regular production. His own firm, he claimed, had ca­
pacity to meet armament demands as well as commercial steel 
users’ orders. Alfred P. Sloan, chairman of General Motors, 
stressed that a $4,000,000,000 arms expenditure in the next 
twelve months would amount only to 7 per cent of all con­
sumer expenditures during 1937, which made unnecessary any 
retreat from "business as usual."
These statements from prominent executives made 
Barron's conclude that in all the "hullabaloo about defense 
needs . . .  we are apt to forget how big the country is. 
. . . "  There was no need to abandon civilian production.
The magazine believed the French defeat caused Americans 
to compare their own industrial establishment to the in­
efficient European system, which led to the inaccurate 
estimates of Prentis and Sargent. Barron's insisted that 
consumption of peacetime goods kept the nation's "economic 
sinews" strong and provided the tax money to support arma­
ments expenditures. In effect, the magazine decided that 
the united states should continue "business as usual."
This shortsightedness at least indicated that business 
had no great desire for war profits.
The first businessmen to feel the effects of
17 3
mobilization were Eugene Grace and his fellow steel execu­
tives. The last months of 1940 found the Administration 
pressing for greater steel capacity which lead to a schism 
between the steel and auto industries, in question was 
whether expansion of plants or the elimination of civilian 
production would be the government's solution to the prob­
lem for providing rearmament with adequate raw materials. 
Modifying his original position, Grace contended that the 
industry's facilities could handle American and British 
arms requirements if they diverted a small portion of steel 
from civilian activities. Rather than expand, steel di­
rectors preferred to cut their allocations to the automo­
bile industry. The steel executives reasoned that curtailed 
civilian production throughout the duration would create 
a "latent demand" for peacetime goods. After the war this 
"demand cushion," they promised, would tide industry over 
the initial postwar period of adjustment, ignoring pro­
tests from George A. Sloan and his Detroit colleagues, the 
steel men went still further in January, 1941, and proposed 
the elimination of civilian automobile purchases for as
long as there was a shortage of steel for defense produc- 
10
tion.
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Business Week supported steel in this argument 
because it doubted that, unless an arms race developed, 
the reduced postwar demand for goods could utilize wartime 
capacity. The magazine cited the current maximum capacity 
of 86 million tons of steel ingots, double World War I pro­
duction, as proof that at least peacetime demands could be 
met. Business Week detected no major argument between ex­
pansionists and nonexpansionists over the steel industry's 
ability to satisfy military demands alone, so the magazine 
came to the conclusion that the basic issue was whether 
Americans wanted both luxuries and guns, if the nation 
chose only guns the magazine reminded its readers that 
many Americans with a vested interest in "business as usual," 
would oppose the "abstention-while-it-lasts theory." Aver­
age citizens, said the editors, such as common retailers 
and salesmen would bound to suffer as well as the automobile 
magnets and other great manufacturers. Sensing the issue 
to be unresolvable. Business Week observed that although 
each side started from different premises and moved to 
"undeniable conclusions, their arguments never meet head 
on," Following the example of Henning Prentis, the maga­
zine turned to the government to await the final decision
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as to whether Americans would have butter or only guns.^^
Expansion seemed inevitable, however, and Banking 
predicted that the businessman's problem throughout 1941 
should be "how to expand enough, but not too much." Bank­
ing judged that, contrary to public opinion, no boom was 
in sight because plant expansion did not alter the nature 
of defense production, it contributed neither to better 
living nor to industry's financial well being. The editors 
regarded the 1940 activity as artificial, with production 
and profit curves "likely to part company in the future."
This naturally made businessmen reluctant to indulge in 
hasty plant expansion because. Banking reflected, when 
mobilization ended "somebody will be sitting on the floor 
when the music stops and there aren't enough seats to go 
around.
The business community's less than full acceptance 
of plant expansion also rested upon its traditional dis­
trust of the New Deal, industrialists suspected that Roose­
velt planned to expand his control over business and possibly 
turn America into a socialist state. Banking charged the
^^Business Week, January 18, 1941, p. 72.
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White House inner circle with plotting to use the crisis 
to destroy capitalism and to set up a "profitless new order" 
after the conflict had ended. Businessmen in general did 
not accept Banking's extreme position, although they agreed 
to use caution when planning industrial expansion. Henning 
W. Prentis took a broader view of government controls in 
his April 1, 1940 radio broadcast. He called on American 
businessmen "to join in a vast mobilization for understand­
ing of our American system. . . . "  He warned his listeners 
that hardships might cause some to become doubters and to 
fall prey to the "siren songs of would be 'economic plan­
ners.'" Prentis pointed out that during periods of political 
and social unrest, history had recorded countless govern­
ment takeovers of business, always "under the guise of 
emergency." He did not oppose "reasonable . . . govern­
ment umpiring" but, he stressed, this was "quite a differ-
13ent thing from national economic planning."
At the 1940 Congress of American industry, Prentis 
warned that modern war caused industrial dislocation and 
governmental totalitarianism which in turn brought on 
socialism. Citing Woodrow Wilson's statement that liberty 
never came from government itself but rather from the
13
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limitations placed on government Prentis urged all Ameri­
cans to guard against totalitarianism. On occasion Roose­
velt struck back at those who in less diplomatic language 
hurled similar charges at the White House. When J. R. Bur­
row, president of a Topeka, Kansas bank, bought a newspaper 
advertisement exhorting Americans to keep the country safe 
"from without, from within and from this Administration," 
the President took action. He prevailed upon the bank's 
board chairman, Carroll E. Merriam, a Republican serving 
Roosevelt in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to 
move against the errant executive. Whatever the fate of 
Banker Burrow, the White House was content that it at least 
had initiated revenge against an obnoxious critic.
More sophisticated in his objection to government 
control was H. W. Hawkes, president of Congoleum-Nairn, inc. 
and head of the Chamber of Commerce. Convinced that the 
public first had to make a choice between traditional Ameri­
can virtures and totalitarianism, he urged the public to 
preserve the "American system. Prentis and his business
^^Stephen Early to Carroll E. Merriam, August 15, 
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colleagues considered resistance to New Deal encroachments 
essential because, as NAM emphasized, only the free enter­
prise system could carry out defense and at the same time 
maintain the traditional American way of life.^^ During 
1941 many businessmen watching the New Dealers in Washing­
ton concluded that government controls were not for winning 
against Hitler, but for implementing a new economic order 
in America. Banking declared that "what is actually on 
trial today is the American system of free enterprise."
To the consternation of the editors, the defense program 
had given the government "remote control" of business, 
including banking services. Banking opposed this trend
because the nation had become powerful under free enter-
17prise, based on "popular consent and not compulsion."
In their fight to retain an economic system suit­
able to themselves, businessmen embraced orthodox economic 
theories of industrial expansion. They expected a reason­
able assurance of future markets if they invested in new 
facilities. However, the division among businessmen be­
came pronounced when many adopted the views of the Presi­
dent's "progressive" economists, as Barron *s described
^^National Association of Manufacturers, The 
Future of America, pp. 307.
17
Banking, XXXIV (November, 1941), p. 91.
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them. Members of the business community accepted the argu­
ments of this group favoring rapid expansion. Barron * s 
assured its readers that these new Administration econo­
mists could be trusted. They were not the "old New Deal 
hit-'em-in-the jugular boys" anti-business radicals who 
formerly had free rein at the White House. Roosevelt was 
now listening to competent, moderate progressives who had 
no intention of seeking the ruin of business. Proof of 
this existed in the acceptance of their theories by the 
respected corporation executives serving the Administration 
in the mobilization program, such as William Knudsen and 
Donald M. Nelson, future head of the War Production Board. 
Converting rank and file businessmen to this position proved 
difficult, even for Nelson, who had little success in con­
vincing his colleagues outside Washington that with expan­
sion lucrative markets lay just around the corner. Barron's 
believed that the Administration's new economists owed 
their success to reactionary businessmen, unable to see 
beyond the tenets of economic orthodoxy. They had dis­
credited themselves at the beginning of mobilization with 
woefully inadequate estimates of defense needs. Still, 
many businessmen refused to accept expansionist policies. 
Barron's described them as wishful thinkers, hoping "that
180
18something will turn up to take care of us."
Businessmen pictured themselves beset not only 
by big government and Washington bureaucrats but also or­
ganized labor. Unions followed the "business as usual" 
routine found in other parts of the American nation, espe­
cially in estimating the labor force available for defense 
work. Business Week detected a "fine display" of contra­
diction" in these estimates. The magazine faulted the 
American Federation of Labor's report that 15,000 unemployed 
machinists were instantly ready for placement in defense 
industry. When the Navy Department advertised for 700 
workers in one class of skilled labor. Business Week dis­
covered that only five qualified men responded. Similarly, 
the National Metal Trades Association announced that it 
had enough workers available to support a 20 per cent expan­
sion in industry. But the National Association of Manu­
facturers challenged this claim and insisted there was a
19
great shortage of skilled labor.
Equally serious were union demands for wage in­
creases. Nation's Business labeled labor the "Achilles
18
Barron's, XXI (February 10, 1941), p. 10; 
(June 23, 1941), p. 4.
19
Business Week, June 8, 1941, p. 64.
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heel" of defense, because higher pay increased the total 
cost of production. The magazine cited the added $400,000 
required to purchase army trucks as the type of increased 
burden taxpayers must shoulder because the Administration
20
consistently favored labor in its disputes with management. 
The 1940 Congress of Industry recognized this problem and 
emphasized the need for smooth relationships between in­
dustrial management and labor. It instructed NAM members 
to abide by equitable wage rates and to make other employ­
ment conditions sufficiently attractive to promote increased 
production. This in turn would create higher incomes for
workers which NAM considered the best cure for strained
21labor-management relations.
NAM President Prentis admonished labor leaders 
to cooperate with management during the crisis. He sug­
gested they discourage unwarranted wage increases and other 
practices that would raise the costs of defense. Strikes 
for overtime pay and fewer working hours should also be 
avoided, prentis warned, because the public would not 
tolerate such interference with mobilization, instead of
20
Nation's Business. XXVIII (January, 1940), p. 15.
21
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continuing the old labor-management rivalry, Prentis hoped 
that both sides would develop a "renewed sense of volun-
p O
tarily imposed restraint" to make defense a success.
Other business leaders doubted that voluntarism would be­
come part of organized labor's credo. H. W. Hawkes pre­
dicted that unions would demand unlimited wage scales on 
defense contracts because of the backing they were receiv­
ing from the general public. In his opinion, Americans 
labored under the false impression that restraint was un­
necessary because mobilization funds came from the United 
States Treasury's allegedly inexhaustible supply of monies. 
Hawkes hoped to correct this misconception and pointed out 
that the government was custodian of the public funds and 
did not actually own the money. Therefore, if the Admin­
istration paid excessive salaries to defense workers it
was as guilty as any other embezzling trustee in public
23or private life.
Unfortunately for preparedness, Hawkes' ominous 
predictions proved reliable and Prentis' dissuasions against 
the union leaders ended in failure. To industry's dismay
22
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strikes broke out in defense plants as labor demanded higher 
rates. The Chronicle charged unionists with sabotaging 
national defense at the very time that other Americans were 
"patriotically and courageously" assuming the burden of 
preparedness. The Chronicle claimed that at the outset of 
mobilization Roosevelt had assured labor that it would not 
be forced to sacrifice social and economic gains made under 
the New Deal. Workers in munitions and other industries 
enjoyed full employment and received high wages without, 
to the editors' consternation, surrendering the right to 
strike. As a result, union leaders slowed down rearmament 
as they struck plants throughout America. In the Chronicle's 
opinion, these men wielded great power but had only the 
minimum of legal responsibility and "regularly endeavor to 
evade that minimum."
One solution to strikes was the Chronicle's pro­
posal of an "efficacious tribunal" to settle disputes, in 
the spirit of the Taft-Hartley Law, the plan included a 
brief "cooling-off" period, to be inaugurated before a 
strike became effective. Work stoppages could be called 
but 60 per cent of the workers concerned had to vote by 
secret ballot in favor of them. The President, however.
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rejected this proposal along with all petitions to modify 
24
the labor laws.
On other problems the President was more willing 
to accept advice from business, particularly in organizing 
mobilization under one agency in Washington, in May, 1940, 
businessmen were asking Roosevelt to coordinate all phases 
of national defense under a single body. Gerald B. Brophy, 
counsel for North American Aviation, the Sperry Corporation, 
and Eastern Air Lines, wrote the President that the appoint­
ment of an independent commission, with a full fledged 
cabinet member at its head, would be the "most inspiring 
announcement to the country." Brophy suggested that a 
prominent American be appointed as head of the group, such 
as World War I hero General John Pershing.
The Chronicle agreed with Brophy, but raised the 
argument that the President had failed to lead the nation 
properly in preparing for defense. As one example of the 
President's negligence, the Chronicle cited the Strategic 
Materials Act of 1939, which the magazine claimed Congress 
had treated as pork-barrel legislation. The result was
24
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that the government spent millions for foreign silver and 
almost nothing for tin, rubber, and other strategic items, 
which reduced the nation's stockpiles to dangerously low 
levels. The Chronicle stressed that the President could 
still expiate these errors if he appointed a new council
of national defense, similar to the Baruch-led War Indus-
26
tries Board of World War I.
In response to public opinion the President an­
nounced, on May 28, 1940, the re-establishment of the Ad­
visory Commission to the Council of National Defense to 
supervise mobilization. The mounting crisis in Europe 
and the clamor for order in mobilization at home led Roose­
velt momentarily to cast aside caution and create the NDAC. 
At first NDAC appeared to be the answer to the needs of 
preparedness. The most respected names of the business 
community staffed the commission. William Knudsen, presi­
dent of General Motors, headed the agency, assisted by 
John D. Diggers of Libbey-Owens Ford, and American Tele­
phone and Telegraph Vice President William H. Harrison. 
Studebaker's Harold S. Vance worked with heavy ordnance 
and Earle F. Johnson, a former General Motors vice
26
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president, with small arms and ammunition. George Moffett 
of Corn Products Refining Company was responsible for food, 
chemicals, and shells. Miscellaneous equipment was assigned 
to J. C. Nichols, a Kansas City real estate man. Edward 
R. Stettinius, former War Resources Board Chairman, was 
Director for industrial Materials, under him was William 
L. Batt, president of SKF Industries, in charge of mining 
and mineral products. Edward R. Weidlein, director of the 
Mellon Institute and a member of the old War Industries 
Board, headed the chemical section and General Food's Charles 
Francis supervised agricultural and forest products activi­
ties. Stettinius' senior consultant was Gano Dunn, chairman 
of the J. G. White Corporation and a Business Advisory 
Commission member, assisted by Charles E. Adams, board 
chairman of the Air Reduction Company.
Americans were sure that this impressive array of 
talent from the business world would bring direction to the 
mobilization program. The Journal reminded the public that 
these men were joining the mobilization team in Washington 
at great personal sacrifice. They had all left their prom­
ising careers and the "comfort and efficiency" of industry 
for the uncertainties of the Federal bureaucracy. Regard­
less of this illustrious group, NDAC failed to resolve the
187
allocation of priorities. From the outset, NDAC had to 
cope with hostile businessmen and uncooperative military 
officials when dealing with the priorities problem. Busi­
nessmen, still wanting butter as well as guns, insisted 
that their respective enterprises merited higher priority 
ratings than NDAC was willing to give. In other cases, 
they saw no justification for priorities in such an indus­
try as cotton cloth, for example, where manufacturers were 
not producing at full capacity. Businessmen accepted re­
strictions as long as rationing did not damage the civilian 
27economy. Business Week reflected industry's concern over 
the editor's prediction that curtailing the output of peace­
time goods would force prices to spiral upward in response 
to the pressures and demand. In this respect, aircraft in­
dustry leaders complained that the defense program was
2Rdraining off too much material from the civilian economy.
The United States Chamber of Commerce judged this a rea­
sonable complaint, since the regular civil aeronautics 
program, with 2,000 airports, beacon lights and radio com­
munications stations, was so important to the national de­
fense system. NDAC responded to these requests by
27
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implementing a compromise priority plan which called for
producing 400 civilian airliners and 39,000 warplanes by
mid-1942. The Chamber of Commerce pronounced this a "rea-
29
sonable reconciliation" of the guns versus butter issue.
In this manner NDAC often reached agreements with industry 
on priorities.
Unfortunately, NDAC's relationship with the War 
and Navy departments was less satisfactory than that with 
industry. Barron's observed that "all is not brotherly love 
between the National Defense Advisory Commission and the 
War and Navy departments," but hoped that this state of 
affairs would not last. Hostility between NDAC and the 
military appeared immediately after the President organized 
the commission in May. Throughout the summer of 1940 in­
creasing points of friction developed over the question 
of priorities. By September both government and business 
recognized the need for redesigning the system. The NDAC 
sought to create more efficient buying methods for the 
Army and Navy so that current and future purchasing problems
29Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Civil 
Aeronautics; Development During Preparations for Defense.
A Report Prepared by the Transportation Committee (Washing­
ton: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1940), pp.
1-4.
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might be avoided. NDAC policy required more business-like 
attitudes on the part of military personnel who, the edi­
tors of Barron * s realized, disregarded "outside advisors 
from the President down." Businessmen knew that the mili­
tary hierarchies, which had seen "Presidents and commissions
come and go," had mounted extensive passive resistance to
30
NDAC in the hope that it would also quickly pass away.
Friction between NDAC and the Army came to a climax 
over the question of munitions plant construction. The Army 
wanted to build most factories itself and then lease the 
facilities to private operators. The NDAC instead wanted 
regular construction contracts drawn up so that plants could 
be financed with private capital. The Army claimed that this 
businessman's approach held up construction when speed was 
necessary. In its turn NDAC criticized the Army on other 
procedures; in most defense contracts escalator clauses per­
mitted increases in remuneration as production costs rose. 
NDAC officials had planned to use strict business practices 
in contract letting and award as many jobs as possible be­
fore commodity prices began to rise, which was inevitable 
when the expected defense boom developed. But before NDAC 
was operational army and navy agents had already employed the
30
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escalator clauses, thus assuring arms producers of higher 
prices than otherwise, and raising costs to the government, 
NDAC estimated, an extra $500 million. If collusion did 
exist between procurement officers and munitions makers, 
at least responsible business leaders opposed such actions.
From the outset, NDAC and military procurement 
officials disagreed on the nature of the priority system. 
NDAC opposed the proposition that military requisitions 
be honored before all civilian orders. The Army stood fast 
on this point as long as the combined military and civilian 
demand for goods was greater than the nation's total in­
dustrial capacity. Barron's predicted NDAC would lose 
this fight in the long run, with the result that the Admin­
istration would institute government price controls and
regimentation of orders to cope with the inevitable demand
31for scarce civilian products.
As a result of the friction that developed among 
those working for rearmament, mobilization experienced a 
general slowdown. The business community, as with most 
Americans, did not comprehend the grave crisis that con­
fronted the United States. Remiss as they were towards 
mobilization, businessmen accused the President of failing
31
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to emphasize the seriousness of the situation. They ig­
nored the President's own difficult position as he walked 
a political tightrope between liberals and conservatives, 
labor and management, and interventionists and isolation­
ists. The smallest misstep could damage not only indus­
trial mobilization but the entire interventionist movement.
The President and businessmen came to grips over 
the issue of the need for an industrial czar to oversee 
all aspects of mobilization. The entreaties of Bernard 
Baruch and others still fell upon deaf ears in the White 
House, which induced business to modify its proposals. 
Barron's suggested that Congress appoint a higher authority 
to run rearmament. A congressional appointee, reasoned 
the editors, would free mobilization from domination by 
inefficient Administration aides who were incapable of 
efficient management. Businessmen were convinced that 
these New Dealers sought to abolish capitalism and private 
enterprise. For this reason the editors thought that a 
man responsible to congress could lead mobilization effi­
ciently and not be under the thumb of Roosevelt's anti-
Op
business advisors.
Confronted with criticism from businessmen, labor
32
Ibid.
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leaders, and New Dealers, the President decided to take 
action. Keeping political considerations uppermost in 
his mind, on January 7, 1941, he superceded the discredited 
NDAC with a new agency, the Office of Production Manage­
ment. The 0PM was Roosevelt's answer both to businessmen 
wanting stronger leadership in mobilization and to New 
Dealers insisting on greater liberal influence in defense. 
The President appeased the two groups by creating a dual 
chairmanship composed of William Knudsen of General Motors 
and Sidney Hillman from the ranks of labor. Businessmen 
were hopeful that the new organization was the answer to 
the mobilization problems that had been developing since 
spring of 1940. Doubters, however, immediately expressed 
their pessimism over 0PM's chances for success. Roose­
velt's co-chairman system drew considerable criticism. 
Business Week regarded the new "split personality" crea­
tion, "Mr. Knudsen-Hillman," a poor arrangement. It gave 
no leadership to rearmament, said the magazine, even though
the two men had experienced agreeable relations when they
33served together on the old NDAC. Despite 0PM's accom­
plishments in placing the American economy on a wartime
33
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basis Business Week's prognostication proved correct. By 
the summer of 1941, priorities and other problems similar 
to those that had beset NDAC undermined 0PM. After the 
Pearl Harbor attack the President abolished 0PM and organ­
ized a succession of agencies to direct American economic
. 34organization.
In the spring of 1940 business appeared to support 
mobilization but realities cast a shadow over events until 
the United States was well into the war. Businessmen de­
veloped fears which became obstacles to rearmament. Many 
believed that mobilization might destroy what progress 
had been made toward recovery since the Great Depression. 
This group opposed rapid expansion of factories until evi­
dence proved that postwar depression would not succeed a 
wartime boom. Whether or not a depression occurred after 
war, businessmen were certain that mobilization would in­
crease government control over their activities. The war 
crisis gave the President an excuse to conduct economic 
experiments at the expense of business, which, as NAM Presi­
dent Prentis said, had small chance of prospering from
34
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mobilization. This thinking produced a period of watchful 
waiting in business circles to see what policy the Presi­
dent would adopt. Business accepted the American public's 
traditional disinclination to sacrifice butter for guns 
except in the direst of crises. The voices of Bernard 
Baruch and his supporters favoring total mobilization under 
a strong authority were drowned out by the general clamor 
for "business as usual." Most business and the public were 
willing to support partial mobilization but nothing more. 
Businessmen, however, had to turn their thoughts to new 
problems connected with rearmament. As mobilization got 
underway charges of war profiteering levied against indus­
try had to be answered by spokesmen for business interests.
CHAPTER VII 
WAR PROFITEERING AND TAXES
During 1940 America began in earnest its World 
War II mobilization. As the wheels of industry turned in 
the direction of rearmament, war profiteering charges against 
business increased. Some businessmen discounted this crit­
icism, although new demands for war goods meant greater 
profits for many of them. Labeling anti-business elements 
as troublemakers did not hide from the public stepped up 
activity in industrial plants. It began with the French 
government's order for 500 new warplanes in February.^
This action alone stimulated production at the Douglas,
North American, and Martin firms. Pratt and Whitney estab­
lished an airplane engine factory in France, and the His- 
pano-Suiza interests bought new tools for their own engine 
plant near Paris. Foreign orders also came from Britain, 
Japan, and the Soviet Union.
Many businessmen acknowledged the benefits that 
foreign purchases brought to industry. Remembering the 
condition of business during the Great Depression, Business
^Banking, Journal of American Banker's Associa­
tion, XXXII (July, 1939), p. 1.
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Week regarded the prospect of additional sales to belliger­
ents as "brightening the outlook for several industries.
2
. . .  Barron's urged businessmen and Americans as a whole 
to face the reality that, regardless of the evils of war, 
a new conflict would boost the nation's economy. The edi­
tors estimated that the Munich Pact of 1938 made Central 
Europe the locale of the next war, with Germany and Russia 
the main contenders. American industry, they stressed, 
was bound to profit from the needs of these potential bel­
ligerents. If chance involved japan and Western Europe 
in the conflict and caused a full scale war, Barron's pre­
dicted ever greater markets for American business, which 
would go far beyond the vaunted recovery peak of 1937.^ 
Industrial leaders did not share the avidity of 
Barron's and Business Week for war business. These men 
recognized the traffic as inevitable, but resolved not to 
give anti-business forces an excuse to hurl warmongering 
charges against industry. General Motor's Alfred P. Sloan 
in particular urged his colleagues to guard against these 
attacks. When the War Resources Board organized in 1939
2
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Sloan admonished it to devise a mobilization plan which
struck out war profits "per se." He felt that business
deserved a just return on its investment, and enjoined
WRB to devise a mobilization system employing sound, non-
inf lationary price levels. By following this policy, Sloan
reasoned, business could have its profit and avoid unde-
4
served accusations of war profiteering. in accepting 
Sloan's logic, business placed itself in a difficult posi­
tion at the threshold of public opinion. To most Americans, 
the very idea of taking excessive profits during wartime 
cast businessmen in an unfavorable light. The average citi­
zen made no distinction between wartime and regular profits, 
as did Alfred P. Sloan and his associates. Business made 
the mistake of ignoring the nation's rejection of blood 
money to restore the economy. As a result, warmonger ac­
cusations slowed down mobilization. But business leaders 
still hesitated signing war contracts until the government 
agreed on profit rates which satisfied capital.
War's outbreak on September 2, 1939 ended business 
speculation on the magnitude of hostilities and the war's 
possible effect on the American economy. As sales rose.
4
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business spokesmen continued to insist that there was a 
difference between war profits and normal gains. Barron's 
pointed out that a sharp business upturn was inevitable, 
"war or no war," The editors found evidence of this in 
the estimate of the traditionally accurate Great Lakes 
Shipping Advisory Board on car loadings for 1939. Before 
the commencement of hostilities the board had foreseen a 
22.4 per cent increase in the fourth quarter over the same 
period in 1938. Citing this evidence, Barron's stressed 
that in August, before Hitler advanced into Poland, Midwest­
ern shippers had expected a substantial increase in their 
fourth quarter business.^
Corporation executives felt that these statistics 
spoke for themselves, but they feared that the general 
public would gloss over these facts and not separate war 
gains from peacetime profits. Hoping to change national 
opinion, business leaders launched an unprecedented cam­
paign to convince Americans that business favored peace 
over war. James H. McGraw, Jr., president of McGraw-Hill, 
published in his Business Week a signed editorial which 
began: "Business stands against war." War was a device
of futility, save for defense, which so disrupted
5
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civilization that humanity falters" in its wake. McGraw 
exhorted his readers to cast aside their assumptions that 
war was inevitable, or that the Administration was attempt­
ing to involve America in the war because of an alleged 
desire for power. These opinions, he stressed, were as 
false as the accusation that business wanted to involve 
America in the European conflict. "To say that Industry 
and Business want war," he added, "is a deliberate lie." 
McGraw urged the public to inform government leaders that 
all Americans desired peace.®
McGraw then instructed businessmen that industry 
must live up to its own responsibilities by providing the 
best in armaments and material. Most important, McGraw 
concluded, businessmen must band together to help maintain 
the peace. Success depended on an articulate business com­
munity, McGraw believed, as he promoted through his publica­
tions the twin goals of peace and preparedness.
Other business leaders expanded the theme that 
industry deserved a reasonable profit, even in times of 
war. At the Farm Equipment Institute in the first week of 
October, 1939, Raoul E. Desvernine, president of Crucible
6
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Steel Company of America, dwelt on this problem. Profiteer­
ing and profits, he lectured, embodied two distinct con­
cepts which must be clarified in the public mind. He agreed 
with Roosevelt that profiteering violated the rule of "cost 
plus reasonable profit," but added that no responsible of­
ficial, including the President, opposed legitimate increases 
in selling prices. Higher costs for raw materials, labor, 
insurance, and taxes made these advances acceptable.
Desvernine claimed that "sound adjusted costs and 
fair profits" constituted the key to preparedness. Mobili­
zation based on these principles need never experience a 
slowdown. Businessmen must not be suspect of war profiteer­
ing, but Desvernine argued that the government and the pub­
lic had to realize that reasonable profits conserved the 
"vitality of those enterprises which are essential to the 
national economy." Most important of all, Desvernine added, 
unsound Administration policies which unduly narrowed pro­
fits and impaired industrial efficiency were foolish and
7
unpatriotic.
National business organizations emphasized that 
if the choice became peace or war profits, they favored 
peace. The United States Chamber of Commerce stated in
^Ibid., p. 51.
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its own publication. Nation*s Business, the cardinal thesis 
of the business community: "War profits would be illusory."
The government would either tax away such income, or reduce 
profits through price controls.® The Chamber insisted 
that American entry into the war spelled an aftermath of 
"depression cind economic catastrophe." Moreover, the Chamber 
feared that war meant additional government control over 
business. Regimentation and dictatorship could result, 
which meant a loss of freedom of initiative for business.
The Chamber, however, did not employ the dictatorship argu­
ment against Roosevelt because it knew the real cause of 
restrictions was the "Industrial Mobilization Plan" which 
had been in the process of formulation since World War I. 
Instead, the Chamber pointed to the priority boards, price- 
control authorities and other bureaucratic obstacles em­
broidered in the plan as the agents that would end the system 
of free enterprise.
The issue of inflation also plagued business spokes­
men. Business sensed the public's strong opposition to 
price spirals at the opening of the European war. Ernest 
T. Weir, president of the American Iron and Steel Institute,
Q
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on October 17, 1939, challenged his colleagues at the Ameri­
can Steel Construction Institute to avoid practices result­
ing in speculation. He reminded them that the autumn
business upturn rested "on a foundation about as firm and
9
strong as the filling of a cream puff," Barron's championed 
just profits for all, and disputed Weir's pessimism over 
national economic conditions. In particular, the editors 
found it strange that New Deal economists sided with Weir 
in advocating the orthodox economic position that bigger 
profits should come exclusively from large volume rather 
than being "wrung from the consumer through increased prices." 
This was not wrong in itself, Barron's said, but the writer 
complained that the Weir group distorted the theory, which 
in reality supported higher prices. The magazine empha­
sized that the nation had no right to expect production 
at a loss from manufacturers, although it appeared to the 
editors that New Dealers demanded this sacrifice from the 
steel industry. Barron's accepted Weir's attitude as proof 
that businessmen were so afraid of excessive price increases 
that they might abandon legitimate profit as well, which 
could damage the national economy. So anxious were indus­
trialists not to have a war profits boom, said the magazine.
g
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"that we may be cheating ourselves out of part of a natural 
business upturn."
Fear of government control led businessmen to op­
pose greater profits regardless of increased volume. Beth­
lehem Steel's E. G. Grace announced that higher prices 
were unthinkable "if nothing occurs to increase our costs." 
Steel men instituted their self-imposed austerity to stave 
off further government control in the guise of price regu­
lation; the temporary loss of some legitimate profit was 
worth the sacrifice, to prove government intervention un­
necessary. Grace's proposal to rule out profits did not 
please all businessmen. Barron's reflected their frustra­
tions in its retort that scrap metal prices had pushed up 
costs sharply, which in Grace's own words justified higher 
prices. Barron's placed no faith in Grace's strategy, be­
cause the editors believed that only the general public 
would be influenced by this "abnegation of industrialists. 
. . . "  The anti-business doctrinaires of the Roosevelt 
Administration, explained the magazine, would never relent 
in their harassment because the giant corporations lost 
one or two quarters' dividends.
^^Barron's, XIX (October 23, 1939), p. 10;
(October 30, 1939), p. 10.
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The National Association of Manufacturers also 
strove to break the old war profiteer image that had plagued 
business since World War I. A week after Hitler invaded 
Poland, NAM issued statements that industry had always 
hated war. Three months later, at the 1939 Congress of 
American Industry, the president of NAM reported wide pub­
lic enthusiasm for the position of business in the American 
economic system. Now considering its views more acceptable 
to the public, NAM planned more frequent declarations of 
its policies to eliminate misconceptions concerning busi­
ness m o t i v e s . N A M ' s  optimism pointed up the division of 
opinion among businessmen on the meaning of the war for the 
American economy. Standard Oil's publication. The Lamp, 
still believed that national opinion was hostile to busi­
ness. The magazine only hoped that the 1939 spurt of busi­
ness toward normality was not the result of war contracts. 
Such "fever-born" prosperity would do nothing more than 
confirm public suspicion of business greed during hostili­
ties. And worse, the editors concluded, business would be 
blamed for the depression that was bound to follow at the
National Association of Manufacturers, Annual 
Report of the President, 1939 (New York: National Associa­
tion of Manufacturers, 1939), p. 6.
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12end of the war, as had happened in the 1930's.
The German drive into the Low Countries and France 
quickened the debate over war profits and forced Congress 
to take action. Battle lines formed quickly as business 
spokesmen and the National Defense Advisory Council argued 
for legislation favoring industry. Senator Robert LaFol- 
lette and congressman Jerry Vorhees led the anti-business 
group which advocated taxing away most, if not all, profits 
from defense orders. Their position was too advanced in 
its concept to win acceptance from businessmen at the time, 
although after the Pearl Harbor attack the United States 
Chamber of commerce and NAM supported a 100 per cent rate 
on war profits, in 1940 reconciliation appeared impossible 
between business and its detractors. Those who expected 
the White House to break the deadlock found the President 
employing his usual cautious methods to reconcile the dif­
ferent factions. Knowing full well that this approach to 
the problem would impede mobilization, Roosevelt in his 
May 26 fireside chat spoke only in general terms that he 
wanted no war millionaires produced through mobilization.
12
The Lamp, XXII (December, 1939), p. 1.
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A tax on income, he suggested, provided the surest way to
13avoid profiteering.
Roosevelt's statement left businessmen resigned 
to the loss of war profits, iron Age told its readers 
that whatever gains came from mobilization would be returned 
to the government through t a x a t i o n . Business Week pre­
sumed that the Administration planned to accomplish this 
policy through a cost-plus-profit system. The editors 
called this procedure reasonable, but scored munitions makers 
who refused to accept it. Thus, for the first time during 
mobilization the dichotomy of the business community came 
to light, as Business Week expressed displeasure with muni­
tions firms aiming for expanded profits. Alfred P. Sloan, 
Jr., and other industrialists never took into account the 
munitions interests when making protestations for peace.
As mobilization advanced, however, business could not ig­
nore the arms manufacturers' prominent role in prepared­
ness and their seeming disinterest in expiating the war­
monger image inherited from World War I. Despite this
13
Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers 
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt with a Special in­
troduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), IX, p. 230.
14
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group, most business leaders were willing to work with 
the Administration to produce a reasonable war profits 
tax bill.
Congress had attempted to deal with war profiteer­
ing in May 1938, when the Senate Military Affairs Committee 
approved a bill to force citizens to invest up to 75 per 
cent of their income in taxable, 1 per cent bonds. Without 
hesitation businessmen denounced the proposal. Business 
Week called it the "most stupid bill" of the s e a s o n . A  
year later Senator Homer T. Bone introduced a new version, 
designed to "take the profit out of war." Upon careful 
reading of the document businessmen discovered that tax­
payers in the higher brackets would owe more to the govern­
ment than their accrued annual incomes.
Agreeing upon a reasonable war profits tax proved 
as difficult a task in 1940 as it had in 1938. Barron's
suggested that "some sort of levy" was in order, but hesi-
17tated to be more specific. Business Week voiced support 
for a war tax because of its value as an anti-inflation
^^Business Week, June 4, 1948, p. 64. 
^^Ibid., April 1, 1939, p. 47.
^^Barron*s, XIX (October 2, 1939), p. 10.
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measure; it would eliminate profits otherwise destined for
18
increased wages.
passage of the Revenue Act of June 22, 1940 shocked 
businessmen, who thought the Administration had singled 
out industry to make financial sacrifices while the rest 
of America escaped this burden, in particular, business 
complained that the act permitted only an 8 per cent profit 
on shipbuilding and aircraft production, a figure nearly 
one-third less than the law had previously provided. The 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle deemed this development 
ironic, since American industry had purposely avoided deal­
ings that "smelled of war" to discourage a recurrence of
19
the Nye Committee's charges of warmongering.
Businessmen had cause to be further alarmed at 
the actions of their enemies in Congress, still fighting 
for more stringent war profits legislation. Especially 
exasperating to them was Senator Josh Lee's proposal for 
a compulsory loan system into which industry must channel 
its war profits, to the benefit of the Federal Treasury.
More reasonable to businessmen was Senator Tom Connally's
18
Business Week, June 1, 1940, p. 52.
19
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CL
(June 29, 1940), pp. 4029-4031.
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idea, which outlined a choice of payment plans for corpora­
tions. They could turn over to the government 50 per cent 
of their net incomes over the average net income for the 
1936-1939 period or else use a graduated scale running 
from 40 to 60 per cent of net i n c o m e . W h e t h e r  Congress 
used this system or adopted a different policy on future 
war taxation, businessmen predicted heavy excess profits 
penalties for corporations. To substantiate this estimate, 
Barron's pointed to Judge Learned Hand's opinion that noth­
ing limited the government's power to tax when national
21survival was at stake. Businessmen in the main were 
willing to pay special taxes on war goods sales, but they 
insisted that the Administration define excess profits. 
Business Week knew the simplest method of taxation was to 
place a levy on munitions orders only, although indirect 
beneficiaries of mobilization would escape extra taxation.
Many members of the business community blamed the 
President for the confusion over the question of excess 
profits. The Chronicle claimed that the Administration 
wanted to push through Congress an "excess-Politics Tax"
20
U. S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3rd 
Sess., September 13, 1940, 12070-12113.
21
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to please radical New Deal interests. Businessmen consid­
ered the time— with the fall of France fresh in their minds—  
inappropriate for the President to be feathering his politi­
cal nest, regardless of the general election scheduled in
22November. Business would not accept the President's point 
of view that he must conserve at all costs the New Deal 
coalition so vital in maintaining his base of power. With­
out it, support for the Allies in Europe was impossible.
Businessmen rejected the Administration's reasons 
for supporting a high war profits tax and started a mobili­
zation slowdown in protest. Anger at government for what 
they considered excessive regulation, combined with business's 
traditional anti-New Deal sentiment, produced a revolt 
against the White House. The seriousness of the slowdown 
became evident when several Navy contracts went begging 
for bidders in mid-summer of 1940. Anti-business elements 
took advantage of these incidents to blame industry for 
the problems that had arisen in mobilization, but business 
spokesmen lost no time in answering their charges. The 
Wall Street Journal insisted that business was not overly 
interested in profits when it refused to accept defense
22The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CLI
(July 13, 1940), pp. 154, 155.
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contracts. It was just as true, rejoined the editors, 
that New Deal extremists were willing to sacrifice defense 
in their zeal to eliminate profits. Small business in 
particular had to generate profits in the interest of part­
ners and stockholders, which required defense contracts to 
include a reasonable profit. The Journal countered by argu­
ing that the government had caused the delay in organizing 
a real mobilization program. The Administration's indeci­
sion on determining the rate of taxation, claimed the edi­
tors, caused an "inexcusable bottleneck" in defense produc­
tion.^^
Iron Age also defended the position of business 
in rearmament. J. H. Van Deventer, the editor-in-chief, 
insisted that business would "go to the limit" to perform 
its mobilization duties. He knew of no firm in metal-work­
ing that wanted to enter into munitions making, but he 
pledged them all to the defense effort, van Deventer was 
more concerned over support from high level administrators 
in Washington. Still suspicious of New Deal motives, he 
stated that the President could rely on William Knudsen 
and Sidney Hillman to do their part, but he doubted this
23
The Wall Street Journal, August 1, 1940, p. 4y
August 22, 1940, p. 4.
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could be said of Secretary of Labor Perkins and other cabi­
net members. Van Deventer considered many of Roosevelt's 
advisers incompetent, especially Secretary of the Navy 
Charles Edison, who the editor claimed was less interested 
in running the Navy than campaigning for congress. As for 
Secretary of War Harry A. Wooding, Van Deventer dismissed 
him as a bureaucrat whose activities in office centered 
exclusively on drawing his government p a y c h e c k . W h a t e v e r  
the President may have thought of this criticism, assuming 
he was aware of it, he reduced the carping when he appointed 
Henry J. Stimson and Frank Knox to the War and Navy posts 
the following month.
Most businessmen were pleased with the appointment 
of these Republicans to the cabinet, but debate continued 
over the war profits issue. The majority favored prepared­
ness and, however reluctantly, stood ready to implement 
defense production. The Journal expressed business senti­
ments in its opinion that, although war should produce no 
profiteering, national mobilization had to get underway 
immediately, regardless of protests from New Deal doctrin­
aires. Time was too valuable, the editors thought, to waste
24
Iron Age, CXLV (June 20, 1940), p. 25,
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it debating a war profits tax. instead, they urged the
President to ignore these arguments and allow business to
25draw reasonable profits for its efforts.
Businessmen regarded a healthy capitalist system 
as vital to the success of mobilization, although many 
believed without foundation that New Deal officials in 
government thought otherwise. With this in mind the edi­
tors of National Petroleum News declared that "Profits 
are patriotic." Not only did the government rely on pri­
vate profits for its taxes, the magazine wrote, but good 
salaries and wages depended on a fair return from private 
investment. Although New Deal propagandists, in the opin­
ion of the editors, had taught the public that profits were
"sinful" businessmen thought them "still sound and necessary. 
26
. . . "  Moreover, many executives considered the issue 
academic, because to them a war boom for business appeared 
out of the question. C. M. Wynne, managing director for 
Overseas industries. Inc., explained at a chamber of Com­
merce round table discussion that even a modest boomlet was 
unlikely. World War I had provided a stimulus for American
25
The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1940, p. 4.
^^National Petroleum News, XXXII (June 19, 1940),
p. 10; (August 14, 1940), p. 17.
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exports, he said, but new restrictions precluded this be­
cause the Neutrality Law excluded United States shipping
from combat zones, and war loans now played no part in fi-
^ 27nancing exports.
The business world's demand for an equitable ex­
cess profits tax caused the government to reconsider its 
earlier actions and to open hearings on a new tax bill in 
September, 1940. Under consideration was H.R. 10413, popu­
larly called the Connally bill. Essentially, Senator Con- 
nally proposed that the earnings of corporations from 1936 
to 1939 provided the basis for taxation. All income ex­
ceeding 95 per cent of the average annual profits during 
those years was designated war profits and became completely 
taxable. Senator LaFollette, Representative Vorhees and 
others still pressed for a stricter tax measure, and busi­
ness supporters pleaded for less control, but moderation 
had become the dominant theme in the deliberations. This 
was evident on the first day of hearings of H.R. 10413 be­
fore the Senate Finance Committee. Businessmen were di­
vided on the merits of the bill, when, on September 3, the 
Chamber of Commerce presented its case against the proposal. 
Ellsworth c. Alvord, a Chamber executive, testified that
27
Nation's Business, June 28, 1940, p. 53.
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the Connally bill was so complicated in form that the In­
ternal Revenue Service would find it "utterly impossible" 
to administer. Alvord believed that the years from 1936
to 1939 did not reflect normal profits and would provide
28an unrealistic base for the computation formula. John 
D. Biggers, one of the most competent businessmen to serve 
NDAC, did not attack H.R. 10413, but urged the committee 
to write a law that recognized the importance of private 
capital in defense. As a businessman, Diggers insisted 
that mobilization's success rested on the free enterprise 
system. For this reason he advocated a liberal amortiza­
tion policy for writing off the high values placed on new
29defense plants in order to reduce taxes. So vital was 
the question of amortization to industry that William Knud­
sen stressed the need for its inclusion in the new tax 
law. Without this stipulation Knudsen warned that a big 
excess profits tax would have a serious effect on defense 
and slow down mobilization.^^
Businessmen who disliked the Connally bill also
28
U.S. congress. Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Hearings, on H.R. 10413, An Act to Provide Revenue, and 
for Other Purposes, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, pp. 260- 
275.
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claimed that it hurt small business. Leonard E. Read, 
general manager of the Los Angeles chamber of Commerce, 
explained to congressmen that small firms needed to rein­
vest large portions of their profits to insure the future 
success of their operations. But the Connally bill was 
not designed for this, and Read predicted that if passed
31it would destroy many small enterprises around the nation.
Much of the Senate testimony was repeated before 
the House Ways and Means Committee on September 5, Wil­
liam Knudsen again asked for a reasonable approach to taxa­
tion as did other Washington spokesmen. Henry L. Stimson, 
now Secretary of War, and James V. Forrestal, the new Under 
Secretary of the Navy, voiced their support for a less 
extreme system of taxation. All three men stood against 
Senator LaFollette's proposal that the top tax bracket rate 
be increased from 40 to 82 per cent. These figures repre­
sented the most extreme of all amendments under considera-
32tion and were quickly set aside by the moderate majority.
31
U.S., congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3rd 
Sess., September 19, 1940, 12306-12308.
32U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Hearings, on H.R. 10413, An Act to Provide Revenue, 
and for Other Purposes, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, pp. 
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Beyond the committee rooms business interests 
continued the fight for a reasonable tax law. The Journal 
backed small businessmen and argued that the bill was too 
arbitrary in nature, with excess taxes falling on all busi­
ness regardless of profit performance. Moreover, the edi­
tors agreed with the Chamber's Alvord that the excessiveness 
of a profit was unmeasurable, which made the bill's enforce­
ment impossible. The Journal lauded Willisun Knudsen's 
able reply to congressional charges that the government 
must be protected from greed, and added that "extortion" 
by business was impossible. The editors pointed out that 
big companies had already started construction of defense 
plants and could not stop now, regardless of a new tax 
law. If these assurances did not placate business critics,
the Journal reminded them that the government could always
33condemn plants and run them directly. In light of this 
Barron's complained that Congress and the White House had 
lost sight of the true aim of a revenue law, namely, the 
acquisition of additional funds to meet defense costs.
The President was lost in a "fog of sentiment," claimed the
33
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August 30, 1940, p. 4; September 3, 1940, p. 4; September 
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editors, as he tried to uphold his vow of no war million­
aires. Instead, Barron's thought he should have been more
34concerned with the law's true objective of producing revenue.
Despite their impatience with the President, busi­
nessmen sought his intercession on the tax dispute. Ber­
nard Baruch attempted to gain Roosevelt's approval of a 
middle position by establishing an 8 per cent profit ceil­
ing on defense contracts. Baruch agreed with Roosevelt 
that the public would not stand for great profits in mobili­
zation, but the financier still believed that capital de­
served a reasonable return on its investment. Surprisingly, 
however, Baruch had no compunction about government seizure 
of needed plants when required by the dictates of mobiliza­
tion. In such cases, though, Baruch still wanted a fair 
profit paid in compensation to the owners.
The petitions from business for a reasonable tax 
law were not lost on the members of the Senate Finance 
Committee. Chairman Pat Harrison steered a steady course 
between anti-business proposals eminating from the House
34
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35
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and the desires of the Chamber of Commerce to emerge with 
a bill acceptable to most businessmen. The law provided 
for excess profits to be taxed at graduated rates up to 
50 per cent after corporations chose one of two methods 
for calculating income credit. The first alternative con­
sisted of all profit over 95 per cent of 1936-1939 profits, 
as proposed at the outset of the debate by Senator Connally. 
As a second choice, income credit could consist of 8 per 
cent of a firm's invested capital for the taxable year.
Most important of all, the 8 per cent ceiling on war profits 
was repealed, which proved the reasonableness of the act
2 A
to businessmen. The Journal applauded Harrison's bill
37as "more rational" than the original H.R. 10413. As 
with most legislation, the new revenue act failed to please
all its critics. The Chronicle noted that many congress-
38men admitted they did not understand the measure and
Batron's agreed with Senator Arthur Vandenberg that the
39
new act was an "imponderable mess." in all, however.
^^U.S., Statutes at Large, LIV, Part 1, 974.
37The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 1940, p. 4.
38The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CLI (July 
13, 1940), p. 155.
39
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the business world resolved to live with the new law.
During 1940 businessmen rejected the idea that 
industry divest itself of war profits. The American eco­
nomic system, they said, was capitalist to the core, as 
the American people desired it to be, and was responsible 
for the nation's historic greatness. Profits were vital 
to the health of capitalism, even war profits, although 
businessmen favored only reasonable markups and were will­
ing to accept an excess profits tax to prove their sincerity. 
In question, however, was whether there would be any war 
profits to tax. Men of Ernest T. Weir's persuasion doubted 
that rearmament would stimulate genuine prosperity, espe­
cially with postwar depression looming in the future. 
Businessmen dismissed Senator Homer Bone's legislation to 
link immorality with war profits and labeled his efforts 
a backlash from the myth which had grown out of the role 
of munitions makers in World War I.
Industry attempted to influence the White House 
and Congress in favor of the least possible restrictions 
on defense contracts. The effect of this lobbying was 
seen in the tax law of October, 1940. Neither business 
nor its New Deal opponents judged the act satisfactory, 
although industry found it possible to live with the new
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legislation. The role of Roosevelt was again that of Bar­
ron's "quarterbacking" President, neither totally accepting 
nor rejecting the petitions of business, on one hand, or 
the counsel of his own New Deal lieutenants on the other.
The maneuvering that transpired in the White House to keep 
the rival factions from clashing head-on possibly delayed 
the finalization of the tax law and kept industry from 
entering earlier into a full mobilization program. Four 
months passed before corporations were given the assurance 
they desired in the new act as what to expect in tax levies. 
The extent to which business was responsible for delaying 
defense production was impossible to assess. While such 
charges were being made, William Knudsen himself reported 
that the machine tool makers, the most vital part of re­
armament in its early stages, had trebled their output in 
two years, a feat the NDAC leader considered a miracle of 
production. Beyond speculation, however, is the fact that 
business did begin to prepare itself for rearmament on an 
unprecedented scale as the united States armed itself and, 
with the forthcoming lend-lease system of 1941, aided 
Britain and the Allies for the duration of the war.
CHAPTER VIII
LEND-LEASE GAINS BUSINESS SUPPORT
During 1940 America approached intervention at 
the same indirect pace held for three years past, congress 
approved the conscription law in September but isolation­
ists fought the bill to the final favorable vote. The 
destroyer deal never ran the gamut of congressional inquiry, 
although transfer of the vessels in effect ended the neu­
tral role America played in the community of nations.
Foreign policy formulation quickened and became less nebu­
lous in 1941. The Administration pushed through Congress 
its new concept of lend-lease, which placed America among 
the belligerents more firmly than had all the President's 
actions since the Quarantine Speech. Exuding confidence 
from his fresh election victory, Roosevelt felt prepared 
for the fight with the isolationists that he knew would 
develop over lend-lease. If the election results provided 
insufficient incentive for action, the worsening Allied 
condition in Europe proved the need for greater aid to the 
democracies. The British Army's North African offensive 
emphasized the financial condition of the United Kingdom, 
which found itself unable to pay for the huge quantities
222
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of goods required to pursue the war.
The Administration's proposal to finance the Al­
lied campaign through loans made Americans sense that the 
nation was slipping into the position of being the "arsenal 
of democracy." But the idea of furnishing supplies to 
the Europeans without specifying the details or committing 
the recipients to a method of repayment caught isolationists 
by surprise. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle in 
early December, 1940, reported that its suspicions were 
correct; a scheme for further Allied aid unprecedented in 
magnitude was under discussion in the Administration. In­
stead of printing its usual criticisms of the President's 
policies, the Chronicle, alarmed by the Allies' general 
decline, suggested a positive plan of action. The editors 
urged the Administration to continue operating on a cash 
basis and to concentrate on shipping aircraft, munitions, 
and foodstuffs to Europe, though this might deny equipment 
to American defenses. The magazine did not even begrudge 
the united Kingdom's order for sixty new freighters or the 
consignment of 50 per cent of American warplane production 
to England. Possibly the editors now accepted the inter­
ventionist concept of Britain being America's first line 
of defense, or perhaps they anticipated great profits for
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business from the transactions. The likelihood, however, 
of the isolationist Chronicle justifying war shipments to 
Europe for profit or other economic motives does not seem 
feasible. The editors never abandoned the basic isolation­
ist principle that, except for certain excess items, equip­
ment must be retained for American forces. Even though 
the Chronicle understood the seriousness of the Allies ' 
position, it still refused to forego a noninvolvement policy. 
It recognized that isolationism was declining and resorted 
to compromise. The editors accepted the transfer of goods 
on a cash basis but rejected loans to the Allies. Senator 
Robert Taft later included conventional loans in his own 
compromise, but the heat of the great debate blinded the 
Chronicle and Taft to the fact that concessions led to a 
weakening of the isolationist position.
Lend-lease added a new issue to the foreign policy 
debate and it further divided the business community, as 
well as all American society. Interventionist businessmen 
supported the President without question. Diehard isola­
tionists, on the other hand, argued that such sweeping 
legislation would lead directly to war and that all resources 
should go into national defense. Nothing could be spared, 
even if the Allies offered to pay cash. Moderate
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isolationists favored aid to Britain, but not legislation 
which gave excessive power to the President, isolationist 
business groups often combined their opposition to inter­
vention and their fear of growing presidential powers into 
a single attack against the President. The Chronicle did 
this. While the President cruised aboard the Tuscaloosa, 
the Chronicle revived its accusations of Rooseveltian in- 
competency and charged that the sea journey was another 
of the President's delaying strategies to heighten suspense 
over the coming aid proposal. No one remained in Washing­
ton with authority to act on foreign policy, stated the 
Chronicle, although the voyagers accompanying the President 
included only his personal staff and Harry Hopkins. Roose­
velt simply wanted a respite from Washington pressures to 
think out his aid program, but to the Chronicle this sea- 
bound band represented the government. Its absence from 
the capital showed that the President's lax methods of 
operation during the 1930's still prevailed; the editors 
expected no better a performance from the Administration 
in time of international crisis.^
Other businessmen refused to dredge up the old
^The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CLI
(December 7, 1940), p. 3286.
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anti-Roosevelt accusations and explored instead Henry J. 
Morgenthau's role in writing the upcoming aid bill. Bar­
ron's reported that the Secretary of the Treasury and his 
aides had found a way to avoid recurrence of the resent­
ment still existing over the unpaid World War I loans.
The Administration, the editors disclosed, would eschew 
"any beating around the dollar-mark tree" in the current 
war. It planned to tell Congress the full story of Eng­
land 's nearly depleted resources and of the need to bol­
ster the British Isles ' preparations for an anticipated 
invasion in May, 1941. congress then would have the re­
sponsibility for saving Great Britain laid "slap bang" in 
its lap. in Barron's opinion, this would be the proper 
course of action, since its conservative editors believed 
the legislative branch, not the executive, should set 
government policy. Although the business press never knew 
Roosevelt's innermost thoughts, Barron * s conjectured that 
the Administration had decided to crush the isolationist 
bloc. The editors welcomed this move as a sign that the 
United States fully supported Britain against the Axis. 
Equally important, Barron's believed, selling or giving 
material and supplies to the Allies promised less chance 
of defeat for the democracies. Only then might America
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avoid direct involvement in the war. The editors rejected 
isolationist claims that aid to the Allies meant direct 
American military intervention and urged businessmen to 
ignore the "clanging complaints" and "confusion of whirl­
ing semaphores" the President left behind as he sailed for 
the Caribbean. The cruise itself, said Barron's, provided 
Roosevelt an opportunity to prepare his strategy for pushing 
lend-lease through Congress. After studying the implications 
of a broader aid program, the magazine again employed mari­
time metaphor and queried how far America might lean over 
the dock and reach into the water without falling in. Bar­
ron ' s shared the isolationists ' fear that expanded aid might 
lead to American convoys to Britain and cause full scale 
intervention. Regardless of these reservations, the edi­
tors agreed with the interventionists that Congress must 
take action to provide financial aid for Britain. Barron's 
longed to stay out of war, as did most Americans, but it
readily joined those who backed the President's new concept
2
of broad financial help for the Allies.
The presidential party's return from the Carib­
bean marked the opening of the lend-lease campaign. At 
the December 17 White House press conference, Roosevelt
2
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stated his novel theory for aiding the Allies. To illus­
trate, he told his parable of the garden hose, from which 
Americans learned that they must make equipment available 
to neighbors fighting fires and never quibble over the 
price. Eschewing outright gifts to the British, the Presi­
dent added that leasing or selling supplies might offer 
the best arrangement for furthering the Allied cause.
These outspoken statements told isolationists that they 
had come to the decisive battle in the great debate over 
foreign policy. The Chronicle's proposal for limited aid 
had no place in Roosevelt's own plan, which the magazine 
denounced as "a vague basis of eventual payment in kind." 
The editors predicted that the Allies would never repay 
obligations thus accumulated. But worse, they saw the Brit­
ish interpreting the President's proposal as proof that 
America had become a full-fledged belligerent. In the 
Chronicle's way of thinking, the nation's international 
position hinged on the fine distinction between the making 
of definite arrangements for payment and the giving away 
of war materials to the democratic powers.
The President's proposal disturbed many represen­
tatives of the business world. An orderly system of ac­
counting for goods shipped to Europe had no place in his
229
scheme, the Chronicle charged. It doubted that Roosevelt 
could persuade isolationists to accept such an aid plan.
The debate had become so wrought with emotion that the 
magazine discounted the possibility of reconciliation on 
lend-lease. Other business publications, lacking real 
enthusiasm for lend-lease, accepted it as inevitable, iron 
Age anticipated victory for the President, as did the Chicago 
Tribune and other isolationist spokesmen, but predicted a 
hard battle over the issue in Congress. The steel indus­
try journal avoided taking sides, but it accurately fore­
cast the isolationists' defeat despite their elaborate 
propaganda campaign.^
Interventionists put forth efforts equaling those 
of their rivals. Harvard's James B. Conant and Lewis Doug­
las voiced pro-Allied sentiments in their "round robin" 
telegram to the President on December 23. Nearly 200 promi­
nent Americans signed the petition, including Ward Cheny,
New York banker Frank Altschul, and the San Franciscan T.
D. Boardman. Since the fall of France the signatories, 
mostly extreme interventionists, had been dissatisfied with 
Roosevelt's cautious approach to involvement. They urged 
Roosevelt to explain in detail the nature of the European
3
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conflict which threatened national security. Once this 
was done, they said, the President could pursue a more 
vigorous interventionist policy. Roosevelt published the 
Conant "round robin" two days before his speech to test 
public opinion. The unenthusiastic reaction neutralized 
the petition's effect on the President, and with justifi­
cation he continued his slow advance toward intervention.^ 
Distrust of Roosevelt permeated the business world 
on the day of the fireside chat. The Chronicle accepted 
aid for Britain but it feared, with other Americans, that 
the President would bypass Congress and strip the Army 
and Navy of vital equipment for shipment to Europe. The 
Chronicle and conservative businessmen, often isolationists 
themselves, had always considered many aspects of the New 
Deal as socialistic, un-American, and unconstitutional.
Many doubted Roosevelt's competency to determine which 
war goods could be spared for Allied use.^ Certain indus­
trialists were so skeptical of Administration policy that 
they eschewed the Conant "round robin." Morris L. Ernst,
4
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a White House confidant, reported to Roosevelt that various
General Motors "big shots" refused to sign the telegram.
As the President began his radio speech the evening of
December 29, anti-Rooseveltians feared the worst.
Roosevelt opened his address by describing the
great emergency confronting America and the measures that
had been undertaken to guarantee security. The country
must become the major supplier for the Allied powers as
the "arsenal of democracy." The greater the amount of
armaments in Allied hands, reasoned the President, the
less possibility there was that American troops would be
sent to Europe. The editors of Barron ‘s had correctly
reported the shape of lend-lease, although its design con-
6
tained no guarantee of congressional control.
Isolationist segments of the business community 
found Roosevelt's proposal unsatisfactory. They had an­
ticipated a more detailed description of the new plan to 
fill out rumors they had heard, instead, they received 
what they considered a general call to transform America
Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.). The Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt with a Special introduc­
tion and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), IX, pp. 663, 664.
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into a vast arms depot. These men of practical affairs 
were more interested in learning how the President expected 
to finance the great project. Business Week complained 
that, although the President described the nation's condi­
tion as an emergency equal to actual war, he failed to clarify 
the specific differences between this and the state of war 
itself. The editors accurately concluded that Roosevelt 
still abided by the "short of war" policy, although they 
suspected this might change if the European situation wor­
sened. The editors pointed out that the President always 
made his promise of no intervention "in the present tense, " 
and never extended it into the future. In effect, the edi­
tors reflected the frustration of many Americans to the 
President's tactics of trying to walk a middle path between 
isolationists and interventionists.^
Roosevelt's allusion in his speech to the United 
States as the new Allied arms depot gratified ardent in­
terventionists around the nation. From St. Louis, the 
banker J. Lionberger Davis wrote the President to congratu­
late him. Davis described Roosevelt as the "symbol of 
almost everything" important in the democratic way of life.
The circle of interventionist businessmen in which Davis
7
Business Week, January 4, 1941, p. 7.
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moved applauded the proposal as vital in cementing the
Q
British-American alliance. These accolades gratified 
the President but did not reduce his concern over recent 
developments in the interventionist camp.
Roosevelt's appeal for increased involvement caused 
a major schism between moderates and extremists on the 
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. William 
Allen White's actions indicated the seriousness of the 
division. The venerable journalist favored aid to Britain 
but not military intervention. As a result. Century Group 
extremists forced White to resign his chairmanship. Busi­
nessmen and others followed White out of the organization 
but many considered the committee intervention's most ef­
fective tool in the great debate. These refused to desert. 
Thomas Lamont, who repeatedly voiced his opposition to armed 
intervention, remained the committee's firm supporter de­
spite mounting extremist sentiment. Lamont and his busi­
ness colleagues realized that the debate over lend-lease 
required interventionists of all shades to rally around 
the new aid project. Of more practical persuasion than
0
J. Lionberger Davis to Franklin D- Roosevelt, 
December 30, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal 
File, Box 186.
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William Allen White, the Lamont group kept the committee
together during the lend-lease debate and helped to insure
victory for interventionism.
Lamont and his friends felt closer to success
when Business Week cast its lot with the interventionists
in the first week of 1941. Roosevelt had just presented
his budget message on January 3, when he warned that, while
America's national existence was uppermost in his mind,
democracy throughout the world also had to be defended.
Roosevelt impressed Business Week with his proposal to
"get away from the dollar sign" in granting further aid
to Britain. Regardless of the proposed $17.5 billion price
tag of the new budget, 60 per cent of which was for defense,
the magazine agreed that this provided the surest method
for avoiding the pitfalls of the old war debt issue. To
the President's delight, the editors suggested that the
new loans be payable on a "when and if basis," a concept
9
already included in the lend-lease draft.
Three days after the budget address Roosevelt de­
livered his State of the Union message in which he further 
revealed his desire for greater aid to Britain. This favor­
able response gave the President courage to advance further
9
Business Week, January 11, 1941, p. 60.
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toward intervention; he declared that the nation had to aid 
the Allies even at the risk of war with the Axis. To answer 
isolationists who challenged the clarity of Allied war aims, 
Roosevelt concluded his address with his famous Pour Free­
doms: mankind, he said, should not be restricted in its
speech or religion and must feel safe from want and fear. 
However, the President did not say what specific measures 
the united States should take to guarantee these freedoms 
throughout the world.
Four days later Administration supporters in the 
House introduced H.R. 1776. Anglophile businessmen flooded 
Roosevelt with congratulations, as they always did when 
he took another step along the road to intervention. Daniel 
Willard, head of the Baltimore and Ohio, praised the Presi­
dent's proposal but declared that Roosevelt was moving too 
slowly toward providing aid for Britain. Although he lacked 
evidence to prove his point, Willard assured Roosevelt that 
the American public was eager to arm the Allies. Willard, 
however, turned his back on the Century Group's request for 
military intervention. Opposing the return of American 
soldiers to European battlefields, he agreed with moderate
Rosenman, Public Papers and Addresses, IX, p.
651.
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interventionists that munificent aid was the best insurance
against military involvement.^^
Following Willard's course, Thomas Lamont expressed
his pro-lend-lease feelings to the President. He opposed
total intervention but favored all aid possible short of
war. His enthusiasm possessed such an infectious quality
that he prevailed upon Alfred E. Smith to speak on national
radio in favor of lend-lease. After the broadcast Lamont,
well aware of the animosity between Smith and Roosevelt,
suggested that the President send one of his "characteris-
12
tic notes" of thanks to his old rival.
Predictably, isolationist spokesmen in the busi­
ness community remained unmoved by Roosevelt's call for 
lend-lease. The Chronicle chided the President for not 
shaping lend-lease "one iota" into a definite, precise pro­
gram. Congress was ready to write a lend-lease law after 
the State of the Union message, but, complained the Chroni­
cle. Roosevelt had not provided the legislators with a 
firm guideline for doing so. The White House did exactly
Daniel Willard to Franklin D- Roosevelt, Janu­
ary 7, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
Box 1621.
12
Thomas w. Lamont to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
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that, only the proposal bore no similarity to the Chron­
icle's concept of a desirable policy.
Lend-lease hearings began in the House Foreign 
Relations committee January 15. Following Secretaries 
Hull, Morgenthau, and Stimson, William Knudsen spoke in 
favor of H.R. 1776. Knudsen represented business among 
the Administration witnesses in his capacity as NDAC co- 
chairman, not General Motor's former president. Industrial­
ists and financiers never testified in favor of lend-lease 
before the committee. Their appearance might have given 
the impression that they anticipated great war profits 
once H.R. 1776 became law. As a result, their strategy 
helped eliminate warmongering charges during the hearings. 
Even Socialist Norman Thomas refrained from attacking busi­
ness in his own testimony, which emphasized that America 
must build strong defenses at home and stay out of European 
wars. Other than Knudsen the only businessman who appeared 
before the House committee was the shipping magnate, Wil­
liam L. Grace. An avowed isolationist, Grace unleashed a 
strident attack against the British Empire and opposed aid 
to England in any form.
13
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLII
(January 11, 1941), pp. 157, 158, 164-166.
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The House quickly passed the bill, but the Senate 
delayed final approval for two months. During that time 
Administration officials pleaded before the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee that massive aid to Britain afforded the 
best means for staying out of war. Interventionist sena­
tors went further and declared that war’s sufferings were 
a better fate than Nazism, but if America did fight it 
was her own interests that motivated her to do so, not 
slavish support of British policy, as isolationists con­
tended. Interventionist businessmen agreed. But, as with
the House hearings, they feared the glare of publicity and
14
preferred others to voice these thoughts at the hearings.
Isolationist businessmen proved less reticent in 
expressing disapproval of lend-lease. Several joined other 
isolationists at the Senate hearings where they used as 
their main theme Roosevelt's thirst for dictatorial powers. 
America First's chairman, Robert E. Wood, took the stand 
first to present a moderate anti-Roosevelt position. He 
favored some form of aid to Britain but he told the commit­
tee that the bill under consideration was too sweeping in 
scope and power. In his meticulous way he had counted
14
U.S., Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess., February 3, 1941, A391, 392,
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thirty "anys" in S. 275, the Senate version of H.R. 1776.
This satisfied him that the bill placed no limits on what
action the President might take as to time, countries, or
money. Detesting both presidential dictatorship and armed
conflict. Wood, in his summation, described lend-lease not
as a defense measure but a "war bill."^^
Midwestern industrialist Hanford MacNider, an
active America Firster, echoed Wood's charge of presidential
tyranny. MacNider correctly regarded lend-lease not as a
simple aid bill but as an instrument for expanding White
House authority. In reality, he concluded, lend-lease
might aid democracy abroad, but more importantly, it would
destroy democratic processes at home.^^ United States
Chamber of Commerce President James S. Kemper pursued the
Roosevelt dictatorship theme. Kemper explained to the
Foreign Relations Committee that the Chamber did not oppose
aid for the Allies, although it desired legislation dif-
17ferent from that before Congress.
Kemper's artful criticisms reflected his Board of 
Director's highly critical statements, which allied the
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearings, to Promote the Defense of the united 
States, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, pp. 342-398.
^®Ibid., pp. 560-567. ^ Ibid., pp. 419-443.
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Chamber with the isolationists during the lend-lease de­
bate. The Chamber wanted action on an impregnable defense 
strategy and extensive aid to Britain, but not in the form 
of H.R. 1776. Many Chamber members had never learned to
trust Franklin Roosevelt and did not want him managing the
18huge lend-lease program. The Board of Directors supported 
selling, leasing, and giving supplies to Britain, but the 
bill under consideration, in its opinion, allowed the Presi­
dent to give away the entire Navy if he wished. The direc­
tors' distrust of Roosevelt made them insist that Congress 
maintain close scrutiny over such schemes as lend-lease. 
Although the Chamber ignored the question of profits coming 
from production generated by lend-lease, it did set forth 
conditions thought necessary to insure H.R. 1776's success. 
Advocating unity without government coercion as the keystone 
of American mobilization, the Chamber backed voluntary 
action and nothing more. The organization's National Policy 
Council insisted that its members have a say in determining 
priorities and price levels so that anti-business New Dealers 
in Washington could not impose unreasonable demands upon
18
chamber of Commerce of the United States, National 
Preparedness; A Report by the National policy Council (Wash­
ington: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1941),
pp. 7-10.
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industry. At this point in mobilization business spokes­
men demurred from calculating the effect of lend-lease 
production upon the economy. Conservatives, however, re­
tained their doubts about benefits from rearmament, which 
they had expressed in 1940.^^
Outside the Capitol's committee rooms the busi­
ness publications continued the great debate. Editors 
following the hearings found themselves divided on the 
merits of lend-lease, with the opposition continuing to 
criticize Roosevelt's penchant for dictatorial government. 
Nation's Business, the United States Chamber's house organ, 
reported that lend-lease "departed from traditional Ameri­
can policy" because it allowed the President to administer 
aid independent of congressional control. The editors 
scoffed at the thought that Germany might attack America, 
asking readers to imagine the Luftwaffe bombing Memphis 
or any other American city. Contradicting this basic prem­
ise, the editors added that America had a generation to 
prepare for invasion before Germany subdued the European 
states. From this estimate the magazine determined that
19
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Lend- 
Lease Bill: A Statement by the Board of Directors (Washing­
ton: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1941), pp.
3-6.
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the United States need not enter the war, at least immedi­
ately, or pass the lend-lease bill. One of the greatest 
concerns of the editors was that business not be blamed 
for another world war. This was inevitable if lend-lease 
passed, they maintained, because industry would then be­
come the supplier for the Allies and a convenient target 
for pacifists and other anti-war groups. Business had less 
reason to anticipate such criticism in 1941, however, as 
seen in the absence of warmongering charges during the 
lend-lease hearings. And no responsible criticism was 
heard that American business lacked a cooperative spirit 
in rearmament. But the fears of a second Nye Committee and
expanded executive powers caused Nation's Business to join
20the anti-lend-lease forces.
The magazine's isolationist editorializing caused 
greater reaction in the business world than any other event 
during the lend-lease debate. Nation's Business reported 
that 70 per cent of its mail favored its noninterventionist 
arguments. Robert E. Wood set the example, saying that 
he found the editor's remarks "refreshing." The remaining 
30 per cent of the writers took a different view. Some
20
Nation's Business, XXIX (February 1941), p. 13;
(March 1941), p. 13.
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cancelled their subscriptions, while others denounced the
editors as Hitlerites on American soil. Finding business
divided over foreign policy as completely as the nation
at large, the editors approached the issue philosophically.
They observed that history proved the dream of world peace
had always eluded mankind, and lend-lease had small chance
of bringing a world of international goodwill closer to
reality. Clearly, their journalistic efforts demonstrated
the great cleavage between isolationist and interventionist
businessmen, and the general public's, in reaction to Roose-
21
velt's foreign policy.
The Wall Street Journal also attacked H.R. 1776, 
calling it "fantastically dangerous." The Journal used 
the familiar argument that the President might strip the 
Army and Navy of their armament and leave America without 
security in the event of war. As a counter measure the 
Journal proposed that the Administration create a new agency 
to take over British-held American securities and other 
assets to help pay for Allied material orders. The editors 
saw this as a sound business move. Lend-lease did not 
measure up to this standard, the Journal claimed, because 
H.R. 1776 contained no provision for "orderly property
21
Nation's Business, XXIX (April 1941), p. 7
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liquidation." The editors wanted to aid the Allies, as 
did most conservative businessmen, but rejected the Admin­
istration's proposals for action. Drawing on the fireside 
speech analogy, the Journal professed that it had no objec­
tion to lending Britain the garden hose, but that did not 
give the President permission to change the architecture 
of the house as well. To climax its argument the Journal 
returned to the standard theme, presidential tyranny. The 
editors insisted that before Congress passed H.R. 1776, 
which most isolationists considered inevitable, Roosevelt 
should specify what he planned to do with his new power. •
In other words, how much of the Navy would go to Britain
2 2and which countries would benefit from lend-lease.
Roosevelt found stronger support for lend-lease 
in the banking world. The Banker's Magazine outlined two 
possible courses for American foreign policy; all-out aid 
to Britain, regardless of the consequences, which included 
war, as Robert Taft had pointed out in the Senate, or aid 
"short of war." The editors realized Americans preferred 
the second alternative, but suggested that this popular
22
The Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1941, p.
4; January 11, 1941, p. 4; January 13, 1941, p. 4; Febru­
ary 12, 1941, p. 4.
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policy might be inadequate for national security. Senator 
Nye's earlier charges against the banking fraternity did 
not frighten the magazine, although it followed the lead 
of the rest of the business community and never mentioned 
that industry stood to gain huge profits from rearmament. 
Its editors, with others, thought excess taxes eliminated 
this possibility. They reminded their readers that there 
could be no "if" concerning the survival of the country, 
and besides, it insisted, a close study of the President's 
statements showed he had never really talked of, much less 
pursued, a "short of war" aid policy. Leaving this ques­
tionable line of thought, the editors reminded Americans 
that timidity encouraged dictators; the nation must back
Administration policy as the surest way of keeping out of 
23
war.
Such bold statements gave the impression that 
financiers desired intervention in 1941 to promote their 
own interests. In reality, bankers, like other Americans, 
were deeply divided on the question of aid to Britain. 
Among the critics of Roosevelt's policies were the editors 
of Banking. This journal echoed the old argument that
23
The Bankers' Magazine, CXLII (January 1941), p.
1; (February 1941), p. 97.
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Roosevelt's limited competency in fiscal matters meant he 
had no business running lend-lease. The editors rejected 
Senator Robert Taft's sharp criticism that the President 
spent government money like water. Instead, Banking ob­
served that the President displayed "a certain disturbing 
tone of complacency" toward serious financial problems.
The magazine knew that it had no power to halt interven­
tion, but realized that lend-lease meant the possibility 
of intervention and the inevitability of industrial mobili­
zation. Refusing to enter further into the debate, the 
editors assumed a businesslike mien and expressed hope
that once industry started producing war goods on a large
24
scale, inflation would not wreck the economy.
Individual financiers and industrialists were 
more inclined to speak out in favor of lend-lease. Some 
expressed their opinions in public addresses, but most 
spoke at private meetings with colleagues and wrote letters 
of encouragement to the President. Thomas Lamont appeared 
before a meeting of the Merchant's Association of New York 
and attacked Charles Lindbergh's claims that Hitler meant 
no harm to the united States. On the contrary, Lamont
24
Banking, Journal of American Banker's Associa­
tion, XXXIV (February 1941), p. 19.
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identified the Nazis as the prime threat to national se­
curity, and lend-lease as an act of American self-preser­
vation. He declared that public opinion had shifted toward 
intervention during 1940, and that the time had arrived 
to give all-out support to Britain's war e f f o r t . ^5 other 
New York financiers joined Lamont in promoting lend-lease. 
W. H. Schubart, vice president of the Bank of Manhattan 
Company, stressed to audiences that the forthcoming lend- 
lease act would forge the united British-American economy 
necessary to defeat Hitler. Although isolationists feared 
that Britain would revert to her traditional imperial pref­
erence system when peace returned, Schubart denied such a 
possibility, instead, he predicted the dawn of a new free 
trade era, with the Anglo-Saxon nations working for tariff 
and quota reductions in the world market.
Roosevelt's St. Louis banker friend, J. Lionberger 
Davis, excoriated the isolationist Post Dispatch in letters 
to the editor. After the newspaper denounced lend-lease
25
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as nothing more than a Rooseveltian trick for acquiring
more power and involving American troops in the war, Davis
retorted that he did not advocate the "blind following"
of the President, Nevertheless, Roosevelt deserved the
loyalty of all Americans as long as he led them in the
27
"right direction," This pronouncement made Davis one of 
the first businessmen to speak out against the charges of 
presidential incompetency, Davis continued his efforts in 
private correspondence with his conservative business associ­
ates, He wrote Francis L. Higginson, the Boston banker, 
that Roosevelt was an emotional artist with strong imagina­
tion; his daring and courageous spirit made up for his lack 
of understanding economics and finance, Davis also dis­
missed Henry Cabot Lodge's criticism of the President as 
nothing more than the words of a "Roosevelt-hater," In 
the face of the increasing international crisis, Davis 
urged his wealthy Eastern friends to realize that their 
limited contacts with "ordinary men" deprived them of the 
realization that public opinion supported the President, 
instead of obstructing White House actions he urged these
27
J. Lionberger Davis to Editor, St, Louis Post- 
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men to remember that the inevitability of change made old
28grudges against Roosevelt insignificant. Notable also
as a lend-lease supporter among the "economic Bourbons"
of the 1930's was John W. Davis, corporation lawyer and
Democratic candidate for President in 1924. He tried to
convince his old anti-Roosevelt Liberty League associates
that congressional amendments to the bill had removed the
danger of presidential dictatorship that so disturbed the
29business community.
The Laments and Davises failed to convince isola­
tionist businessmen of the merits of lend-lease. The pros­
pect of presidential dictatorship remained the central 
issue in the minds of many of the business community. The 
Chronicle declared that the bill granted Roosevelt nearly 
unlimited power to give the Allies the Navy and untold 
amounts of equipment. Following closely the congressional 
hearings, the Chronicle assured its readers that once the 
American public realized that lend-lease led straight to 
war, Roosevelt would have more difficulty pushing further 
pro-Ally legislation through Congress. The editors admitted
28J. Lionberger Davis to F. L. Higginson, January 
23, 1941, in ibid.
29
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defeat on lend-lease but intended to place obstacles in 
the way of future interventionist p l a n s . Business Week 
suggested that the uncertainty of the future regarding a 
German challenge to America required the President to ask 
for broad powers in the lend-lease bill, but this did not
31remove the Chronicle's fears of a White House dictatorship.
Individual businessmen opposed lend-lease, but 
the most extreme reaction came from Senator Burton K* Wheeler, 
who charged that the aid bill was a diabolical plot to 
"plow under every fourth American boy." Answering this 
tasteless remark, L. J. Miller, an interventionist New 
England distributor for Superior Coach Sales Company, wrote 
Wheeler that no businessman on the Eastern Seaboard agreed 
with the Senator and the voters should plow under the iso­
lationist congressmen for impeding the passage of lend- 
lease.^^
Other businessmen kept the debate on a higher 
plane. Robert E. Wood, once he had completed his testimony
^^The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLII 
(January 18, 1941), pp. 302, 304, 307, 308,
^^Business Week, January 25, 1941, p. 7.
32L= J. Miller to Burton K. Wheeler, January 15, 
1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, Box 
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before the Foreign Affairs Committee, attempted to influ­
ence Roosevelt by a direct appeal. The President, however, 
refused to grant the General a personal interview. Not 
deterred by his ostracism from the White House where he 
had been welcome during the 1930's as an NRA supporter and 
Business Advisory Council member. Wood resorted to letter 
writing. The General charged that H.R. 1776*s broad scope 
was "sure to involve us in war," although he believed the 
public would accept aid and defense legislation when it 
clearly delimited executive powers. Wood's opinions in­
dicated that he did not fit the isolationist stereotype. 
Possibly America First needed a change of chairman, but 
no candidate could lend prestige to the organization in 
the way that Wood did. The General enjoyed a reputation 
of competency in business and integrity in his past govern­
mental responsibilities unsurpassed by other isolationist 
leaders. If Wood's position appeared too moderate to hard­
core isolationists, a more extreme policy would have alien­
ated America Firsters who thought Britain deserved at least 
limited aid. Moderation within America First boded the 
end of isolationism? once the committee modified its strict 
principles opposing any form of aid to belligerents, its 
arguments evaporated in a series of compromises, conservative
252
business leadership brought down the isolationist organiza­
tion as surely as the reports of Axis aggression from the 
33Continent.
The Chicago realtor, George D. Wilkinson, better 
represented standard isolationist thinking. Proud of his 
membership in three isolationist groups, Wilkinson wrote 
various senators during the lend-lease debate that England 
had no claim against America for aid because democracy in 
the island kingdom was no more than a sham. Only warmongers, 
communists and traitors, he asserted, favored lend-lease, 
leaving approximately 80 per cent of America opposed to 
intervention, which proved to the Chicagoan that Congress 
should vote down H.R. 1776.^^
E. L. Connelly, a southwestern oil producer, also 
represented extreme isolationism. Generally misinterpret­
ing the 1940 election results, he insisted that Roosevelt's 
triumph indicated Americans opposed involvement in the 
European war. If the United states entered the war, only 
then did he favor a lend-lease law; otherwise, he believed
33
Robert E. Wood to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Febru­
ary 7, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
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^^George D. Wilkinson to Elmer Thomas, February
20, 1941, Thomas Papers, Box 148.
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the President should not have such great power in peace- 
35time. In agreement was a southwestern petroleum geolo­
gist who claimed that Britain and France themselves armed 
Germany as part of the power politics game played during 
the 1930's . A  Detroit realtor exceeded the others in 
originality by selecting historical examples to prove the 
errors of lend-lease. Recalling that Pontius Pilate blamed 
the "jurors" for forcing him to allow Christ's crucifixion, 
Adams warned Congress that its position paralleled that 
of the ancient sages of Jerusalem. If congressmen who 
represented the jurors in the lend-lease debate had no 
concern over their reputations, they must realize that the
hostilities constituted a European war only, with no claims
37on American wealth for its pursuance.
During the closing days of the lend-lease debate 
much editorial opinion favored the bill, although die-hard 
isolationists refused to acknowledge its merits. The Chron­
icle characterized H.R. 1776 as the "most remarkable"
35
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legislation ever proposed in a supposedly democratic nation 
because it permitted the President to usurp the prerogatives 
of Congress even more effectively than had New Deal legis­
lation. Other publications had rejected this argument with 
the realization that the President, in his role as Commander- 
in-chief, already possessed the allegedly dictatorial powers. 
The Constitution, not lend-lease, gave the Chief Executive 
this great authority. Nevertheless, the Chronicle regarded 
what it described as Roosevelt's breezy casualness toward 
the debate as a warning sign that in the name of lend-lease 
the White House planned further highhanded tactics reminis­
cent of September's destroyer deal.^®
Barron's, in contrast to the Chronicle, led the 
business press in promoting lend-lease. The threat of an 
invasion of Britain within ninety days caused the editors 
to exclaim that America must "send [Britain] what we have 
now" to stave off the Hitlerian onslaught. Better to have 
American equipment in Britain available for use against the 
anticipated invasion, decided Barron's, than sitting idle 
in the united States. "Good business" required Roosevelt 
to dispatch all available materiel across the Atlantic to
38
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLII
(January 25, 1941), pp. 584, 591-593.
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insure Britain's security while expanded mobilization built
39up defenses at home.
Efforts in congress to diminish the "dictator" 
argument also caught the eye of business editors. To as­
suage the isolationists, congress banned convoying and 
fixed June 30, 1943 as H.R. 1776's expiration date. Busi­
ness Week, favoring intervention but still leery of Roose­
velt's intentions, regarded these amendments as temporary 
measures and part of a "Presidential compromise" that would 
be forgotten once the Administration had the lend-lease 
act safe in hand.^^ The Chronicle's editors remained op­
posed to the broad scope of the amended document and branded 
it a "dictatorship bill."^^
March 11, 1941, climaxed the great debate as the 
President signed lend-lease into law. The following day 
interventionist businessmen heaped congratulations upon 
the President. Herbert S. Houston, elated over the lend- 
lease victory, ranked Roosevelt with Washington, Jefferson, 
and Lincoln as one of the greatest presidents. After
39
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40Business Week, February 1, 1941, p. 7.
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fighting the Borahs and Johnsons for twenty years "as vig­
orously as Sam Houston fought Santa Anna," Houston regarded
lend-lease as the summation of his long struggle against 
42isolationism. With equal enthusiasm, Julian Goldman 
wrote that lend-lease was not enough; the President must 
provide "militant leadership" to combat Axis aggression.
Business Week assessed the impact of lend-lease 
on industry and concluded that on March 11 "American busi­
ness entered the war." The editors believed that the suc­
cess of lend-lease rested upon the business community. In 
terms of foreign policy. Business Week accurately believed 
that the Administration had gone beyond the question of
whether to risk war because the "die is cast" with the en-
44actment of H.R. 1776. This realistic assessment escaped 
the Chronicle, which declared lend-lease a hoax designed to 
conceal Roosevelt's true aims. Angry over the intervention­
ist propaganda spread by Barron's and other interventionists 
that had warned of an imminent German invasion of Britain,
42
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the Chronicle rejoined that not a single German landing 
craft had been sighted in the Channel during this time of 
peril which proved Roosevelt had concocted lend-lease as 
another ruse to involve America in a shooting war. While 
Business Week and other voices of moderation considered 
the risk incidental to the primary purpose of lend-lease, 
the Chronicle maintained the Administration had a very 
different objective in mind. The magazine insisted Roose­
velt wanted to involve the united States in a shooting war
through the risk inherent in supplying the Allies with war
 ^ 45 goods.
At least the lend-lease victory moved the Chronicle 
into the central arena of the great debate, with its edi­
tors abandoning the dictatorship argument and emphasizing 
instead the possibility of direct intervention in Europe. 
Similarly, The Wall Street Journal shifted its criticism 
to the military effects of lend-lease. No citizen, least 
of all the President, wrote the editors, wanted the respon­
sibility of carrying the nation into war through "trickery 
or cajolery." In the Journal's estimation, Americans ac­
cepted without question the false assumption that lend-lease
45The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLII
(March 15, 1941), pp. 1632, 1633.
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meant inevitable war for the united States. Congress still 
had the power to declare war, emphasized the editors, which 
made it doubly important for voters to impress upon the 
solons that the nation wanted to keep out of hostilities.
The lend-lease victory signaled the end of isola­
tionism but the Journal refused to admit defeat. The for­
eign policy battle had reached the crucial stage, said the 
editors, and the legions of America First had no time to 
lose in mounting their anti-war crusade. The chances for 
success hung on the true nature of lend-lease. If the new 
law contained no hidden meanings. Senator Wheeler and his 
colleagues in Congress might yet prevail, but if H.R. 1776 
masked preparations for a shooting war the Journal admitted 
that the great debate of the 1940's had ended in favor of 
the interventionists.^^
Other isolationist strongholds also realized that 
intervention had won the day. Gas Age reacted with a nega­
tive assessment of the effect that the New Deal and impending 
war had on American life. The editors saw the "Zero Hour" 
of civilization approaching, with "radicals," working to 
remake the social and economic system, opposing the "moderate
46
The Wall Street Journal, March 12, 1941, p. 4;
March 17, 1941, p. 4; March 26, 1941, p. 4.
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liberals," the preservers of capitalism. For a decade
"moral pressure and persuasion" had lost ground to "severe
controls" over national life. But Gas Age thought that the
shock of war might be the salvation of society if Americans
then recognized the need for traditional institutions and
47established economic principles.
Unlike the Chronicle and Gas Age, Iron Age never 
took sides in the great debate, although its reaction to 
lend-lease reflected the business world's conservativism 
in domestic affairs. The editors ignored the possibility 
that Hitler might use lend-lease as a casus belli and con­
centrated their concern on the act's effect in labor rela­
tions. Giving its own twist to the Nye Committee thesis. 
Iron Age feared that labor would hinder the effectiveness 
of lend-lease by trying to "cash in on the enemy." The 
editors pointed to the West Coast shipyard workers, who 
had struck for higher wages soon after the President signed
H.R. 1776. Increased labor pressure, reasoned iron Age, 
would disrupt industry and hamstring lend-lease unless 
unions moderated their demands. The editors did not sug­
gest methods to deal with strikes, but left this to the
47
Gas Age, LXXXVII (March 27, 1941), p. 19.
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A Q
determination of their readers.
Other parts of the business press cheered the 
passage of lend-lease. Discounting the dictatorship argu­
ment, the interventionist Bankers' Magazine scoffed at fears 
of Congress abdicating its powers under lend-lease. The 
affirmative vote, which seemed remarkably large and non­
partisan to the editors, indicated "substantial unanimity" 
in support of intervention, evidence that America had set­
tled upon an aggressive pro-Ally course in foreign policy. 
The vapid isolationist arguments presented during the de­
bate proved to Bankers' Magazine that America First and its 
allies lacked the dynamism needed to influence public opin­
ion. It found nothing new in the opposition's speeches, 
only the outworn arguments left over from the days of the 
Nye Committee. The magazine applauded the passage of lend- 
lease, but scored Congress for failing to take prompter
action on the bill, a circumstance it blamed on the isola-
^ 49
tionists.
The lend-lease victory climaxed the great debate 
in favor of intervention. However, the vote on the bill
A Q
iron Age, CXLVII (March 20, 1941), p. 78; (April
3, 1941), p. 60.
49
The Bankers' Magazine, CLXII (April 1941), p. 281.
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(260 to 165 in the House; 60 to 31 in the Senate) evinced 
a considerable isolationist minority ready to oppose future 
Administration moves in foreign policy. For this reason, 
and also to prevent the public from retreating into the 
isolationist camp, the President continued to move cautiously 
throughout 1941 in uniting American and Allied efforts 
against the Axis. The fight for lend-lease revealed a 
business community divided on foreign policy. Anglophiles 
such as Thomas Lamont stood behind the President; hard­
core isolationists, on the other hand, worked diligently 
to defeat H.R. 1776. Hanford MacNider adopted Senator 
Taft's line of reasoning on the question of lend-lease's 
future effect on American international relations. Mac­
Nider maintained that aid for the Allies meant eventual 
military involvement for America. To the detriment of 
their position, isolationists compromised that crucial 
point when they accepted the general principle of aid for 
the Allies.
Businessmen supporting isolationism fused together 
the twin fears of presidential tyranny and military involve­
ment into a single statement against intervention. As a 
result, ambivalence often developed on basic issues, as 
illustrated by the united States chamber of Commerce, which
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opposed alleged Rooseveltian tyranny but not intervention 
in general. The chamber's magazine, however, advocated 
extreme isolation, and fought against all aid to the Allies.
Businessmen, both isolationist and interventionist, 
were cheered to learn that charges of warmongering had 
greatly diminished by 1941. The interventionist sentiments 
of Barron's emd Bankers' Magazine precipitated no outcry 
from tne public. The Nye Committee faded farther away in 
time as the threat of war came nearer; immediate events 
in Europe impressed the public more than the Senate hear­
ings of 1935. Americans largely forgot accusations that 
the businessman's desire for profits had dragged the nation 
into World War I and now looked to industry as the supplier 
of the democracies in their struggle against Axis domina­
tion. Talk of mobilization as a cornucopia yielding huge 
profits for industry diminished so as to be almost unheard 
in or out of the business community. Lend-lease gave the 
business world its mandate for mobilization, and ended the 
warmonger epithets heard for the past two decades.
Most significantly, lend-lease meant the triumph 
of intervention in America. Business Week's statement 
that business had entered the war applied equally to the 
country at large. Interventionists consolidated their
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position, but isolationists, refusing to believe their day 
had passed, mounted rear guard actions serious enough to 
force the President to turn his attention to them in the 
remaining months of 1941.
CHAPTER IX
BUSINESS AND UNLIMITED NATIONAL EMERGENCY
The lend-lease victory provided the breakthrough 
interventionists needed to achieve their objectives. They 
continued to back the President's program as he established 
naval patrols in the Atlantic in April, and issued his May 
29 "unlimited national emergency" proclamation. Two months 
later he met with Prime Minister Churchill at sea, off the 
Newfoundland coast, for the Atlantic Conference. In Sep­
tember America lost its last vestiges of neutrality when 
the President delivered his "shoot on sight" speech and 
inaugurated convoys for Allied shipping. During November, 
Roosevelt gained legal sanction for these moves when he 
engineered partial repeal of the Neutrality Law.
Americans learned of the extended naval patrols 
at Roosevelt's April 29 press conference, when he acknow­
ledged that the Navy had begun operations 2,000 miles into 
the Atlantic. The Administration calculated that this 
cautious prelude to the convoy strategy would neither bring 
recrimination from the Nazis in Europe or from isolation­
ists at home. The White House avoided confrontation with 
the German government, but the isolationist uproar in
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Congress over the patrols and the probability of future 
convoys reached such great proportions that it produced 
the Tobey Anti-Convoy Resolution, which threatened not 
only Atlantic patrols but lend-lease itself.
Ignoring interventionist criticism that he should 
move more quickly, Roosevelt defeated the Tobey resolution 
in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and eventually made 
convoys a reality. The President realized that imprudent 
action on his part might give the isolationists an oppor­
tunity to revitalize their forces and thwart his newest 
interventionist move. Undaunted by the outcome of the lend- 
lease debate, segments of the business community joined 
isolationists to oppose the Atlantic patrols, which they 
rightly claimed would eventually lead to convoys and a 
shooting war. The White House received petitions from such 
prominent leaders as Harold Vanderbilt, who vowed he was 
"100 per cent pro British and 100 per cent anti Nazi" [sic], 
but begged Roosevelt to cancel convoy orders and abandon 
lend-lease. All manpower and material should go into Ameri­
can defenses at home, not squandered abroad, he insisted.^
Conservative business groups criticized the
Harold S. Vanderbilt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
May 19, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
Box 6666.
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President's methods in setting up patrols and the secrecy 
in which he enveloped the entire program. The Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle complained that his remarks at the 
April 29 press conference were so vague that they confused 
the public about naval activity on the high seas. The 
editors held that the President had purposely led the na­
tion to the brink of war with his patrols, or, possibly, 
full-fledged convoys. Regardless of isolationist assump­
tions, the President had not yet arrived at the conclusion
2
that America would inevitably enter the war. The Wall 
Street Journal pointed to the Neutrality Law's prohibition 
against united States merchant vessels entering war zones 
and decided that if Congress did not want freighters in 
danger areas the president should not send warships into 
the same waters. The Journal still looked to congress 
for major decision making, although it well realized the 
President had over the years assumed many of these powers. 
Anticipating isolationist accusations, Roosevelt took care 
that patrols did not extend into the prohibited areas, so 
as not to violate the neutrality statutes.^
2
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLII
(May 3, 1941), p. 2752 
3
The Wall street Journal, May 1, 1941, p. 4.
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Roosevelt found further reason to move cautiously 
when certain lend-lease supporters refused to back convoying. 
Barron's attacked Roosevelt's official family for trying to 
force him to initiate convoys. "Palace pals" such as Henry 
Wallace and Felix Frankfurter, "Washington's black robed 
Richelieu," maintained the editors, advocated convoys reach­
ing the full distance to Great Britain. Regardless of the 
power these men wielded in the White House, Barron's trusted 
that Roosevelt would delay convoys until he could rely on 
public support.^ Accordingly, Roosevelt authorized the 
Secretary of War to promote convoys in a strongly worded 
radio address on May 6. Stimson announced that the Navy 
possessed sufficient men and ships to guard the sea lanes 
against German submarines and insure that lend-lease goods 
reached their destination. If the Navy did not assume this 
duty the Secretary foresaw the demise of lend-lease as 
wolf packs continued to prey unchecked upon Allied Shipping.
Isolationists condemned Stimson's proposal as un­
realistic because it assumed America could supply the Allies 
and yet remuin aloof from the fighting. The Chronicle con­
demned the idea as more propaganda, "singularly lacking in
4
Barron's, The National Financial Weekly, XXI
(April 14, 1941), p. 4.
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forthrightness," which ignored the possibility of a shoot­
ing war. Stimson's remarks also revived accusations that 
interventionists hoped to preserve the British Empire at 
the expense of the united states. The Chronicle suspected 
that stimson wanted the Navy to assume convoy duties pri­
marily for that purpose, regardless of the threat to Ameri­
can security.^ The Journal at least rated Stimson's forth­
right address above recent statements made by Secretaries 
Knox and Hull and asked why the Administration could not 
be as open when other subjects were at issue. In particu­
lar, the editors said the only candid way to go to war—  
now an alarming possibility to the magazine because of lend- 
lease and the convoys that were sure to materialize— was 
to ask Congress for a formal declaration of war against the 
Axis.^ Gas Age seconded this with the admonition that 
Americans should prepare for the future knowing that the
7
nation "will become a war belligerent."
Barron's found the President's approval of Stim­
son 's speech dismaying, although the editors still relied
^The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLII 
(May 10, 1941), pp. 2910-2912, 2915.
^The Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1941, p. 4.
7Gas Age, LXXXVII (April 10, 1941), p. 35.
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on Roosevelt not to act against the public will. Except 
for the 1937 Conrc-packing bill, the editors found he had 
nevr ’ tried to force the nation to accept an unpopular 
policy. These tactics had resulted in agonizing delays 
for the interventionists as the President postponed rearma­
ment for eight months after Hitler invaded Poland. But 
Barron's believed that hastier action would have left the 
President open to anti-Administration charges that he only 
wanted a defense boom to insure prosperity for the nation 
and a third term for himself. Barron's also recalled that 
during the aircraft production crisis in 1940 Roosevelt 
waited three months for congress to produce an excess prof­
its bill needed to resolve the issue in a manner acceptable
O
both to the solons and concerned industrialists.
Historians continue to debate the point raised by 
Barron's, as to whether public opinion actually was ahead 
of the President in favoring greater preparations for de­
fense against the Axis, polls taken at the time indicated 
that a majority favored aid to Britain and noninvolvement 
in the actual fighting. This paradoxical situation caused 
the Administration to move cautiously as each crisis arose, 
without speculating on the ultimate result, military
^Barron*s, XXI (May 12, 1941), p. 4.
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involvement. Authorities such as William L. Langer and 
S. Everett Gleason accept Roosevelt's politics of caution 
without strongly endorsing it.^ Robert A. Divine^*^ and 
Selig Adler^^ subscribe strongly to Roosevelt's slow paced 
technique as the surest method for achieving intervention 
in a nation so divided on foreign policy.
In the spring of 1941 interventionists found Roose­
velt's circumspection in foreign policy intolerable as 
German submarines sank ever greater numbers of freighters 
carrying lend-lease goods to Britain. Businessmen in this 
group implored the White House for immediate convoy runs 
to Europe. Julian Goldman told the President that in New 
York, the interventionist stronghold, convoying had lost 
its revolutionary character as Manhattanites advocated an 
open declaration of war against the Axis. Goldman insisted 
that the public stood firmly behind Roosevelt, which made
g
William L- Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The 
undeclared War. 1940-1941 (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1953), p. 450.
^^Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: 
American Entry into World War II (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 135.
^^Selig Adler, The uncertain Giant: 1921-1941:
American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (New York: The
Macmillan Co.), p. 256.
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possible entry into the war whenever necessary to block
12Axis aggression, Lewis W. Douglas, one of Roosevelt's 
old business friends, also importuned the President to 
deploy the Navy and help turn the tide in the battle of 
the Atlantic in favor of the Allies.
When, in May, Charles Lindbergh attracted atten­
tion over his resignation from the air force reserve, in­
terventionists feared the President might further slow his 
pace toward involvement. Businessmen moved quickly to dis­
credit the aviator's protest against involvement. The New 
Yorker Frederick H. Prince realized that the Administration 
could move no faster than public opinion allowed, but stressed 
that Lindbergh's superficial arguments would not sway Ameri­
cans toward isolationism.^^ J. C. Hebditch, a Maryland 
Coca-Cola bottler, questioned Lindbergh's patriotism as an 
isolationist propagandist. As the living personification 
of the Prussian officer corps, Lindbergh, explained Hebditch,
12
Julian Goldman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 
25, 1941, President's Personal File, Box 6495.
13Lewis w. Douglas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 
25, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, Box 
1914.
14
Frederick H. Prince to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
April 29, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, Miscellaneous File, Box 
4193.
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instinctively preferred noninvolvement to pro-British inter- 
15vention.
Beyond the executive suites of big business, other
men such as Hebditch promoted convoys for Britain. A small
town Oklahoma banker considered convoy escorts the only
sure means for protecting the American taxpayer's huge
lend-lease investment as it crossed the A t l a n t i c . A
southwestern typewriter distributor informed his senator
that he favored convoys and "anything else we can do to
17
whip Germany and Italy.” From Auburn, Kentucky, the
Rotary Club forwarded to the White House its pro-convoy
resolution, which supported any measure necessary to de-
X8
liver materiel to Britain.
The display of interventionist fervor by business­
men and other groups encouraged the President, but he had 
to cope with still powerful isolationist forces. Sweeping 
aside the bombast and rhetoric, he sought to determine
C. Hebditch to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 
30, 1941, in ibid.
L. Cruther to Elmer Thomas, Thomas papers,
BOX 147.
17
J. W. Densford to Elmer Thomas, May 18, 1941,
in ibid.
18
Telegram, Auburn Rotary club to Stephen T. Early, 
May 20, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 4426.
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genuine public opinion on convoying. The President's study
convinced him that caution remained the best course of
action. The Atlantic patrols, not convoys, represented the
limits to which the public would go in aiding the Allies.
Accordingly, he told Thomas Lamont to inform the Committee
to Defend America that it must curtail its pro-convoy propa-
19
ganda campaign until later in the year. The intensity 
of the arguments against convoying convinced Roosevelt 
that the speeches of Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Hull 
had only inflamed the isolationists. To repair the damage 
the President himself went to the people on radio to ex­
plain the seriousness of the international situation. Gen­
eral Rommel had driven Britain's Army back into Egypt and 
the Bismark, which had slipped out of its Scandinavian base,
threatened shipping on the Atlantic routes, until sunk on 
20
May 27.
To meet the new crisis interventionists pressed 
Roosevelt for an emergency proclamation. Joining in the 
move were such businessmen as C. I. Ochs, president of the
19
Thomas Lamont to Clark Eichelberger, April 8, 
1941, Roosevelt Papers, Secretary's File, Box 81.
20
Memorandum of Franklin D. Roosevelt, no date. 
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Eaton Manufacturing Company, who favored a national emer-
21gency declaration to alert Americans to the Axis menace.
The Auburn, Kentucky, Rotary Club suggested that the Presi­
dent assume "war emergency power," and staff members of 
Westinghouse's laboratories favored similar White House 
action. Although Roosevelt kept his own counsel when mak­
ing decisions, he took advantage of these interventionist 
petitions to include in his speech a national proclamation. 
Originally planned only to extricate cabinet members from 
their impolitic position on convoying, the address now be­
came a formal pronouncement on American foreign policy. 
Roosevelt, in his first major address in five months, de­
clared the existence of a national emergency on May 27, 
the same day as the Bismark sinking.
After the fireside chat businessmen congratulated 
Roosevelt on his call to the nation even though his silence 
on convoying, in reality, had set back interventionist aims. 
But he had accurately judged the public's anti-convoy feel­
ings, including those of moderate interventionists, who
21
C. I. Ochs to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 22,
1941, in ibid.
22
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promptly delivered their accolades to the White House.
From the business community came numerous assessments of 
the speech. The Wall Street broker, C. Frederick Childs, 
found it perfect for waking up "Maginot-Line minded" citi­
zens to the Hitlerian threat against the Western Hemisphere, 
Childs declared that Americans had no excuse for not unit­
ing behind the President, because the 1940 election had 
settled the question of Roosevelt's powers to deal with the 
crisis. The broker's remarks thus reflected the growing 
trend among businessmen to lay aside New Deal animosities 
and accept the President as the country's undisputed leader. 
To a large degree this rising sense of allegiance to the 
President, which became more evident in the months follow­
ing the "unlimited emergency" speech, resulted from the
Administration's pursuit of a middle course of action when
23
dealing with foreign policy.
Further evidence of business support came from 
RCA's David Sarnoff, who, after hearing the President's 
"historic address and momentous declaration," pledged his
23
C. P. Childs to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 
29, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
Box 200 B.
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support to the defense p r o g r a m . S .  J. Corbett, a Detroit
businessman, predicted that Americans of all political
shades would back the President, since the proclamation
had united the people of North and South America against 
25
the Nazis. Praise also came from J. Carroll Cone of
Pan American Airways, who held that "all good Americans"
2fibacked the proclamation. Enthusiasm reached greater
heights when Harry A. Builis, executive vice president of
General Mills, sent telegrams to his executives in field
operating divisions urging them to support the President.
Unlike the Quaker Oats men who turned their offices over
to America First, Bullis believed that Roosevelt's policy
offered the best chance of achieving justice and goodwill 
27
in the world.
References made in 1940 to industrial mobiliza­
tion and the general war effort as a cure-all for
24
Telegram, David sarnoff to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
May 28, 1941, Roosevelt papers, in ibid.
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depression ills such as unemployment now were rarely heard 
from businessmen stunned by the realities of the European 
war. The need to unite against the Axis for humanitarian 
purposes became more evident in the thinking of business
leaders throughout the nation. The Norfolk, Virginia,
28
chamber of Commerce voted to back the President, while 
a Chicago chain restaurant operator promised Roosevelt
29
that most Americans supported him even if it meant war.
Further evidence of the President's rising prestige among
businessmen came from the Dunedin, Florida, Chamber of
Commerce, which resolved to follow Roosevelt because he
had displayed a high degree of "statesmanship and courage"
. 3 0
in meeting previous crises.
Businessmen from the western states combined this 
new found trust in the President with a revival of World 
War I Wilsonian idealism. An Arkansas bank president re­
ported that he and his colleagues looked to Roosevelt as
28
F. E. Turin to Stephen Early, May 29, 1941, 
Roosevelt papers. President's Personal File, Box 200 b.
29
Bernard J. Elfman to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
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30
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31the savior of Christian civilization. A Fort Worth real­
tor, H. L. Collins, wrote that all Tarrant County supported 
Roosevelt, whom God had "raised up— for this Great Hour."
Collins offered his two sons to "The Holy Cause for Humanity"
32if the President decided on a declaration of war. Another
Texan, chairman of the board of a Galveston bank, told
Roosevelt that the public favored his "policy of courage,"
although he must constrain both capital and labor so that
self-seeking interests would not hinder the defense build- 
33
up. Businessmen, however, did not let labor-management 
problems dampen their spirits over the White House procla­
mation, as seen in a San Franciscan's assertion that with
34Roosevelt "Abraham Lincoln lives again."
Extreme interventionists shared little of this 
enthusiasm, and found disappointing the moderate tone of 
the proclamation. The Century Group and the more radical
31
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32
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Fight for Freedom Committee demanded an immediate declara­
tion of war, but could not even persuade the President to 
implement vital convoys to Britain. Businessmen, including 
Laurence D. Rockefeller, Marshall Field, Sinclair Weeks, 
and the truck manufacturer Walter White, provided leader­
ship and funds for Fight for Freedom, but failed to push 
Roosevelt along the road to intervention any faster than 
the President himself wished to go. Other businessmen, 
such as Joshua Meier, a small New York manufacturer, feared 
the President "pulled his punches" after the speech and 
seemed almost apologetic toward the proclamation the fol­
lowing day at his press conference, Meier warned Roosevelt 
that if Britain fell the President would be remembered not
as the Twentieth Century's Jefferson but rather as its dis-
35
credited Andrew Johnson.
Isolationist criticism of the May 27 speech came 
from segments of the business community as well as other 
groups, despite growing approval of Administration policy. 
The Journal questioned Roosevelt's sincerity because in 
its opinion the speech raised more questions than it
35
Joshua Meier to Stephen T. Early, May 29, 1941, 
Roosevelt papers. President's Personal File, Box 200 B.
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answered. The Journal found Roosevelt's explanation of the 
geographic limits of American defense vague and suspected 
that the Atlantic patrol had already assumed convoy duties 
on the shipping routes. Especially did the editors ques­
tion the absence of references to the Neutrality Law of 
1939 and its effect on the traditional freedom of the seas 
d o c t r i n e . T h e  Chronicle seconded the Journal and described 
the May 27 address as "another bit of skillfully managed 
showmanship" which left American policy as confused as be­
fore. The President had subverted the public will for peace, 
claimed the editors, to achieve his iniquitous purposes.
The proclamation, they complained, made isolationists ap-
37pear unpatriotic if they continued to oppose intervention.
Isolationists stood by their arguments that Roose­
velt had unlawfully seized "huge new arrogations of power" 
under the authority of the proclamation. The Chronicle 
rejected interventionist assertions that the President 
already possessed the powers implied in the declaration.
The editors insisted that Roosevelt could enact emergency 
conditions only if he believed war was imminent, which
36
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the Chronicle maintained was not the case. Individual 
businessmen followed the Chronicle's attack on the decla­
ration. John L. Kuhn, Jr., a New York stamp collection
O p
dealer, noted that it was "pregnant with . . . dramaturgy," 
and an Oklahoma banker charged that Roosevelt had further 
eroded the authority of Congress and destroyed the balance
Q Q
of power in the federal government.^
Extremist arguments did not obscure the proclama­
tion's significance to many Americans. Middle-of-the-road 
business editors placed the emergency call in its proper 
perspective. Business Week suggested that the President, 
far from gaining new powers from the proclamation, was
only trying to make Americans accept the need for tighter
40defense measures. Barron's conceded that the President 
wanted war materiel delivered to Britain at all costs, 
even if his policy forced the nation into war. The edi­
tors hastened to add, however, that Roosevelt was unready 
"to kiss away entirely" the chance that the United States
38John L. Kuhn, Jr., to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
May 28, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File, 
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39
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might help Britain with "little more than a naval brush 
or two" with the German navy. Dismissing the dictatorship 
charges against Roosevelt, Barron's and Business Week agreed 
that the presidential declaration served as a psychological 
tool to awaken the people to the seriousness of the Axis 
threat. Also, it made clear to Hitler that America had a 
strong leader ready to challenge the advances of the Third 
Reich. Roosevelt instinctively grasped for power, said 
Barron's, and for good reason. He needed reserve powers, 
such as calling the Navy into action, when coping with un­
expected crises.
As editors argued the merit of the proclamation, 
some speculated on the proclamation's effect on interna­
tional relations. Gas Age saw that the declaration con­
stituted another link in the course of events preparing 
America for her future imperial role in the world. As the 
Empire diminished, the editors predicted, much to their 
regret, that America would shoulder Britain's responsibili­
ties, regardless of the war's outcome. Gas Age, with most 
Americans, abhorred the thought of America assuming a
41
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larger role in world politics, regardless of the lure of
42
greater profits.
Other business groups assessed the emergency procla­
mation's effect on immediate mobilization problems. Lend- 
lease proved that rearmament, launched with such optimism 
in 1940, had fallen far behind the needs of the United States 
and the Allies. Business Week believed that Roosevelt de­
livered the May 27 speech primarily to "build a fire" under 
the lagging program. But the President had hindered produc­
tion when he applied his cautionary techniques, so success­
ful in the political realm, to the assembly lines of industry. 
Instead of following through the emergency declaration with 
a comprehensive mobilization plan, the President allowed re­
armament to drift throughout the summer. He then reorgan­
ized the Office of Production Management with little effect,
43
much to the consternation of industrialists.
After the overhauling of 0PM, industrialists still 
complained that the mobilization agency suffered from over­
lapping authority, divided leadership, and lack of power
42
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over other organizations, including OPACS and the War and 
Navy departments.^^ The President eventually appointed 
Vice President Wallace head of the new Board of Economic 
Defense, which found itself unable to deal with strikes; 
priorities, and other mobilization problems. Roosevelt's 
caution in reorganizing his own administrative agencies 
frustrated most industrialists and all interventionists 
as did his slowness in aligning America with the Allies on 
the battlefield. The President, however, still believed 
that he must exercise caution because most Americans thought 
of war in the context of the Nineteenth Century and opposed 
un-neutral acts, such as convoying belligerent m e r c h a n t m e n .^5 
Interventionists, as well as certain historians, insisted 
that public opinion polls favored intervention by as much 
as 68 per cent, but the statistics failed to reflect that 
the majority of Americans would never consider an actual 
declaration of war. The average citizen, although sympa­
thetic to the Allies, placed his faith in the ocean bar­
riers and, as had Europeans in 1914, considered war a distant, 
unreal manifestation which "can't happen here."
44
Industrial Mobilization for War, I, pp. 91, 92.
45Roosevelt to Norman Thomas, May 14, 1941, Roose­
velt Papers, Secretary's Pile, Box 82.
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Members of the business community also bear respon­
sibility for the slowness of rearmament. Some associated 
military involvement with economic dislocation and the col­
lapse of the capitalist system. Bard Priddy, a supporter 
of the New Deal and no "economic Bourbon," calculated that 
military participation in the war would cost $100 billion
and bring on national bankruptcy, and "Bankruptcy means
46American Socialism." Nation's Business agreed and edi­
torialized that involvement signaled the destruction of
the American way of life, especially the loss of economic 
47freedom. Gas Age added that daily it found more evidence 
that the nation had become part of a "semi-socialistic 
plan" which constituted a New Deal for the entire world.
The editors blamed this condition on the war economy that 
already gripped the United States and other nations. Worst 
of all. Gas Age predicted that the restrictions on busi­
ness would continue in effect after hostilities ended, which
meant there was no hope for a return to normalcy and tra-
48ditional capitalism. In light of this. Nation's Business
46
Bard Priddy to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 28, 
1941, Roosevelt papers. President's Personal File, Box 200.
47
Nation's Business, April, 1941, p. 13.
48
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questioned the value of the entire industrial mobilization 
plan as long as insolvency and "stagnation of personal 
initiative" threatened the nation.
Most businessmen, however, accepted national de­
fense as America's "number one job," despite what they 
viewed as the clash of opposing economic systems. Even 
Nation's Business, lamenting the shift from freedom of
action in business to an economy ruled by "defense consid-
49
erations," accepted this condition for the duration. But 
businessmen still felt that Roosevelt had singled them out 
to make most of the sacrifices for the defense program.
Iron Age bowed to the President's call to place guns be­
fore butter, and expected the government and politicians 
to eliminate pork barrel legislation and other forms of 
patronage in the name of defense.
Other businessmen attacked the Administration's 
anti-trust policy as an obstacle to mobilization. National 
Petroleum News insisted that industry should be allowed 
"freedom of cooperation" in order to achieve effective 
r e a r m am en t. Bu si ne s s had not counted on Thurmond Arnold,
49
Nation's Business, July, 1941, p. 15.
50
iron Age, CXLVII (June 5, 1941), p. 76.
^^National Petroleum News, XXXIII (June 11, 1941),
p. 11.
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Roosevelt's chief trust buster, who thwarted every effort 
to liberalize anti-trust policy. As a result, the Presi­
dent, caught between business-hating New Dealers and in­
dustrialists demanding less anti-trust action, avoided a 
decision throughout the war. The Oklahoma banker, George 
Reeves, an active Democrat, tried to reduce Arnold's in­
fluence by working through the party organization. He 
urged that the Administration protect private industry 
"as far as possible" during mobilization; the President 
ignored this Democratic voice from the provinces as com­
pletely as he did those close to the White House inner 
circle.
Roosevelt proved equally unresponsive to pleas
that he step into the labor-management disputes that plagued
rearmament. Many Americans viewed with alarm the strikes
that had been spreading throughout industry since January,
1941. In charging guilt for the crisis, William Knudsen
blamed both union leaders and business executives for the
impass that had developed in West coast shipping yards,
52the Allis-Chalmers plants, and the coal industry. Iron 
Age declared that strikes and bickering must cease, because 
the nation was at war. Production slowdowns could be
52
Vital Speeches, VII (April 15, 1941), p. 410.
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reduced, claimed the editors, if the President stopped
showing undue partiality to l a b o r , Nation's Business
branded the Administration's pro-union policy a major cause
for the continuation of old class hatreds which divided
the nation, in reply. Secretary Morgenthau commented that
defense industry strikes should not be curtailed since
there were "higher considerations than quick delivery" of
war goods. Business claimed that this proved the White
House had no intention of upsetting the Democratic politi-
54cal balance, regardless of mobilization.
Against this background of accusation and recrimi­
nation some businessmen surveyed the scene with a distorted 
sense of Wilsonian idealism. Gas Age called for great 
sacrifices by business to bolster rearmament, although 
the editors opposed the price curbs, priorities, wage ceil­
ings, and the "economic master plan" that made up the Ad­
ministration's mobilization system. These restrictions 
led the editors to ask if preserving democracy had become 
secondary to "saving our property and our lives." Right 
thinking and planning could avert this calamity, said Gas 
Age, if Roosevelt implemented a plan based on conservative
53
iron Age, CXLVII (March 20, 1941), p. 78.
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economic principles, including the encouragement of per­
sonal incentive and individual ability, and the protection 
55of capital. Sacrifices had to be made, to insure mobili­
zation's success, but as late as the summer of 1941 Ameri­
cans could not agree where to start cutting back on peace­
time activities. Business, labor, and the public must 
all share responsibility for delays in rearmament, in addi­
tion to the Administration which feared the political con­
sequences of pushing the nation faster than it wished to 
go into the strict regimen of a true war economy.
America's reluctance to assume the full burden of 
rearmament did not halt the onrush of events during the 
summer and fall of 1941. Roosevelt attempted to avoid 
offending either side in the great debate as he ordered 
the occupation of Iceland. This move elated intervention­
ists, but Prime Minister Churchill's announcement on July 
8 that British military units would remain on the island 
incensed their opponents. Speaking for many isolationists, 
the Journal accepted the Iceland naval base as part of 
national defense, but looked upon joint occupation with 
Britain as "collaboration" in a shooting war. The editors
55
Gas Age, LXXXVII (June 5, 1941), p. 24; (June
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added that polls reporting nine out of ten Americans op­
posed to a shooting war had not daunted the President in
his reckless pursuit of intervention. This, thought the 
Journal, proved its point that the President could not be 
trusted to conduct foreign policy in the best interests 
of the nation.
Despite isolationist danger signals, Roosevelt met 
with Churchill at sea on August 9, for the Atlantic Confer­
ence. The two leaders secretly agreed to give military
support to Russia and drew up the final arrangements for 
United States naval convoy escorts halfway across the At­
lantic, although Roosevelt did not commence the operation 
until September. For public consumption the conferees 
issued the Atlantic Charter, an updated version of Wilson's 
Fourteen Points, which stressed self-determination, the 
expansion of democracy, and opposition to aggression. Im­
mediately isolationists charged that Roosevelt's collabora­
tion with a belligerent endangered America's official status 
as a neutral. The Chronicle demanded to know what secret 
dealings Roosevelt had entered into with the British, since 
even a "suckling babe" would not believe that post-war 
affairs constituted the major topics of conversation at
^^The wall street Journal, July 3, 1941, p. 6.
291
the meeting. In reality Roosevelt had warded off Churchill's
attempts to win specific commitments from him, especially
a declaration of war on Germany. The Chronicle, however,
still suspected that the President had placed the country
57at the disposal of Britain for the duration of the war.
The Journal was less sure that Roosevelt had made 
secret commitments to Britain. However, the editors be­
lieved the Atlantic Charter had defined America's position 
toward the warring nations. The President, determined 
the Journal, had assumed the role of a belligerent when 
he joined the British leader in announcing post-war aims, 
in the thinking of the editors, Roosevelt had again placed 
the nation on the horns of a dilemma: no government could
share in the peace without participating in the fighting.
In light of this, the Journal found reassuring Henry Stim­
son 's statement of August 17, that American soldiers would 
be used for defensive purposes only, not military adventures 
in Europe and Asia. Taking Stimson's remarks at face value, 
the editors were encouraged that at least one high Washington 
official said that no deals had been made at the conference.^®
^^The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLIII 
(August 9, 1941), pp. 732, 733; (August 16, 1941), pp. 876-878.
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Of more interest to the business community were 
reports that the conference had produced lend-lease quotas 
for the next two years. Unfortunately, no industrialists 
had been invited to participate in the decisions. Iron 
Age ruefully noted that the presence of businessmen at 
the meeting, rather than certain "deadhead passengers," 
would have greatly aided industry in preparing to meet 
increased demands. Business deserved better treatment.
Iron Age believed, as management struggled to reorganize 
for rearmament in the face of priorities, price controls, 
and labor s t r i k e s . Business Week assumed the more opti­
mistic view that despite the absence of American industrial­
ists at the conference, those present had successfully 
established lend-lease needs for the next two years. The 
editors welcomed this move because it answered business­
men's complaints about the military's traditional reluc­
tance to commit itself on anticipated requirements. With 
quotas projected through 1943, industry could "move up 
smoothly to full-tilt operation.
Before this optimum condition materialized, other
59
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^^Business Week, August 23, 1941, p. 7.
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production problems first had to be solved. Businessmen 
again urged the President to reorganize government agencies 
dealing with rearmament in order to increase production 
efficiency. Since World War I Bernard Baruch and others 
had advocated the creation of an industrial czar to direct 
any future industrial mobilization, but their entreaties 
always fell on deaf presidential ears. After Roosevelt 
shelved his own War Resources Board report in 1939, he 
created the weak National Defense Advisory Commission, but 
had to concede its failure in solving mobilization problems, 
The Office of Production Management, NDAC's successor, 
fared no better in meeting demands for the increased pro­
duction that the Atlantic Conference agreements required. 
Some members of the business world believed that the Presi­
dent, spurred on by these new obligations, would create a 
super defense agency to rule over 0PM, OPACS, and lend- 
lease. Barron * s announced with optimism that the President 
would soon affix his "FDR" to the order creating the new 
"Supreme Defense Policy Board" to direct mobilization.^^ 
Optimism soon turned to disappointment, however, as the 
President resorted to his game of caution and created in­
stead the Supplies Priorities and Allocation Board. With
^^Barron *s, XXI (August 18, 1941), p. 4.
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this agency Roosevelt hoped to improve the situation with­
out infringing upon labor, business, or Washington bureau­
cratic interests. Doomed to failure by this mandate, SPAB 
never became the supreme headquarters for industrial mobili­
zation, and was incorporated into the War Production Board 
in 1942.
Businessmen and other Americans also speculated 
on further agreements the President may have made at the 
AtlcUitic Conference. They suspected that the President 
planned to extend lend-lease to the Soviet union, still 
considered a pariah nation by many Americans. The Journal 
voiced the common argument that Roosevelt could not expect 
to rid the world of totalitarianism if he aided the most 
tyrannical of governments, the Kremlin Communists. Aside 
from political ideologies, the Journal added that Ameri­
cans assumed lend-lease was meant for Britain only, because 
nothing had been said about helping Russia. Although H.R. 
1776 set no limits upon which nations might receive lend- 
lease, the Journal argued that the United States lacked 
the resources necessary to extend aid to the Russians. 
American and British requirements already overtaxed indus­
try, said the editors, which left nothing for the Soviets
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or other potential recipients.
Anti-Roosevelt critics also attacked what they 
called the President's slack methods of running the govern­
ment. In their estimation, the Atlantic Conference changed 
nothing and New Deal confusion still reigned in Washington. 
The Chronicle doubted that an effective rearmament program 
had a chance of survival as long as the government continued 
the "hoarding" of cotton and wheat to bolster commodity 
prices. And with organized labor "plainly bent upon get­
ting all it can" from the rearmament program the chronicle
63considered unthinkable ventures into foreign wars. Nor 
did Banking see any hope for straightening out the disorder 
held over from New Deal days. The myriad problems that 
banks had faced before were small indeed to those that 
lay ahead, said the magazine. It predicted that govern­
ment would become even more powerful and further hamper 
business with unpredictable rules and regulations.®^
Despite continuing criticism from conservative
^^The Wall Street Journal, August 1, 1941, p. 4. 
6 3The Commercial and Financial chronicle, CLIII 
(August 16, 1941), pp. 876-878.
64Banking, Journal of American Banker's Associa­
tion, XXXIV (August, 1941), p. 75.
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forces, the business community had largely accepted Roose­
velt's foreign policy by the time of the Atlantic Conference. 
Hitler's gains during the spring and summer of 1941 had 
awakened businessmen and Americans in general to the need 
for a stronger stand against German aggression. The public 
had finally caught up with Roosevelt, albeit not with ex­
treme interventionists, in foreign policy formulation.
Among businessmen the new outlook was most evident in The 
Bankers Magazine, which declared that the President and 
the Congress must have full freedom to determine the proper 
course of action in time of crisis. Although public opin­
ion had not united completely behind the President, the 
editors maintained that "we can safely trust our elected 
representatives" in the performance of their duties.
The President detected the new ground swell in 
support of his policies and decided to initiate the long 
awaited Atlantic convoys. When the Germans torpedoed the 
destroyer Greer on September 4, Roosevelt found the pre­
text he needed to begin the operation. Still obeying his 
cautious instinct, Roosevelt approached the issue indirectly. 
He accused the Germans of piracy on the high seas and of
^^The Banker's Magazine, CXLIII (August, 1941),
pp. 95, 96.
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aggression against the United States, but did not actually 
announce to the public the Navy's new convoy duties. In­
stead, in his September 11 "shoot on sight" speech, Roose­
velt revealed his order for the Navy to fire on Axis ships 
venturing into American waters. Pollsters reported that 
70 per cent of the people supported the President's actions. 
This allowed him to discount the Journal's astute observa­
tion that the British and the American interventionists 
must be equally delighted in that the Germans chose that 
moment to attack the Greer. No more convenient an excuse, 
thought the editors, could have been devised for extending 
interventionist policy.
Many isolationists felt they were slipping into 
the minority during the last months of the great debate, 
but this did not silence their attacks on the President.
The Chronicle summed up their thoughts in its charge that 
Roosevelt was an "unrelentingly stubborn, utterly war-minded 
President." The Chronicle and other isolationists claimed 
that the President had duped the public into following him 
down the interventionist path to the brink of war. isola­
tionists, the Chronicle decided, had to convince the
^^The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 1941,
p. 4.
298
"unthinking masses" that Rooseveltian policies must be op­
posed, else involvement in the war was inevitable.
Many businessmen and Americans in general no longer 
responded to the isolationists' exhortations. The Banker's 
Magazine stated that every patriotic American must stand 
by the side of the President in the war crisis.®® Business 
Week characterized the pledges of loyalty to the Chief 
Executive as the natural result of his dramatic shoot on 
sight order. However, in its accurate estimation of the 
speech the magazine reminded its readers that the Presi­
dent's remarks were an anti-climax, since the Administra­
tion had accepted in August the certainty of eventual mili­
tary involvement.^^
Encouraged by the favorable response to his Sep­
tember 11 address, the President took the last "short of 
war" step before entry into actual hostilities. On October 
9 he proposed revision of the Neutrality Law, although he 
cautiously asked Congress only for permission to arm
67
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merchant ships and, later, to send vessels into combat 
zones. The President's wisdom in not pushing Congress 
for complete repeal of neutrality was evident in his nar­
row margin of victory in the November 7 vote. A more rash 
approach on his part might have caused his eighteen vote 
margin to evaporate in the face of isolationist opposition. 
Taking the opposite view, isolationists boasted that the 
President's bare victory proved their cause was not dead 
but actually gaining in strength. The Journal thought this 
claim correct, because the sole reason for the Administra­
tion's success, aside from the President's usual devious 
tactics, was that congress had not been given the clear- 
cut question of a declaration of war. Even with this ad­
vantage the Journal insisted that Democratic loyalty had
70swung the vote in the President's favor.
Barron's accurately appraised Administration policy 
when it reported that Roosevelt still wanted to keep Ameri­
can troops out of the war. He had popular support for 
his short of war policy, the editors realized, but they 
knew millions of Americans would be relieved if the Presi­
dent told them he did not anticipate taking the nation
70The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1941, p.
6; November 14, 1941, p. 4.
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71into the war. Elements of truth existed in the think­
ing of both Journal and Barron's editors. With the altera­
tion of the Neutrality Law Roosevelt had used up his last 
tools of diplomacy, leaving only the possibility of war, 
as the Journal maintained. But as long as the President 
did not ask for all-out war against the Axis Barron's was 
correct in saying his policy had the approval of the Ameri­
can majority.
Interventionist hopes clashed with isolationist 
doubts in the weeks following the Neutrality Act's modifi­
cation. Both sides in the great debate stepped up their 
campaigns to sway public opinion, but by November, 1941 
the united States had set a collision course with the Axis 
powers and war seemed inevitable. Isolationists still dis­
trusted the President and the Journal, on December 6, de­
manded to know if Roosevelt had organized a new American 
Expeditionary Force to fight abroad. The Journal received 
its answer the next morning when the Japanese bombed Pearl 
Harbor.
The sneak attack united the business community and 
all Americans behind the president. Robert E. Wood dissolved
71 Barron's, XXI (December 8, 1941), p. 4.
72The wall Street Journal, December 6, 1941, p. 4.
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the America First committee and pledged his support to the
President. Albert W. Hawkes, president of the united States
Chamber of Commerce, backed the Administration because
there was "no end conceivable other than victory for the
73
things we, as a people, stand for." Business Week shed 
its ambivalent attitude toward presidential policies and 
announced that all else was secondary to winning the war.^'^
The stakes of victory, emphasized Barron * s, made necessary 
greater national unity than in the past, because of the
75"struggle for world power" in which the nation was involved.
To insure victory Banking declared that war had become "our
76
first order of business." Even the Journal acknowledged 
that Japan had begun the war, but "we shall finish it."^^
The only noticeable challenge to unity came from 
the Chronicle. It reported that after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor "unity in Washington lasted just about six hours."
7 3Albert W. Hawkes to Franklin D. Roosevelt, De­
cember 13, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal 
File, Box 1483.
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And then what the editors considered traditional Roosevel­
tian confusion again prevailed in the capital. The Chron­
icle saw little hope for a viable policy because Roosevelt 
"still thinks fundamentally in the terms of Hitlerc"^^
After lend-lease became law, businessmen and many 
other Americans realized the nation had come to the brink 
of war. Isolationist businessmen fought convoys and ex­
coriated the emergency proclamation, which they labeled 
White House instruments for dragging the nation into war. 
These critics ignored Nazi aggressions that had forced the 
united States to take a more active part in the world con­
flict. They claimed that Roosevlet had deliberately pushed 
America into the crisis because his hunger for power made 
him oblivious to the risks of war. in contrast, interven­
tionist businessmen cheered Roosevelt's pro-Ally policy, 
with the extremists among them advocating immediate mili­
tary involvement. In particular, the darkening war clouds 
expanded Roosevelt's support in the business press, with 
some editors pledging their loyalty to the President.
As each foreign policy question arose in the summer 
and fall of 1941, most businessmen urged the President to
7 8
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303
reorganize the mobilization program by placing an indus­
trial czar in charge of production. But the President's 
political instincts made him advance cautiously at best 
in this direction. He knew that a rash move on his part 
might upset the delicate balance among labor, management, 
and other groups and set back his defense program. To 
alleviate his predicament, Roosevelt resorted to the crea­
tion of a maze of commissions and boards to carry out re­
armament.
Despite its contempt for Washington bureaucracy, 
business strove to meet defense needs through increased 
production. This expanded war profiteering opportunities, 
but businessmen still regarded income from defense produc­
tion as a short term venture and basically injurious to the 
health of industry. Fewer comments came from business on 
the inevitability of some profiteering during mobilization 
than had the year before, when industry had first turned 
to reorganizing for defense. Executives still remembered 
Alfred P. Sloan's admonition that business must not again 
be blamed for involving America in a war. Businessmen 
were sincere in their desire to support defense without 
accumulating excess gains for themselves. Those without 
pronounced views on foreign policy hoped, as did most
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Americans, that in some way Roosevelt could remove the war 
threat from America's doorstep. But they had no proposals 
for accomplishing this goal. They simply followed the 
President, closing their eyes to the increasing likelihood 
of involvement. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor finally 
settled the issue for these businessmen as well as for the 
President himself.
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION
Businessmen often have been cast in the role of 
scapegoat, which has placed men of commerce and industry 
on the defensive throughout the Twentieth Century. Social 
critics have frequently blamed the business community for 
the unsatisfactory condition of a large share of mankind. 
The businessman's prominence in the modern world made him 
an inviting target for reformers frequently imbued with 
Marxian theory, who condemned the business community as 
social parasites. The Nineteenth Century Robber Barons, 
ignoring the problems of the industrial age and displaying 
their own wealth in all its vulgarity, added meaning to the 
indictment against the capitalists. Of particular conse­
quence after world war I was the warmonger thesis, which 
contended that businessmen manipulated international af­
fairs and instigated wars for the sake of greater profits.
Many Americans accepted the theory that a mono­
lithic business world controlled the international scene 
in its own interests. A leading interpretation of the 
reasons the united States entered World War I was that the 
country succumbed to the influences of greedy bankers and
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armament makers. This continued in the 1920's and was 
reinforced by the 1935 Nye Committee report, which implied 
that businessmen might contrive similar machinations in 
the future. When war clouds formed over Europe in 1939, 
many Americans presumed that the business community would 
grasp at this new opportunity to make profits from blood 
money, as Senator Nye had predicted. A study of available 
evidence indicates, however, that no business conspiracy 
developed in the united States. General Robert E. Wood 
maintained throughout his life that no conspiracy existed 
among businessmen to maneuver the nation into war. The 
General went so far as to say that industry had no fear 
of being condemned as warmongers, a supposition easy enough 
for an isolationist businessman to make.^ In 1939 and after, 
businessmen were motivated by more than economic interests.
A rich background of religious and educational training 
developed a broad, humanitarian outlook in Thomas Lament 
and others who sought to influence Administration policy. 
Their basic, although conservative, faith in democracy made 
them favor Britain over Germany, as did most Americans be­
fore Pearl Harbor. At any rate, American businessmen were 
not of the same mind on foreign policy. Small business
^Robert E. Wood to writer. May 9, 1969.
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often opposed the aims of big business because the two 
groups had different aims.
Small firms traditionally feared big business 
competition, and now they faced a struggle with the great 
corporations over sources of supply and defense contracts. 
Until 1941 big businessmen, the usual target of warmonger­
ing charges, divided on policy, from the question of Social 
Security to the extension of military aid to Great Britain. 
Prominent businessmen played important roles on both sides 
of the great foreign policy debate prior to the Pearl Har­
bor attack. Opposing isolationist Robert E. Wood was Thomas 
W. Lamont, allied with the interventionists. The paradox 
of Wood, a big businessman, presiding as chairman of America 
First, never detracted from the General's standing among 
isolationists, who regarded him more as a large scale dry 
goods merchant than a villainous munitions maker.
Businessmen needed to develop a greater unity among 
themselves to further their own aims, but during the great 
debate the business community never possessed the inner will 
to unite on foreign policy, or the force to influence the 
public in the manner of the arch-isolationist, William Ran­
dolph Hearst, and other opinion makers. Few Americans 
thought of churches, labor unions, or other American
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institutions as great monolithic entities, but the spread 
of Marxian theory led many Americans to regard business 
in such a light.
As the great debate unfolded, businessmen failed 
to settle upon a foreign relations policy because they dis­
agreed strongly on what should be America's position in the 
world. Four basic groups within the business community at­
tempted to influence the President's foreign policy. In 
the first category were those who opposed everything presi­
dent Roosevelt stood for, both in his domestic and foreign 
policies. Resentful over Roosevelt's dubbing them the 
economic royalists of America, they distrusted the Presi­
dent and his New Deal reforms and regarded his foreign 
policy as the work of a meddling incompetent. The editors 
of The Commercial and Financial Chronicle illustrated this 
position as they denounced Roosevelt's foreign policy as 
strongly as they had his domestic program. The editors 
condemned the destroyer deal, lend-lease, and other inter­
ventionist policies as unconstitutional and a presidential 
usurpation of power.
A second category of businessmen favored the New 
Deal but denounced Roosevelt's interventionist foreign 
policy. These businessmen endorsed the domestic reforms of
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the 1930's, but resisted the new foreign policy. Many New 
Deal adherents opposed intervention because they feared 
Roosevelt would channel funds into international affairs 
at the expense of domestic programs and end reform in America. 
Businessmen were less concerned with this than with what 
they considered the rejection of the isolationist tenets 
in Washington's Farewell Address. They saw interventionism 
leading to the establishment of entangling alliances with 
European governments. Robert E. Wood embodied this think­
ing. Wood, a sincere patriot who had supported the National 
Recovery Administration and other New Deal measures, so 
abhorred the idea of American involvement in another Euro­
pean war that he broke with Roosevelt and became the leader 
of the America First Committee, the major force attacking 
the President's policy of involvement-
Other businessmen had opposed the President's 
domestic policies from their inception, but unhesitatingly 
embraced his new internationalist foreign policy. The 
businessmen of this group appear as the same self-seeking 
capitalists of legendary fame who would support any policy 
that guaranteed war profits, in reality, the position of 
businessmen in 1940 was more complicated, and historical 
evidence does not sustain this simplistic position. The
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businessmen who climbed aboard the Roosevelt bandwagon 
only for the journey into interventionism had often been 
supporters of the American Liberty League. This rabidly 
anti-Roosevelt organization was mainly an instrument of 
the Du Ponts, the family traditionally associated with 
munitions making in America. With much to gain from war 
business, the Du Fonts feared criticism of their activities 
and rarely attached themselves to intervention. Instead, 
James P. Warburg, J. P. Morgan, and George B. Cutten, presi­
dent of Colgate University.t represented League members who
clearly expressed their desire for involvement by joining
2
the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
A final category of businessmen favored the entire 
Roosevelt program, both domestic and foreign. J. Lionberger 
Davis declared that he had always been a New Dealer and 
favored all the Roosevelt reforms instituted since 1933.
Soon after formation of the Committee to Defend America, 
Davis joined the local chapter in St. Louis and became its 
vice-chairman. Former United States Chamber of Commerce 
president, Henry I. Harriman, also supported the President's
2
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A History of the American Liberty League, 1934-1940 (Boston: 
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311
domestic and foreign policies. Harriman had defended the 
New Deal before his business friends, and continued to 
support the White House when foreign affairs became more 
important to Roosevelt after 1937. Although not active 
in the Committee to Defend America, Harriman backed inter­
ventionism with frequent letters of encouragement to Roose­
velt.
Businessmen generally fell into one of these four 
groups, but certain leaders, such as Bernard Baruch, defy 
simple categorization. The financier supported cash and 
carry, an isolationist policy, and discounted the possi­
bility that the United States economy would be discomfited 
in a trade war with a victorious Germany. Baruch also 
advocated an American defense system, as did many noninter­
ventionists, but his internationalist, if not intervention­
ist, thinking proves he was not an isolationist, in reality 
most interventionist businessmen backed cash and carry to 
insure some means of supplying the Allies with needed ma­
terials and, like isolationists, also favored a stronger 
defense system. In contrast to the isolationists, Baruch 
and others insisted on realistic defense measures, which 
necessitated expenditures far above what Robert E. Wood and 
his allies in Congress wished to spend.
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The distinction between interventionists and iso­
lationists appears to have been a question of degree. Ex­
tremists in both camps fit a simple pattern. Hard-core 
isolationists opposed all aid to the Allies and wanted 
little or no money spent on American defenses. On the 
other hand, extreme interventionists demanded military in­
volvement to defeat the Axis. Between these two groups 
stood most businessmen, and the majority of Americans. They 
favored a moderate foreign policy, best described as "cen­
trist" in nature. The Allies deserved aid, but centrists 
detested the idea of American soldiers being sacrificed on 
foreign soil, even in defense of democracy. Robert E. Wood 
and William Allen White agreed on this and differed mainly 
on the degree of aid Britain deserved and on the size of 
an adequate defense budget for the united states. Although 
their ideas on foreign affairs appeared far apart, both 
accepted the basic interventionist principle that Britain 
should be aided. Starting with this common belief, the 
centrists should have reconciled their differences and 
pressed for a positive foreign policy. The result might 
have been a viable policy instead of one noted mainly for 
its drift. Had Roosevelt received the united backing of 
this middle of the road majority, he would have dealt with
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Axis advances in stronger fashion. Instead, the feuding 
centrist groups, such as America First and the Committee 
to Defend America, made Roosevelt adopt a cautious course 
of action. As a result, the President's timid advances 
toward intervention did little to challenge the Axis threat 
to democracy in the early war years.
Many involved themselves in the foreign policy 
debate, but others supported preparedness without partici­
pating in the great debate. These business leaders worked 
in industrial mobilization and left the speechmaking on 
foreign policy to the old internationalists James p. War­
burg, Thomas Lamont, and Thomas J. Watson. Only Henry 
Ford, among the captains of industry, refused to partici­
pate before Pearl Harbor. As an isolationist. Ford refused 
to build Spitfire engines for Britain as long as the united 
States was not at war with Germany. To him, this would 
have been unneutral, giving Hitler provocation for attack­
ing America. William Knudsen and his army of dollar-a-year 
men applied their expert knowledge to the production line, 
and not to pronouncements on foreign policy, a wise move 
considering Knudsen's noted remark that the European war 
was just a street fight on an international scale. In con­
trast to the Knudsen group, Thomas Lamont and his associates
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had been active in furthering American participation in 
world affairs since the 1920's. Failing to involve the 
united States in any degree prior to World War II, this 
group pressed for greater international understanding even 
during the war years of the 1940's. Their efforts were 
rewarded when they and others seeking world peace convinced 
the major powers to establish the United Nations in 1945.
As for mobilization, the Administration placed the 
major responsibility for industrial production upon the 
shoulders of Knudsen and his business associates. They 
assumed these duties without hesitation but soon found them­
selves under fire from anti-business forces claiming that 
industry was dragging its feet in mobilizing for defense.
The business world traditionally feared any dislocation of 
the economy, which made industry reluctant to begin mass 
production of war goods if America had a chance to remain 
at peace. War profits were illusory, businessmen claimed, 
and offered no compensation for the inflation and for the 
depressions that followed hostilities. After the NDAC was 
established, businessmen realized that they must accept in­
dustrial mobilization, and they began to gear their plants 
for war production. War profiteering, the bane of the 
business world, became a vital issue. Businessmen criticized
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high excess profits taxation, and won a moderate victory 
in the Revenue Act of October, 1940. But the threat of 
high taxation was not the sole cause of business reticence 
concerning war production; nor was the reticence due to 
the belief that war business and the resultant expansion 
in the long run were injurious to industry, until the rise 
of the NDAC businessmen still lived in fear of Gerald P.
Nye's report of 1935. They had no desire to be branded as 
warmongers.
In assessing responsibility for the slowness of 
American mobilization, and the lack of preparedness in 
December, 1941, Robert E. Wood and the isolationists must 
accept a major share of the guilt. Regardless of their 
sincerity, they caused Americans to discount the Axis threat. 
This resulted in an undersized preparedness program, in­
adequate as the basis for a strong foreign policy and in­
sufficient as a line of defense for the nation. Arguments 
blaming the industrial slowdown in 1940 on business's re­
taliation against the excess profits tax contain an element 
of truth. William Knudsen, however, maintained that pro­
duction had increased, as illustrated by the trebling of 
machine tool production. The delay due to the excess profits 
tax debate totaled three months in 1940. As Barron's
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suggested. President Roosevelt must bear partial respon­
sibility for not forcing congress to act on an acceptable 
tax bill after the fall of France, The key to the delay 
rested on the attitude of Congress, and the nation in gen­
eral, and even the president. No one appreciated the neces­
sity for immediate and drastic measures to prepare the 
nation for war, regardless of domestic political consequences, 
The unlimited national emergency proclamation was ten months 
away when businessmen and the New Dealers were debating the 
excess profits tax, which indicated that American leader­
ship did not consider American involvement imminent, despite 
the war warnings of the interventionists. The nation as a 
whole was paralyzed with fear of the Axis and, paradoxically, 
blind to defense requirements.
Attempts by isolationists and interventionists to 
influence the President's foreign policy decisions succeeded 
only to the extent that Roosevelt slowed down intervention­
ism to pacify the advocates of noninvolvement. Hindsight 
suggests that the President needed not to have been as cau­
tious in advancing his foreign policy as he thought before 
Pearl Harbor. At the time, however, he correctly judged 
isolationist strength in and out of Congress as strong 
enough to require a slow advance toward interventionism.
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Businessmen hoping to influence the conduct of foreign 
policy worked through the national organizations dedicated 
to this purpose, such as the committees headed by Robert 
Wood and William Allen White. No particular segment of 
the business community, however, predominated in either 
committee. For throughout the nation, with the spector of 
the Great Depression still in their minds, involvement in 
hostilities was a possibility capitalists preferred to 
ignore, as did most Americans, When the dangers of war 
became more evident they accepted the need for prepared­
ness to the same extent as did the general public, because, 
as Thomas Lament said, businessmen were just as patriotic 
as other Americans, "no more, no less."
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